

ANTITHESIS

A Review of Contemporary Christian Thought and Culture

INSIDE:
Copyright Challenge,
Feminism's Failings,
Dissent on Deception,
and a Debate with Atheists
Parsons and Martin

"All that miserable
tale of the Devil and Eve,
and an Intercessor with
the childish mummeries
of the God of the Jews, is
irreconcilable with the
knowledge of the stars."

Percy Shelley

"The heavens are
telling of the glory of
God; and their expanse
is declaring the work of
His hands. Day to day
pours forth speech, and
night to night reveals
knowledge. There is no
speech, nor are there
words, where their voice
is not heard."

Psalms 19:1-3

The Other Shoe:

Copyright and the Reasonable Use of Technology

John Frame.....10

The Approaching Storm

An Overview of Scottish Presbyterian History — Pt. 7

L. Anthony Curto.....13

The Feminist Flaw

J. Daryl Charles.....18

Challenging "Compassion" in Crisis Childbearing

Susan & Marvin Olasky.....24

My "Final" Offer:

A Moral Critique of Bluff in Negotiations

David Hagopian.....30

July/August 1991
Volume II, Number 4
\$4.00

ANTITHESIS

I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; He shall bruise you on the head, and you shall bruise him on the heel.

Genesis 3:15

My covenant is with you, and you shall be the father of a multitude of nations. No longer shall your name be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham; For I will make you the father of a multitude of nations...and kings shall come forth from you. And I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to your descendants after you.

Genesis 17:5-7

Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is one Lord. And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might.

Deuteronomy 6:4,5

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge; fools despise wisdom and instruction.

Proverbs 1:7

Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, for He has visited us and accomplished redemption for His people, and has raised up a horn of salvation for us in the house of David His servant — As He spoke by the mouth of His holy prophets from old — Salvation from our enemies, and from the hand of all who hate us; To show mercy toward our fathers, and to remember His holy covenant — the oath which He swore to Abraham our father.

Luke 1:68-73

And Jesus came up and spoke to them, saying, "All authority has been given to Me in heaven and earth. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations."

Matthew 28:18,19

We are destroying speculations and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and we are taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ.

II Corinthians 10:5

Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?

I Corinthians 1:20

Though there are very many nations all over the earth,...there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities,...one consisting of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God....To the City of Man belong the enemies of God,...so inflamed with hatred against the City of God.

Augustine

Without Christ, sciences in every department are vain....The man who knows not God is vain, though he should be conversant with every branch of learning. Nay more, we may affirm this too with truth, that these choice gifts of God — expertness of mind, acuteness of judgment, liberal sciences, and acquaintance with languages, are in a manner profaned in every instance in which they fall to the lot of wicked men.

John Calvin

Christ is exalted in his sitting at the right hand of God, in that as God-man, he is advanced to the highest favour with God the Father, with all fulness of joy, glory and power over all things in heaven and earth; and doth gather and defend his church, and subdue their enemies; furnisheth his ministers and people with gifts and graces, and maketh intercession for them.

Westminster Larger Catechism

There can be no appeasement between those who presuppose in all their thought the sovereign God and those who presuppose in all their thought the would-be sovereign man....Rather than wedding Christianity to the philosophies of Aristotle or Kant, we must openly challenge the apostate philosophic constructions of men by which they seek to suppress the truth about God, themselves, and world,...so that we may present Christ without compromise to men who are dead in trespasses and sins, that they might have life and that they might worship and serve the Creator more than the creature.

Cornelius Van Til

The Christian cannot be satisfied so long as any human activity is either opposed to Christianity or out of connection with Christianity. Christianity must pervade not merely all nations but also all of human thought.

J. Gresham Machen

ANTITHESIS

Antithesis (ISSN 1049-8737), a review of contemporary Christian thought and culture, is published bi-monthly, six issues per year, by Covenant Community Church of Orange County, O.P.C. (4521 Campus Dr. #349, Irvine, CA 92715).

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Subscription rates for individuals are \$18.50 for one year, \$34.00 for two years. The special student rate is \$13.00 for one year, \$25.00 for two years. Foreign subscriptions are \$21.00 for one year, \$39.00 for two years. Institutional subscriptions are \$29.00 for one year, \$39.00 for two years. Individual copies and back-issues are \$4.00. Subscription requests and back-issue orders, and address changes should be directed to:

Antithesis
4521 Campus Dr., #435
Irvine, CA 92715
or (714) 744-0238

SUBMISSION OF ARTICLES

We invite readers to submit articles dealing with all aspects of Christian thought and practice. Articles should be typewritten or computer printed, and double spaced. Notes must contain full bibliographic data.

A writer's introduction for *Antithesis* is available upon request. Manuscripts not accepted for publication will be returned only if they are accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope.

Editorial correspondence, reviews, and articles should be forwarded to:

Antithesis
P.O. Box 503
Pullman, WA 99163

Compuserve I.D. - 71621,3501

© by Covenant Community Church of Orange County 1990. All rights reserved. Permission to copy articles for personal or classroom use is hereby granted. No other reproductions are permitted, except by written permission of the publisher.

Articles appearing in *Antithesis* express the views of the respective authors and not necessarily the views of any other persons.

Editor

Douglas M. Jones III

Senior Editors

L. Anthony Curto
David G. Hagopian
Ellery C. Stowell
Greg L. Bahnsen

Contributing Editors

Wesley J. Callihan
David W. Hall
Thomas Schirrmacher
Douglas J. Wilson

Circulation Manager

Karen Cunningham

Technical Editors

Jamie Hagopian Jolee White
Vicki White Nancy Wilson

Production Assistants

Scott Lehart Mike Nelson
Teri Lehart Stacy Nelson
Paula Jones Willie Winnick
Carol Winnick

Contents

Feature Articles

10 The Other Shoe: Copyright and the Reasonable Use of Technology

John Frame

Copyright laws are not founded upon prohibitions against theft but rather upon special privileges for the few.

13 The Approaching Storm An Overview of Scottish Presbyterian History - Pt. 7

L. Anthony Curto

Broken oaths, cowardly betrayals, and internal dissensions bring storms of persecutions to the Covenanters.

18 The Feminist Flaw

J. Daryl Charles

Feminist antagonism is driven by a non-Christian fixation with rights, but a sound theology of the cross liberates us from politicizing the purposes of God.

24 Challenging 'Compassion' In Crisis Childbearing

Susan & Marvin Olasky

A Biblical notion of compassion stands as a challenge to the Pro-Life movement and the statist spirit of our age.

30 My 'Final' Offer: A Moral Critique of Bluff In Negotiations

David Hagopian

Some of the harder questions about commonly accepted forms of "bluffing" demand a more careful Biblical analysis.

Departments

2 Observing the Current

Dual party paternalism, the injustice of annihilationism, two cheers for acid rain, a Bronx cheer for the Rainbow Man, and a subjective nod for Franky Schaeffer.

6 In Other Words

Wes Callihan's fiction gives us a breather in New Orleans.

8 Christianity Yesterday

An excerpt from a W.G.T. Shedd sermon demonstrates why the gospel will triumph.

38 For the Record

Doug Wilson shows how those who oppose foreordination destroy free will.

40 Issue and Interchange

Doug Jones rejects non-Christian thought but Keith Parsons and Michael Martin still want to hold on.

48 Journal Journal

David Hall reviews recent theological essays of note.

51 Book Review

Norlan DeGroot welcomes Oskar Skarsaune's The Reality of the Incarnation.

52 Novelty, Nonsense, and Non-Sequiturs

Notable truths, fallacies, and arrogance making the rounds.

Observing the Current...

Democrats and Republicans Join Hands in Exacerbating Racial Tensions

"Civil rights" or "civil liberties" once meant the protections one held in person or property against the intrusion of the civil government, but now, of course, these designations refer to the subjugation of individual property rights to group rights, primarily sexual or racial. This well-known shift came to prominence largely in the Warren court era in its effort to strike down racist Jim Crow practices in state and later private institutions.

In and of itself, a court or legislature in its *proper* jurisdiction would be acting justly if it sought to do away with racist state restrictions given the Biblical charge to, "Judge righteously between a man and his fellow countrymen, or the alien who is with him. You shall not show partiality in judgment; you shall hear the small and the great alike" (Deut. 1:16, 17).

But the transition from private to group "civil rights" arose in a rather statist century in which racism could easily prosper given that the

potentially powerful sanctions of the marketplace, church, family, and individual eroded by themselves or were subjugated by the civil government. Hence, the only means the collectivist vision could imagine for righting racial discrimination was the coercive hand of the civil government.

But the civil government only exacerbates issues for which it was not designed to handle (e.g., prohibition), and it was not designed to legislate over issues of the heart, even race hatred. In the case of race discrimination, civil authorities attempted, in part, to fight racist attitudes by externally coercing communities to conform, all the while allowing resentment to fester. And we wonder, why after all the decades of struggle, we now face renewed outbreaks of racial violence and hatred.

Yet since collectivists are collectivists they cannot conceive of any manner of solving the tensions except by means of more civil action: "We must never allow the clock to be

turned back on race relations in our country," declared Richard Gephardt before the House passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The recent rancor between Republicans and Democrats over the civil rights bill is in reality an intramural debate. Both sides have bought into the collectivist vision and only differ in degree.

For example, John Dunne, Assistant Attorney General for civil rights, defended the Bush administration's proposed civil rights measure by arguing that, "it will strengthen civil rights laws,... overturn two of five disputed 1989 Supreme Court decisions," and provide that "victims... can recover \$150,000 above the normal relief."

We can be sure that the final compromise bill will serve to further poison racial relations in the long term. Perhaps the only short term hope is that when the President finally approves some collectivist bill, we may see it overturned at some point by his own Supreme Court hopeful, Clarence Thomas.

DMJ

Why No Joy Over the Acid Rain Report?

We now have another good example of why it is foolish to lurch into imprudent environmental legislation. The National Acid Precipitation Assessment Project spent ten years, and over 500 million dollars, studying acid rain. After all that study, it turns out that "acid rain" which is "poisoning" rivers and lakes is in fact a result of water filtering through naturally decaying vegetation and has virtually no adverse effects on the environment.

The results came out last June, but were suppressed so that they wouldn't threaten the passage of the Clean Air Act. In other words, the results of a scientific study were censored (and the naive gasp) in the interests of an ideological, religious agenda. This shouldn't be surprising; our eco-fascists generally conduct their political activity as though there were little difference between proof and assertion. We help them out by failing to respond with appropriate

skepticism. Why, and how, did we become so gullible? We must recover the art of asking discomfiting questions: "Exactly how big was the hole in the ozone layer in 1310?" "What was the average global temperature in 1776?"

Of course the answer is that we don't know how big the hole was, and we don't know what the global temperature was. The relevant corollary should be obvious; those in a dither about ozone depletion and global warming are, scientifically speaking, talking through their hats.

Is this saying that such things couldn't possibly be a concern? Of course not. It is simply saying that such questions should be researched by careful scientists before our Solons charge off blindly, vigorously yelling and tapping their canes, enacting legislation to fix they know not what. It should also be mentioned, as an aside, that computer modeling, however useful to real scientists, can also

be used as an instrument which enables one to speculate wildly at a high rate of speed.

Every religion has its fanatics and doomsayers, and eco-panteism is a religion. Christianity has had, to its embarrassment, many who have prophesied with certainty the day and hour of the End. Not to be outdone by those on the fringes of Christianity, pantheistic environmentalists also indulge themselves in the same apocalyptic, apoplectic way. They too know that the End is Near, and nothing is worse for such folks than good news.

To return to our beginning example, how many enviro-pantheists were happy to hear the news that acid rain isn't the problem we thought? First they were distressed because acid rain was causing all this damage, and now they are distressed because it isn't. There's no pleasing some folks.

DJW

If You Can't Beat 'Em, Enjoin 'Em.

The Big Three automakers — Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors — have been hit hard during the most recent economic downturn, each posting massive losses. Take mini-vans, for example. After pioneering this market, the recent performance of the Big Three has been anything but sterling. But instead of learning how to improve and market their mini-vans at more affordable prices, the Big Three have, once again, appealed for legislated trade privileges over their competitors.

Recently, the Big Three filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC), seeking to enjoin Toyota and Mazda from "dumping" mini-vans on the American market — i.e., selling their mini-vans either for less than they "cost" to produce or less than such vans cost in America. This anti-dumping action, the first of its kind against Japanese automakers, alleges that Toyota and Mazda have been selling their mini-vans for as much as 27 percent below their "fair value."

Of course, this is not the first time the Big Three have cried foul against their superior Japanese

counterparts. For some time now, the Big Three have been appealing to the Bush administration to ease up market place pressure (read: to secure favored status vis-a-vis their true competitors overseas). While the White House has so far resisted implementing direct regulatory policies, both the White House and Commerce Secretary Robert A. Masbacher may view this anti-dumping action as a proper vehicle for halting the alleged problem of the import-export imbalance.

Should the ITC find that Toyota and Mazda have been dumping their mini-vans on the American market, the Commerce Department would then slap import duties on the vans to raise their prices before they ever reach the car lot. Result: the American consumer loses once again.

To see why the Big Three are ranting and raving, we need to focus, for a moment, on the big picture. While Chrysler has long learned to cry on the government's shoulders, GM lost 12 percent of its market share to Japanese automakers in the 1980s. And don't forget the fact that Ford posted record losses during the

first half of this year, with Chrysler and GM not far behind. Also, consider the fact that Japan is not married to America's wage-inflating and output-deflating labor unions, which means that Japanese autos can be produced at a lower cost.

What about the mini-van market, in particular? To date, the Big Three have invested six billion dollars in developing and marketing their boxes on wheels. But then it happened. Toyota and Mazda introduced their mechanically and aesthetically superior Previa and MPV, respectively, both of which met with the highest praise here at home. Although they are the new kids on the block, the Previa and MVP have recently been rated more highly than their Big Three counterparts.

Having once again been beaten on their home turf, the "Big Three" have done the only thing bullies ever do when they are humiliated: they have run home crying to Big Brother. By so doing, however, they are the ones who really have dumped on the American consumer.

DGH

The Best and Worst of "Children's" Literature

Do you enjoy what you read to your children?

"No book is really worth reading at the age of ten which is not equally (and often far more) worth reading at the age of fifty." If C.S. Lewis was right about this, then a good test of the quality of a given "children's" book should be whether or not adults can (not whether they do) enjoy it as well. To put it another way, if it is *only* a children's book, it is probably not a *good* children's book.

He's right, of course. Consider those books that are called children's classics. *Peter Rabbit* is considered a classic. So is *Winnie the Pooh*. So are many fairy tales, and so also (though for different reasons) are the *Little House* books. Children love these stories — but the same is true of the adults who read them to the children. Something in them goes deeply enough into a person to obviate the question of age. A child may

be delighted by a story in different ways than the adult who is reading the same story, but it would be surprising if those elements of poetry and romance (yes, in Beatrix Potter!) that delight the adult did not also delight the child, not because of some remnant of the child in the adult, but rather because of the human in both.

On the other hand, there is a class of books written specifically for young people which is nearly impossible for adults to enjoy. Nor should it be said that we shouldn't try to enjoy them because they are written for young people. That would be a great mistake. These are the teen series of the pulp or school book club variety wherein some teenager "learns about life" through an adventure (in boy's books) or through a relationship (in girl's books). In these books, most of the elements that make children's books so delightful are lost. The supernatural, the world of faerie,

talking animals — all are gone. Some might respond, "and good riddance, too! Escapism is all right for children, but young people need to learn about the real world." This response shows how badly literary fantasy and the purpose of stories in general is misunderstood — and what assumptions lurk behind such a remark about "reality"?

Something else is gone, too. In the best books, children are taken seriously as people — young, yes, but people nonetheless. In the other kind, they are talked down to in the attempt to give them "their own literature." If they have their own, and we have ours, how will they make the transition? How do children's minds become adult minds? What is the essential difference between the best children's books and the best adult books? It is not one of kind.

WJC

Franky Schaeffer Hasn't Left Contemporary Christianity

Franky Schaeffer recently joined the Eastern Orthodox Church, and in an article entitled "Protestant Orphans" he explained some of his reasons for doing so. He complains that, "For years I could not have honestly said why I went to church, let alone what communion was for" and argues (quite aptly) that "Protestants had as much ritual, tradition, and liturgy as anyone else." This is quite true, but it presents us with a false dichotomy. There is no reason to prefer a disobedient Protestantism to a disobedient Eastern Orthodoxy, and, as classical Protestants, we don't.

Whenever Christians meet, they will follow certain traditions and rituals in their services of worship. Such traditions are inescapable because of how God created the world. Our only choice, therefore, is between Biblical traditions and traditions of men. We do not have the option of "no tradition." Schaeffer has confused this basic dichotomy, thinking of it rather as a choice between modern traditions of men and ancient traditions of men. What would we rather present to God, he argues, an ancient venerable tradition of worship or our modern evangelical treacle?

What this question amounts to is this: If someone wants to observe extra-Biblical traditions in worship, then it only makes sense to opt for a tradition that is ancient. Why abandon the Bible for a tradition that was established in the early 70's somewhere in Cleveland?

But for the classical Protestant, there is another question. Why abandon the Bible at all? The Reformation tradition of *sola Scriptura* does not stand for the rejection of tradition. It stands for the rejection of man-made traditions. This principle of worship is known as the Regulative Principle of Worship, i.e. "Whatever is not commanded for worship is forbidden." Schaeffer has left modern evangelicalism, which does not know what that principle is, for the Eastern Orthodox Church, which denies it.

In rejecting the man-made traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy, classical Protestantism does not do so because they are ancient, but rather because they are not ancient enough — they do not go back to the eternal counsels of God revealed to us in Scripture.

If Schaeffer wants to argue that modern evangelicalism maintains

its own manufactured traditions, and that those traditions are aesthetically pitiful to boot, we are right with him. And if he wants to say that the traditions of the ancient apostate communions are far less trendy, we'll buy that too. But when, as a consequence, he seeks to commend Eastern Orthodox worship as acceptable to God, we part company.

It is quite true that when the blessing of God is removed from a modern evangelical church, the results are immediate and pathetic. If the Spirit of God is not inhabiting the preaching of the Word, there is nothing left but bare walls. But when the Spirit is driven out of an Eastern Orthodox sanctuary by the smoke of candles and the veneration of saints, it will be about a millennium or two before anyone notices He has gone — because even when He isn't there, the place still feels holy.

So Schaeffer's testimony makes this one thing abundantly clear. He has left mainstream evangelicalism, which prefers its modern traditions to the Word of God. He has joined himself to a church which prefers its ancient traditions to the Word of God. In terms of the basic issue at stake, Franky didn't leave contemporary Christianity at all.

DJW

Somewhere Under the Rainbow

We've all seen him. Behind homeplate during the final pitch of the World Series; at center court for the final shot of the NBA Finals; between the goalposts for the game-winning fieldgoal of the Super Bowl. Everywhere and anywhere we have seen his rainbow — the one on his head, that is. At the same time, or course, we have also seen his shirts and signs, usually with John 3:16 printed in bold letters. But something tells me we won't be seeing much of this self-styled sports evangelist in the near future.

While innocent until proven guilty, forty-six year old Rollen Frederick Steward, better known as the Rainbow Man, has allegedly been running from an arrest warrant issued in southern California for a string of stink bomb attacks. Only recently, however, were police reportedly able to link the Rainbow Man with the attacks.

The break in the case came a few months ago, when police in Richmond County, Georgia detained the Rainbow Man after he apparently set

off a remote-controlled siren while Jack Nicklaus was putting on the 16th hole of the Master's tournament in Augusta, Georgia. After tournament officials decided to drop charges, but before he was released, the Rainbow Man drafted a statement that allegedly matched handwritten notes found with several stink bombs recently set off in the southern California area at the offices of the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Orange County Register*, the Trinity Broadcasting Network, the Crystal Cathedral, a local Christian bookstore, and other locations.

Then, five days after being released from custody in Georgia, an electronically-activated device coincidentally detonated a package of fireworks at the Foreman-Holyfield championship bout in Atlantic City, only to be followed the next day by a similar contraption found at the site of a televised professional bowlers tournament. Should these antics be attributed to the Rainbow Man, they would be nothing new. As far back as 1989, he

was arrested for throwing skunk glands into the crowd of the American Music Awards.

Granted, the skunk glands, fireworks, and stink bombs have not yet injured anyone. But that is not the point. The point is that if the Rainbow Man has perpetrated these self-centered acts, he has endangered life and violated the rights of others without Biblical justification, to say nothing of his run-ins with the law. While he may be ultimately innocent of all charges, his flight from justice only adds insult to injury. Once again, the Christian community is forced to bear the onus of a self-proclaimed zealot who found his way into the public spotlight only to end up shaming the name of Christ.

Tragically, the Rainbow Man appears to have come to the end of his rainbow. After Richmond police detained him, they recovered a sign which confusingly read, "The trumpet and siren mean no rapture...a skunk was released to show you there is no God, no more John 3:16." How sad.

DGH

Canadian Tax Dollars Flushed

Not to be outdone by their high rolling American counterparts who have long grown accustomed to spending other people's money in the name of "the public good," the city of Montreal plans to go where no city has gone before; or more accurately, Montreal is enabling its dogs to go where no dogs have gone before. Montreal plans on spending \$34,000 from the public treasury to build an "experimental bathroom" for 'dogs in one of its city parks.

It seems that the traditional fire hydrant is no longer sufficient for good ol' Fido. Much to his relief, he will now get to avail himself of an elaborate

facility where he can choose from among an assortment of concrete poles, trees, and shrubs. What's more, he will be able to parade his talents in front of his proud owner who can view the whole scene from a box seat located a few feet from center stage.

Montreal, mind you, is the same city that recently built an entire subway system without so much as a single public restroom. Even worse, Montreal, for the past several years has been systematically eliminating public restrooms — for humans — from its public parks.

So what's really going on in Montreal? Who's behind this fiasco

and how can they possibly justify it? Animal rights activists? Spendthrift politicians eager to solve another crisis? Followers of Jim and Tammy Bakker who long for the air conditioned doghouse days? Or — and this is my theory — America's National Endowment for the Arts which showered several several thousand tax dollars last year on a known porn star to do on stage in New York what dogs will soon be able to do in Montreal. In other words, NEA-funded "artists" and Montreal's dogs have more in common than first meets the eye: they both produce the same thing at taxpayers' expense.

DGH

GUEST EDITORIAL

What There'll Be to Pay

Gerald Wisz

More people are believing in it — hell that is. According to a recent *U.S. News and World Report* cover story, belief in existence of a place of eternal torment is up, even when compared with "the generally more wholesome and pious 1950s." What this portends is anyone's guess, but ever since George Gallup began asking the question, more people have said they believe in heaven than in hell. It's good at least to see a more even distribution.

U.S. News reports a variety of responses by clergy who were asked about their beliefs and preaching on hell. The Rev. Mary Kraus of Washington, D.C. says, "My congregation would be stunned to hear a sermon on hell." No doubt.

An interesting sideline is the reported differences among evangelical "annihilationists," who believe in the complete destruction of the condemned soul, and those who still view hell as a place of eternal torment for the damned. John Stott, Clark H. Pinnock, and the late Philip E. Hughes are numbered among the annihilationists. Like a college co-ed confronted with the gospel for the first time, Pinnock asks, "How can Christians possibly project a deity of such cruelty and vindictiveness [as to inflict] everlasting torture upon his creatures, however sinful they may have been?" Such a God, says Pinnock, is "more nearly like Satan than like God."

Of course, hell is awful, even to contemplate. The 19th-century American theologian R.L. Dabney, even while defending the doctrine of eternal

punishment, said it is "so awful and solemn that it is with painful reluctance the Christian sees it made a subject of controversy ... It is presumed that there is not a right-minded man in any church who would not hail with delight the assurance that every creature of God will be finally holy and happy, provided only it could be given with certainty, and in a way consistent with the honor of God."

But it is the honor of God, ultimately, that justifies the doctrine of endless punishment. How? Consider an analogy in terms of debits and credits. All are debtors to God, born as we are in Adam's sin. This sin requires payment by a just God, whose mercy never operates in contradiction to His justice, since He is perfectly consistent in all His attributes.

But how can a creditor remain just, that is, exact what is rightly owed, and cancel a debt at the same time? It cannot be done. Once the debt is canceled, mercy has supplanted justice. This seems to be Pinnock's version. Then isn't it possible for God to extend mercy while remaining just?

Payment for the debt must be exacted; the debtor cannot pay. But what if another paid the debt in the debtor's place, reconciling the debtor's account with the creditor? The creditor would be satisfied, and the debtor would go free, although the one making the payment may be set back considerably. The Bible teaches that the creditor and the one putting up the payment are one. By receiving payment for the original debtor, the creditor's justice remains intact; by putting up payment on the debtor's behalf, the one incurring the debt himself demonstrates love that passes understanding.

Are all debtors? Yes, most certainly. Do all debtors have someone to pay their debt to the lawful creditor? No, not all do. But if they don't, they really can't complain, since *they* are the ones who owe the creditor, not someone else. However, if someone does step in to assume their debt, paying it in full, then the only proper response is thanksgiving, eternally.

Now, what about those who still owe the creditor but have no one to pay their debt? They owe. How will payment be made? It cannot be, since regardless of how much the debtor pays out — even if it's the life of his soul — it can never be enough to satisfy the creditor. There is such a great gulf between what he owes and what he can periodically pay out, that his account will *always* remain outstanding, and therefore, he will *always* have to be paying out. He won't be able to make a dent.

For the unredeemed debtor, final payment will never be made in full. He can never earn enough to square off with his creditor. But from the creditor's perspective, payment must be made, and so the unredeemed debtor pays, and pays, and pays, eternally, until (if it were possible, which it's not) the last farthing is exacted.

God's honor serves as a more reliable yardstick than our sensibilities for understanding Christian doctrine, whether it's the kind we would rather talk about or not. Δ

Gerald Wisz has served as an elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and written for *Eternity*, *World*, and *Journey*. He currently writes for a New York financial services company.

In Other Words

Aeschylus Pour Cinq Sous

Wes Callihan

One sweltering afternoon I went down to the French Quarter to meet a friend near Jackson Square. I idled beside the wrought iron fence of the cathedral, imagining troops drilling in the square, the Stars and Bars flying, and drums rolling in the heat. At the waterfront I imagined great steamboats on the river. Back on Decatur Street, in a semi-reverie, I passed a Cajun quartet ignoring the humidity by belting out a beery "Jolie Blonde," a growing pile of bottles at their feet. My friend never came. Rotten luck, I thought.

Coming abreast of a little Greek cafe toward evening, I was still wandering in absent-minded meditation when the door burst open with a blast of bouzouki music from the jukebox inside, and a black-haired girl rushed out and banged into me. I automatically wrapped my arms around her to steady us, and the huge Greek who stormed through the door in the next instant didn't like what he saw. He pulled a great knife and brandished it at us. The girl shoved me away and shouted "run!" and so, bewildered by the sudden action, and panicked by the angry man's evident misinterpretation of my role in it, I ran.

I heard confusion behind me. Glancing back, I saw the girl on my heels and the huge man on hers, still waving the knife and cursing violently, so I grabbed her hand and sprinted around a corner. She gasped, "He will kill us!" And I believed her. Dodging past stalls full of watermelons and garlic, I saw an iron gate standing open and pulled the girl toward it; I saw the words "Aeschylus pour cinq sous" hand-lettered over the doorway and wondered irrelevantly as we ducked through what anyone in the Quarter had to do with

the great Greek dramatist. I slammed the gate shut, and we ran down the narrow passageway. A rush of people passed the gate, yelling, but their voices faded and then were gone.

I stopped and panted; the girl sank to the ground and began sobbing. My luck has distinctly deteriorated, I thought. The heat and humidity were stifling, but the late afternoon sun left our little passageway in shadow, and the city noise was subdued here; I began to feel calmer and was trying to think of a way to comfort the girl and ask her what had just happened, when a slow, languid voice said, "Cinq sous, si vous plez."

I turned quickly and discovered in the deeper shade of a wrought-

I heard confusion behind me. Glancing back, I saw the girl on my heels and the huge man on hers, still waving the knife and cursing violently.

iron balcony an old woman in black silks sitting behind a small cloth-covered table that had on it a large book and a coffee pot. From the darkness of an open door behind her came the heady aroma of boiling crab seasoned with peppercorns; azaleas rioted in boxes around a bench near the table.

The girl quickly stood, wiping her face with her sleeve, and dropped the requested nickel on the table. "We are sorry for intruding," she said, with the soft edge of a Greek accent. "There as a man who was angry because I would not marry him, and then this man helped me run away." I was surprised to find what I'd done.

The old woman gazed at us steadily, saying nothing. She closed her eyes, was silent for a long moment, and then began to recite in a high, steady voice

"Zeus, the Suppliant's God, be gracious to us, Pitifully behold

us, for fugitives are we; Where the blown sand-dunes silt the mouths of Nilus, There we took the highway of the blue, salt sea; There we looked our last at the land of Zeus, her borders Lapsed and lost in the Syrian marches wild, Fleeing, not as outlaws banned for blood-guilt Lest a people perish, but self-exiled. No way but this to escape abhorred embraces, Marriage rites unholy that rue love shuns; Better far lands..."

The girl's eyes were wide, but I broke in, "Excuse me," I said, and the old woman opened her eyes and blinked. "I don't understand," I went on, and the girl looked from me to the old woman.

"You are fugitives, are you not?" the woman asked.

"Well, in a way, but —"

"No matter. His counsels tread the maze of labyrinthine ways."

I tried again. "Please — it's just bad luck that brought us —"

She interrupted. "It was the voice of the Pelasgian's King that moved them, supplying the persuasive word, but Zeus determined what the end should be." She widened her eyes at me. "You came to listen, you see? No accident," and she picked up the girl's nickel as proof. "Now please sit."

The girl sat cautiously on the bench amongst the azaleas with her dark eyes fixed on the old woman, looking as though she thought perhaps it was, after all, no accident. Thinking of the man with the knife, I realized that it might indeed be best to stay; looking at the girl's dark eyes, I became certain. So I sat next to her and listened as the high, steady voice resumed:

"Better far lands and unfamiliar faces Than wedded and bedded with King Aegyptus' sons. As when hard pressed on the board a cautious player This piece or that from a threatened square withdraws. One move seemed best ..."

Wesley Callihan is a Contributing Editor of Antithesis.

How many of these conservative classics are still missing from your library?

Take
one

FREE.

Or, if you prefer, take TWO free. Values to \$69.95

2730 THE CONSERVATIVE MIND — *Russell Kirk*. New 7th Edition of "the best and clearest exposition of the conservative philosophy."—James J. Kilpatrick. **\$19.95**

2550 WITNESS — *Whittaker Chambers*. Eloquent autobiography of the man who spied for Stalin, repented and became America's chief anti-Communist witness. **\$17.95**

2819 NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution — *Forrest McDonald*. Pulitzer Prize nominee by America's leading Constitutional authority (and a no-nonsense conservative). "His authority is unequalled — magisterial ... of inestimable value ... McDonald's masterpiece."—M.E. Bradford, *National Review*. "Vigorously and wittily written."—Russell Kirk, *Reflections*. **\$25**

3322 THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE — *Barry Goldwater*; chapter-long, evocative Introduction by *Patrick J. Buchanan*. Back in print, the book that gave modern conservatives their marching orders. Prophetic, and still required reading. **\$17.95**

3300 BASIC COMMUNISM: Its Rise, Spread and Debacle in the 20th Century — *Clarence B. Carson*. Sweeping survey covers the origins, spread, thrust and theory — PLUS profiles of 61 top Communists. One-volume "library" includes every aspect. 575 pages. **\$29.95**

2632 THE ESSAYS, ARTICLES & REVIEWS OF EVELYN WAUGH. Rich 687-page collection of 237 sparkling pieces — most never published in U.S. **\$40**

2620 SUICIDE OF THE WEST — *James Burnham*. The most profound (and prophetic) insight into the liberal mind ever written. "A book ... for which the world has been aching."—Wm. F. Buckley Jr. **\$18.95**

2630 LOSING GROUND — *Charles Murray*. "Has finally and unanswerably demolished both the moral and the practical claims of the welfare state."—George Gilder. "Devastating."—*National Review*. "A great book."—*Wall St. Journal*. **\$23.95**

2693 THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918-1956 — *Alexander Solzhenitsyn*. The three massive volumes of the original here masterfully abridged by Edward E. Ericson Jr. — with Solzhenitsyn's approval. The heart of the most important anti-Communist book ever written now emerges with even greater impact. Foreword and Afterword by Solzhenitsyn himself. **\$25**

2554 UP FROM LIBERALISM — *Wm. F. Buckley Jr.* Foreword by *John Dos Passos*. Classic anti-liberal polemic reissued. "What he says and how he says it is sure ... to drive the liberals to the brink of mayhem ... breathtaking."—*Wall St. Journal*. **\$16.95**

2966 ODYSSEY OF A FRIEND: Letters to Wm. F. Buckley Jr. 1954-1961 — *Whittaker Chambers*. Revised Edition with unpublished letters. "Compelling."—*Newsweek*. **\$17.95**

2612 THE LETTERS OF EVELYN WAUGH. If letterwriting is a dying art, it expires gloriously in these 684 pages. "Dazzling."—*Time*. "Delicious."—*Newsweek*. **\$25**

How to claim either one or two of these classics **FREE**

CONSERVATIVE BOOK CLUB

15 Oakland Avenue • Harrison, NY 10528

How the Club Works

Every 4 weeks (13 times a year) you get a free copy of the Club Bulletin which offers you the Featured Selection plus a good choice of Alternates — all of interest to conservatives. ★ If you want the Featured Selection, do nothing; it will come automatically. ★ If you don't want the Featured Selection, or you do want an Alternate, indicate your wishes on the handy card enclosed with your Bulletin and return it by the deadline date. ★ The majority of Club books will be offered at 20-50% discounts, plus a charge for shipping and handling. ★ As soon as you buy and pay for the number of books you agreed to buy at regular Club prices, your membership may be ended at any time, either by you or by the Club. ★ If you ever receive a Featured Selection without having had 10 days to decide if you want it, you may return it at Club expense for full credit. ★ Good service. No computers! ★ The Club will offer regular Superbargains, mostly at 70-90% discounts plus shipping and handling. Superbargains do NOT count toward fulfilling your Club obligation, but do enable you to buy fine books at giveaway prices. ★ Only one membership per household.

Please check the option you prefer

- ☐ Please accept my membership in the Club and send, free and postpaid, the book whose number I have written in the box below:

I agree to buy 3 additional books at regular Club prices over the next 18 months. I also agree to the Club rules spelled out in this coupon.

- ☐ Please accept my membership in the Club and send, free and postpaid, the two books whose numbers I have written in the boxes below:

I agree to buy 4 additional books at regular Club prices over the next 2 years. I also agree to the Club rules spelled out in this coupon.

ANT - 6

Name

Address

City State Zip

CHRISTIANITY YESTERDAY

The Certain Success of Evangelistic Labor

W.G.T. Shedd

W.G.T. Shedd, D.D. (1820-1894) served as a presbyterian pastor and seminary instructor during tumultuous times for the American church. Though most noted for his theological treatise, *Dogmatic Theology*, Shedd was also, for a time, a Professor of English Literature, a background which is always present in his theological writings. The passage below is an excerpt from Shedd's *Sermons to the Spiritual Man*.

Inasmuch as each and every disciple of Christ is bound to contribute his share towards the evangelization of the globe, it becomes an interesting and important question, whether the work is *feasible*. May it not be that the Church is attempting too much? The larger part of the world is still pagan and totally ignorant of God in Christ; and a considerable part of nominal Christendom consists of unrenowned men who are as distant from heaven as the heathen, so far as the new birth is concerned.

How can the Church at large, and the individual Christian, be certain that they are not undertaking a work that is intrinsically impossible of performance? No laborer desires to spend his strength for nought. It was one of the torments of pagan hell, perpetually to roll a stone up a hill, and just as it reached the summit, perpetually to see it slip from the hands and roll back to the bottom.

We propose to mention some of the reasons that make it certain that evangelistic labor will succeed; that the effort of the Church to preach Christ crucified will no more fail of its effect, that the rain will fail to water the earth, and cause the seeds that are sown in it to germinate (Is. 55:10).

I. We argue and derive the certainty of success in evangelistic labor, in the first place, from the nature of

Divine truth. There is something in the quality and characteristics of the doctrine which we are commanded to preach to every creature, that promises and prophesies a triumph.

This fact we need to keep in view, if we would see any ground of certainty for the success of the Christian evangelist. Unless he is commissioned to teach something that is superhuman; something that did not take origin with the sphere of earth and of man; something that is not found in the national literatures of the world; he will spend his strength for nought. The apostles of human reason, the inventors of human systems, and their disciples, have labored for six thousand years without radically changing a single individual man, or converting any of the sin an misery of earth into the holiness and happiness of heaven; and if the Christian herald does not go entirely beyond their sphere, and proclaim truths from another and higher world, he will only repeat their futile endeavor. He must teach the Word and commandments of God; a higher doctrine that the commandments of man, and wisdom superior to that of any people, Hebrew or Hindu, Greek or Roman.

II. We argue and derive the certain success of evangelistic labor, in the second place, from the fact that *God feels a special interest in his own Word*.


This fact is clearly taught in Isaiah 55. "My word," says God by His prophet, "shall not return unto me void; but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." Here is personal interest and personal supervision. These doctrines relating to the salvation and destiny of man are not sent forth from heaven as lonely messengers to make their way as they best can. The third Person of the trinity goes with them and exerts an influence through them that is undefinable but as almighty and irresistible, within its own sphere and in its own way. For there is not a human heart upon the globe, whose hardness is impenetrable to the combined operation of the Word and Spirit of God.

In this fact, then, we find a second ground of certainty of success for evangelistic endeavor. You may proclaim all your days, your own ideas, or those of your fellow men, but you will say with Grotius, at the close of a long and industrious career which had by no means been exclusively devoted to humanistic learning: "I have spent my life in laboriously doing nothing." But if you have passed your days in teaching the unevangelized and conveying into their dark and blinded understandings the truths of the law and gospel, you may say, at the close of life, as you sum up your work, with a clearer consciousness than that of the pagan Horace: "I shall not wholly die. I have erected a monument more durable than brass. I have taught the Word of God that liveth and abideth forever, to many human souls."

The same law prevails in the larger sphere of mission that rules in the individual experience. There must be a ceasing to look at the creature and an absorbing, empowering looking to the Creator and Redeemer. No sinner obtains peace, until he sees that the Divine clemency is greater than his sins. So long as his sins look larger than the Divine mercy, so long he must despair. Precisely so is it with efforts to save the souls of men. The Church will not be instrumental in evangelizing the globe, unless it believes that God the Holy Spirit is more mighty than man's corruption. So long as the work looks too great to be accomplished; so long as the ignorance, vice, brutality, and apathy, of the sinful masses all around seem insuperable by any power human or divine; so long there will be no courageous and confident labor for human welfare. Not a missionary would ever have gone upon his errand of love, had his eye been taken from God and fixed solely upon man and man's hopeless condition.

Think you that the apostles would have started out from the little corner of Palestine to convert the Greco-Roman world to a new religion, if their vision had been confined to earth? Apart from the power and promise of God, the preaching of such a religion as Christianity, to such a population as that of paganism, is the sheerest Quixotism. It crosses all the inclinations and condemns all the pleasures of guilty man. The preaching of the gospel finds its justification, its wisdom, and its triumph, only in the attitude and relation which the infinite and almighty God sustains to it. It is *His* religion, and therefore it must ultimately become a universal religion. Δ

Redeeming the Time . . .



OUR SUFFICIENCY IN CHRIST

John MacArthur

The fact that this book should be so controversial is a telling indictment of the church in the 1990's. With its growing infatuation with psychology, show business techniques and extreme mysticism, the church is tacitly acquiescing to the notion that Christ alone simply is not sufficient to meet people's *real* needs. In this new book, Pastor John MacArthur calls for a new generation of Christians with the courage to confront a disturbing mindset that is taking the church by storm.

Published by Word Publications @ \$15.99 (286pp/hardbound)—available for \$10.95.

CALL THE SABBATH A DELIGHT

Walter Chantry

A startling transformation has taken place in the way Christians today approach the Lord's Day. The effects of this have been disastrous—morally and socially, as well as spiritually. This new book by Walter Chantry is concerned to show why and how the Lord's Day is meant to be one of joy and blessing for God's people. Written with a deep pastoral concern, this is an important book for all Christians to read.

Published by Banner of Truth @ \$5.95 (112pp/paperback)—available for \$3.25.

THE RATIONAL THEOLOGY OF JONATHAN EDWARDS, VOL. ONE

John Gerstner

Perhaps no other evangelical theologian alive today is more familiar with the theology of Jonathan Edwards than John Gerstner. In this recently released volume, the first in a projected three volume set, Dr. John Gerstner provides the most extensive analysis of Edwards' unpublished sermons ever produced. The book serves as an excellent introduction to the theology of the man often considered America's finest theologian.

Published by Ligonier Ministries @ \$29.95 (700pp/hardback)—available for \$19.95.

"So teach us to number our days, that we may gain a heart of wisdom."

PSALM 90:12

The summer months offer most of us a little more time for leisure and relaxation. Why not "redeem" those extra leisure hours by taking up some rewarding reading?


TRINITY BOOK SERVICE would like to introduce you to some of the very best Christian literature available today. Our hope is that, as you prayerfully plan for these summer months, you might consider having your soul fed and encouraged through the testimony of excellent Christian books.

We invite you to call toll-free for our special *Summer Reading* brochure—at 1-800-722-3584.

We carry a large selection of books—all carefully reviewed to ensure doctrinal soundness and practical relevance—at significant discounts. There are no membership fees and every purchase comes with our money back guarantee.

We'll even give you a coupon for an additional discount on your first order!

So why not call today?



Post Office Box 569 • Montville, NJ 07045

1-800-722-3584

Visa and Mastercard accepted

FAITH AND LIFE

B.B. Warfield

B.B. Warfield stands as one of the greatest defenders of Reformed orthodoxy. ***Faith and Life*** contains some memorable addresses to his seminary students, wherein 'the deeper currents of Christian faith and life' were explored. Among the various subjects dealt with are these classics:

The Work of the Spirit in Conviction, Faith, Adoption, and Prayer, and The Need for True Devotion to Christ and His Cause.

Published by Banner of Truth @ \$23.95 (460pp/clothbound)—available for \$12.95.

EXPOSITION OF EPHESIANS

Charles Hodge

Charles Hodge remains one of the ablest men to have ever written on Ephesians. The great virtue of Hodge on ***Ephesians*** is his ability constantly to communicate the sense and overall argument of a passage. A peerless teacher, his aim with the pen as in the classroom was 'the simple exhibition of the truth which God had revealed'—his own description of Paul's preaching. His excellent work on Ephesians is now available as part of the *Geneva Series Commentaries*.

Published by Banner of Truth @ \$21.95 (296pp/clothbound)—available for \$13.95.

THE LIFE OF JESUS

Carine Mackenzie

Who is Jesus? What did He do? What is He really like? Have your children ever asked questions like these? Do you want to teach them more about Jesus and all the things He said and did? This full-color picture book is careful to be faithful to the biblical account, yet the story is told in an interesting way without using pictures of Jesus. Your children ages 4-8 will enjoy listening to the major events in the life of Jesus, and you will have opportunity to show them how God's prophecies in the Old Testament were fulfilled by the coming of Christ.

Published by Christian Focus Publications @ \$9.95 (64pp/hardback)—available for \$5.75.

The Other Shoe: Copyright and the Reasonable Use of Technology

**Copyright laws
are not founded
on prohibitions
against theft but
rather on special
privileges for
the few.**

John M. Frame

Seven or eight years ago, when photocopiers first began to be common in church offices, religious and music periodicals began running articles warning us of the danger of violating copyright laws, especially in making transparencies of songs, publishing the words of hymns in bulletins, etc. The stream of such articles

has continued unabated; indeed, one can hardly ever pick up a piece of church music without reading stern warnings about the consequences of illegal copying. Indeed, one music publisher in our area regularly sends out vaguely threatening letters to all the local churches on this matter. It is hard to believe that they actually think this sort of practice will improve their business; my own inclination is to steer far away from any involvement with such a company. But from another point of view, this publisher's efforts are only a tiny sound amid the din of voices moralizing and legalizing about copyright.

In all this time, I have been waiting eagerly for the other shoe to drop. It has seemed inevitable that some article, somewhere, would advocate an obvious alternative. For it is possible, after all, in our democracy, to get laws *changed*. We are not constrained forever to meekly acquiesce to a system which continually threatens us with grave consequences, even for innocent oversights, on dubious moral grounds. Perhaps I have not read the religious press as carefully as I might have, but I have yet to see any article on this subject advocating anything other than grovelling compliance. Hence, I must drop the other shoe myself.

It might be interesting to ask why, on this particular issue — surely an issue on which reasonable persons may differ — articles in favor of legal change have been so few and far between. One thought naturally occurs: religious and music journals are, after all, publications, and are therefore controlled by publishers. Publishers are interested parties in this particular dis-

cussion. I will, however, say no more on that subject except this: that anyone who publishes the present essay will win the 1991 Frame Award for Journalistic Impartiality.

First, let me say up front that I am not urging anyone to break the law as it now stands. I try to adhere to it scrupulously (especially as I plan the worship in my local church), and I would urge others to do the same. Romans 13 tells Christians to be subject to the civil powers, and there is no argument in the present context for making any exception to that principle. My point is rather that we should exert our political influence to make a few changes in the present law and/or in its application. Here are two arguments which I believe should carry some weight:

The Basis of Copyright Law

The "meek acquiescence" literature rarely speaks about the purpose or value of copyright law. Rather, it usually just sets forth what the law is and what the punishments are for disobeying it. But if we are going to raise the question of what the law *should* be, we must ask broader questions.

Laws are generally of two sorts: laws of morality and laws of utility. The former seek to enforce eternal moral principles: laws against murder and theft are examples. The latter merely seek to improve our quality of life in some way, even without the sanction of eternal moral principles. For example, there is no moral principle (in Scripture or anywhere else that I know of) requiring Americans to pay tariffs on imported goods. Whatever one's views of tariffs, the justification of them is not essentially moral but is rather society's desire to help someone (such as American industry or the U.S. Treasury). I do not deny that in that desire to help someone there may be some (true or alleged) moral motivation; but no one would claim that societies which lack such tariffs are *ipso facto* in violation of moral law. If American society is morally required to make American industry competitive, there are ways of aiding it other than tariffs; so tariffs are not as such *required* by morality.

Now what kind of law is copyright law? The literature sometimes describes copyright violation as "stealing," and that would put copyright law in the moral category. But that is not at all obvious. When a carpenter makes a table and sells it to me, I then become the owner of that table. I can make another table like it, if I have the skill to do so; indeed, I can sell the table and its "copies" to someone else, even at a profit if that is possible.¹ But copyright law insists that when I buy a piece of music I may not make additional copies (without permission), nor may I sell the originals or copies to anyone. If copyright were a moral issue, that same moral issue would arise in the case of the carpenter: morality is not a respecter of persons, for God is not respecter of

¹ I realize that sometimes a design for a table can be patented. Patents, of course, raise the same problems for me as copyrights. But for now, let us consider the simpler case, where patents are not involved.

persons. Why does the law give privileges to publishers ("ownership rights" of publications which continue even following their sale) which it does not give to carpenters and others?

Indeed, copyright law itself must make some fine distinctions. We are told that verbal formulations can be copyrighted, but the information conveyed by those formulations cannot be. In my own writings, I may freely use information found in copyrighted material without permission of the copyright owner, but I may not make my own copies of such material without permission. But if copyright is a *moral* right, shouldn't it be possible to protect information as much as formulation?

Further, if the issue were one of morality, copyrights should never expire. If it is morally wrong to copy a piece of music in June of 1989, it is also morally wrong to copy that same piece of music in June of 1991. (Moral principles, by their very nature, are eternal, as God is eternal.) But in the present law, copyrights do expire. A piece that is under copyright in 1989 may be in public domain in 1991. The case is very different with theft. My ownership of my belongings does not exist only for a time arbitrarily specified by law. It exists until I sell or give away the belongings, or die.

Indeed, the more thoughtful apologists for copyright law do not claim a moral sanction. Rather, they rest their case on utility, arguing that society has an interest in giving special aid to authors and publishers (thus encouraging free expression), just as many have argued that tariffs aid local industry. This assertion, however, is highly debatable. For one thing, where does it stop? If society gives special benefits to one industry, why not to all? If it gives special benefits to authors and publishers, why not to carpenters?

For another thing, however, I doubt if copyright laws are a very efficient means of encouraging free expression. I do not doubt that copyright laws are a boon to publishers; but I don't think they help authors very much. (Usually the apologist for copyright focuses on the benefits for *authors*, expecting readers to sympathize more with authors than with publishers.) I have seen the issue from the other side, for I hold copyright to three books. Writing theological books is very unrewarding financially, and I can't believe that copyright makes any positive difference. Public domain books, if the public wants them, can be very profitable; copyrighted books can be similarly unprofitable.

But for a Christian, the bottom line has to be that Scripture nowhere gives government the right to exercise this kind of favoritism. Indeed, for government

to penalize consumers in order to give special benefit to an industry might well come under the Biblical definition of theft. I am inclined, incidentally, to regard most "utility" laws as in this category, including tariffs.²

The Reasonable Use of Technology

Similar issues have arisen with other recent technologies. When Video Cassette Recorders first came on the market, broadcasters were threatening to arrest any VCR owner who reproduced material under copyright, even for his/her own private, non-profit use. But of course it was unthinkable to imagine police entering people's bedrooms, arresting them for making what certainly seems to be a reasonable use of technology. Eventually the VCR manufacturers and the copyright holders got together and some agreement was reached that did not keep ordinary people from doing what their equipment was designed to do. Of course, if the copy-

right owners had a *moral* right on their side, such negotiation would have been morally inappropriate. But as we've seen copyright is not a moral right, but a special privilege. Special privileges can be negotiated, and in this case the owners were wise to accept negotiation lest their privilege be removed altogether by an outraged public.

There was also a time when computer software manufacturers spared no expense to "copy-protect" their products under copyright. The law was on their side, of course. But eventually copy protection schemes were matched by equally ingenious software

programs intended to bypass copy protection. Further, many software users avoided purchase of copy protected software because computer disks do deteriorate and there are many situations in which computer workers have a legitimate and immediate need for copies of disks. I gather that there still exist some copy protected software programs, but most manufacturers have dropped copy protection and have found that step to be good for business.

It may not be true that "you can't stop progress;" but technological progress is *hard* to stop. And in the above cases (the arrival of digital Audio Tape will doubtless furnish a third example) copyright privilege has had

The literature sometimes describes copyright violation as "stealing," but that is not at all obvious...If the issue were one of morality, copyrights should never expire. If it is morally wrong to copy a piece of music in June of 1989, it is also morally wrong to copy that same piece of music in June of 1991.

² A utility law, as I have discussed it, is almost necessarily a law without Scriptural sanction. If it had scriptural sanction, it would be in the moral category. This is not to rule out laws which, e.g., require motorists to drive on one side of the road. That might seem like a "utility" law, but it is in fact an application of a scriptural moral principle, namely the sixth commandment—our obligation to guard others against unjust injury and death.

to yield somewhat to a reasonable use of technology. Why has this not happened in the case of churches who wish to make copies of music? Surely to be a Christian it should be just as unthinkable to allow police to search church files for illegal copies as it is to allow police into people's bedrooms to search out illegal video tapes. Yet no VCR owner has ever been arrested for copying TV programs for his own use, while some churches have had to pay massive fines for making unauthorized copies of music. This may be part of the Christian-bashing which is unfortunately too prevalent in modern society. Certainly, however, Christians should not stand still for it. We have rights in a democracy, and we ought to assert them. We should insist that freedom of religion is at least as important as the "right" (actually the special privilege) of a publisher to extract the last possible penny from his enterprises.

Surely it is not reasonable, when photocopy technology is at our disposal, for a church secretary or music director to have to spend half of his/her time locating copyright owners, writing letters, sending out checks, wondering how long it will all take before the church can sing a particular song, even when this process results only in tiny benefits for the copyright owner. Christian Copyright Licensing, Inc., has aided this process enormously, to be sure, and I would definitely recommend their service to churches that use hymn transparencies, etc.³ They have arranged with many copyright owners to grant CCLI members permission to copy the words to hymns under certain circumstances. But CCLI charges annual fees which are too large for some churches, and they demand a complete record to every transparency, every set of words published in a bulletin, etc. Further, in my view, CCLI's own restrictions on the use of copyright materials are not sufficient to allow reasonable use of technology. And besides that, their literature is full of those threats about even inadvertent breaking of the law, and frankly I am getting tired of reading that stuff. A Christian organization (which CCLI claims to be) should seek the interests of the body of Christ, rather than being stooges of the publishing industry. CCLI should be seeking to get the laws changed, rather than betting its own future on the maintenance of the status quo.

A far better solution would be to have the photocopier manufacturers negotiate with the publishers to find a compromise that will allow photocopier owners to make reasonable use of the technology. Failing that, the law should be changed to allow churches to make transparencies of the words to songs, to publish such words in church bulletins, and to make copies for accompanists of the music and words to songs that cannot be purchased individually.⁴ Restrictions on copying permanently out-of-print music should be removed altogether.

Another way to a better situation would be this: just as some software manufacturers dared to produce

non-copy-protected products, and those came to dominate the market, so some enterprising publisher of Christian music might publish a book of widely used songs with permission to copy included in the price of the book. That is, the publisher, not the purchaser, would go through the difficult work of obtaining copy permissions (preferably with the kind of liberal conditions described above) and would add an amount to the price of the book to compensate his/her company and the copyright owners for this privilege. Such a book would be expensive, but not as expensive as it would cost a church to buy hundreds of copies, nor as costly in time or money as it would be for individual churches to make these arrangements themselves. It could be that, just as non-copy-protected software has become the usual thing, so copy-permitted music books might come to dominate the hymnal field. It could be that eventually the price of such books will come down as authors, composers and publishers come to recognize the economic value of such an arrangement.⁵

Even more radical would be this proposal: that some composers, authors and publishers contract to publish music that is to remain in the public domain, with no copyright at all. Who can say that this would not be the best of all possible worlds?⁶

Well, such solutions seem reasonable to me. But we need more dialogue on the subject within the Christian community. My main purpose in writing has been to stir up such dialogue, rather than to have to endure forever the monotonous one-sidedness of the literature we have seen so far. Δ

⁵ As I said earlier, many public domain books do sell, and they do make money. I suspect, indeed, that under the system I have suggested, there would be an additional benefit beyond the economic: there would be fewer books published and a higher percentage of them would be of good quality. That has been the case, e.g., with present-day publication of books from previous centuries.

⁶ My guess (and it is no more than that) is that under this arrangement a composer would contract with one publisher for the right to publish his song *first*. After that, those who want to publish the song would compete freely to produce it in the best selling format (much as many manufacturers compete to market the same cheese) with no legal impediments. If the song becomes popular, the composer will benefit from much greater exposure and more advertising than the song would likely receive under a one-publisher-only system. Then he will be able to offer his *next* song to the "first publisher" at a higher price. Again, I suspect that under this system fewer songs would be published, but those that are published would be well-compensated. And frankly, I consider it an advantage to the church to have fewer songs published, with, presumably, greater quality.

John Frame is Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology at Westminster Theological Seminary, California and author of several works including The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God and Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons, and Problems. Readers are welcome to make unauthorized reproductions of this essay, store it in a retrieval system, or transmit it or its contents in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise.

³ Write CCLI, 6130 NE 78th Ct., Portland, OR 97218.

⁴ We still have the problem that publishers expect a church to buy books of 350 songs in order to have three or four songs that the church really wants to sing. That is simply unfair.

The Approaching Storm

An Overview of Scottish Presbyterian History — Part Seven

Broken oaths, cowardly betrayals, and internal dissensions bring storms of persecution to the Covenanters.

L. Anthony Curto

Changing Winds (1648-1651)

Following the outbreak of civil war in England between Parliament and Charles I (1642) and the ratification of the Solemn League and Covenant (1643) by which Scotland aided the Parliamentary army against the Royalist troops, the winds of the storm seemed to be settling on the horizon. In 1644, the Parliamentary army, led by Oliver

Cromwell, along with the Scottish forces, were now able to turn back their series of losses by means of a decisive victory over Royalist troops at Marston Moor in Yorkshire. And even when Charles gained a Scottish ally in James Graham, Earl of Montrose, who turned to regain Scotland for the king, the Covenanter army, under David Leslie, was finally able to defeat this strongest remaining royalist band at Philiphaugh (1645). Graham and his small band of Scottish royalists did not oppose the Solemn League and Covenant but did oppose those who wanted the Covenant in the place of the king. Nevertheless, with the loss at Philiphaugh, it seemed that all hope for the king was finally lost.

During 1645, the Scots grew steadily more dissatisfied with the radical republicanism of Cromwell and his followers. Political power became more greatly centered in Cromwell and his army, and neither had any desire to carry through and transform England into a Presbyterian nation. In May of 1646, Charles tried to take advantage of this situation and sought refuge with the Scottish army. The Scots, however, were hesitant to aid Charles because he still hadn't accepted the Solemn League and Covenant, and so they declined to render aid to the king and finally turned him over to Parliament.

Toward the end of 1646 a breach occurred between the Parliament of England and the Army. Once again Charles tried to take advantage of the situation and rally the army behind himself. Instead, the army turned on Charles, capturing him and calling for his trial.

This action was all the the monarchial Scots could bear. Scotland began to rally for the king, and a group of Scottish nobles (led by the Presbyterian noble Lauderdale) sought to rescue the king from Cromwell's hands and enter into an agreement — the Engagement — with the crown. This Engagement pledged the Scots to help the king obtain his freedom and restore him to his position as king. For his part, the king engaged to confirm the Sovereign League and Covenant, to maintain Presbyterian government in Scotland for three years, and to consult the Westminster divines on a general ecclesiastical settlement.¹ Many Scots hoped that this Engagement would unite Scotland behind Charles and against England. However, this action had two devastating results. *First*, it failed to unite Scotland behind the king. In fact it divided the covenanters into two factions — Engagers and Anti-Engagers. The Anti-Engagers (led by men such as James Guthrie, Samuel Rutherford, and Lord Wariston) saw the Engagement as a compromise on the Covenant and refused to have anything to do with it. This split was especially evident between the estates and the General Assembly of Scotland, which refused to ratify the Engagement. *Second*, the Engagement brought the Scots into war again, this time on the king's side against Cromwell; but, in 1648, Cromwell sorely defeated the Engagement Army at Preston. Upon his return to London, Cromwell purged the House of Commons of all Presbyterian members and kept it under guard by threat of arms.

Following the Preston defeat, the Anti-Engagers gained control in Scotland. They immediately passed the "Act of Classes,"² which excluded from public office all those who had in any way taken part in or failed to stand against the Engagement. Those who had engaged were called "malignants."³

Within a short period of time after the "Act of Classes" was passed, Charles I was executed by Cromwell's Rump Parliament in England. Even the radical Anti-Engagers would not stand for such a rebellion against the crown. The Scottish Parliament acted immediately to proclaim Charles' son as lawful successor to his father's throne. Charles II was then at the Hague in Holland, and the Scottish Parliament quickly sent a delegation inviting him to Scotland to serve as king on the condition that he would subscribe to the Solemn League and Covenant. At first Charles declined to accept, but finally, realizing that he had no better chance of securing the throne, agreed. Charles arrived in Scotland in June of 1650 and subscribed to the Covenants of Scotland. On the 23rd of June 1650 Charles accepted the Dunfermline Declaration in which he denounced his father's rejection of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, repudiated his mother's Roman Catholic idolatry, and vowed to uphold the true religion against all heresies and superstition in the realm of Scotland.⁴ As

¹ Burleigh, J.H.S., *A Church History of Scotland* (London: Oxford Press 1973) p. 229.

² *Ibid*, p. 230.

³ Beveridge, John, *The Covenants* (Edinburgh: T.T. Clark, 1944) p. 20.

⁴ Purves, Jock, *Fair Sunshine* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth 1982) pp. 198-99.

far as the English were concerned, this was a declaration of War.

Charles knew he needed to muster an Army immediately and also knew he needed all able bodies to fight. This action would include men on both sides of the "Acts of Classes," but this effort ignited another debate once again dividing the Covenanters of Scotland. Those who favored allowing "malignants" into the army were called Resolutioners and those who objected were called Protesters. This division greatly weakened the Scottish resolve and was sure to lead them into defeat against England.

Cromwell was not slow in his response and met the Scots for the first time at Dunbar in 1650, where he inflicted a devastating blow to the Covenanters. As the year proceeded, the Resolutioners gained more support and as a result the Scottish army was resupplied with troops. Charles was crowned the king of Scotland on January 1, 1651, and proceeded to lead an army into England to claim his throne there. Unable to secure the help of royalist forces in England, Charles was finally defeated at the battle of Worcester in September 1651. As his troops lay in defeat, Charles fled to France and remained in exile for nine years.

Quiet Before the Storm (1651-1660)

For nine years, English commissioners administered Scotland. Those Scots who had been supporters of the Crown were treated harshly. Their lands were confiscated, and they were heavily taxed. Samuel Gardiner characterizes the situation well when he writes, "The English government of Scotland was a good example of the government which fails, in spite of its excellent intentions and excellent practise, simply because it pays no heed to the spirit of nationality."⁵

Oliver Cromwell was not a Scot, and he failed to understand the Scottish mind. The Scots would fight to the death for their cause in Christ and would be ardently opposed to a military machine more devastating than the monarch had been. The Scots wanted independence, but they could not tolerate the regicide and rebellion that usurped God-ordained rule. The Scots wanted the freedom to worship God according to their conscience, but they would not countenance a latitudinarianism that embraced all manner of Sectaries. The Scots were churchmen, but eyed only that form of ecclesiastical government which came with the seal of God.

The Scots designated Cromwell as "The Late Usurper,"⁶ yet in other circumstances they maintained that God's blessing was upon Cromwell. He was the "Great God-fearing Englishman." During the time of his Protectorate, Scotland flourished spiritually. This interlude was truly a quiet before the storm. James Kirkton writes, "Then was Scotland a heap of wheat set about it with lilies, ...a palace of silver beautifully proportioned; and this seems to me to have been Scotland's high

noon."⁷ Scotland's churches had pastors who loved the Word and preached with fire. Children were being educated and reading the Scriptures. Converts were added to the Church, vile swearing was unheard of, and the only people complaining were ale house owners because business had fallen off.⁸ It was said that if you were to visit the country homes of Scotland you would find families worshipping the Lord in reading, singing and prayer.⁹ Who was most responsible for this? Smellie writes, "And the many who, more than any other, helped to secure for the land this Sabbatism of Godliness was misunderstood, resisted, denounced."¹⁰ It was Cromwell.

Cromwell died in 1658 and almost immediately the shouts began for Charles II to return to the throne. Would Charles abide by his previous pledge? The Scots would only receive him back to the throne if he avowed once again his allegiance to the covenant. "From France, where he had found asylum, came his captivating reply 'I am a covenanted king.'"¹¹ Great jubilation rang out in the streets of Scotland for it appeared that the struggle was over. Little did these saints know it was just beginning.

The Wind's Fury Unleashed (1660-1661)

Now that Cromwell's sojourn on earth had ended, the question of English leadership remained open. In January of 1660, General Monck, a Parliament man, decided to march on London. His goal was to regain the power that the Parliament of England had lost to Cromwell and his army. He succeeded in this attempt. It had also become apparent that the popular sentiment of the English people was toward the monarchy.

In Scotland, the Resolutioners' party had gained a strong control over the Scottish Presbyteries. Upon hearing of the sentiments in England, the ministers of Edinburgh decided to send a delegation to England to help influence the proceedings. They chose as their chief spokesman James Sharp, minister in the Church of Crail. Sharp quickly established a relationship with General Monck. Nevertheless, it became evident at this time that the English would now reject the Solemn League and Covenant. The English Presbyterians were seeking an accommodation with the Episcopalian settlement. Many were still hopeful that the king would allow the Scots to retain their church's present form of Presbyterian government in Scotland. This hope was based on two circumstances. The first was that the king seemed to still be in good relations with some Presbyterian Scotsmen such as Lauderdale, who had first met with young Charles II when his father died. (Lauderdale later abandoned the Covenanter cause and as the king's newly appointed chief Commissioner in Scotland would wish for a regular rebellion of Covenanters so that he "might bring over an army of Irish Papists to cut all their

⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 37-38.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 38.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹¹ McFeeters, J.C., *Sketches of the Covenanters* (Philadelphia: Second Church of the Covenanters, N.D.) p. 163.

⁵ Smellie, Alexander, *Men of the Covenant* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth 1975) p. 36.

⁶ *Ibid*, p.35.

throats."¹²) The second was a letter that Charles sent to the Presbytery of Edinburgh in September 1660. In this communication Charles reiterates his resolution to "protect and preserve the government of the Church of Scotland, as it is settled by law, without violation; and to countenance, in the due exercise of their functions, all such ministers who shall behave themselves dutifully and peaceably as becomes men of their calling. We will take care that the authority and acts of the General Assembly at St. Andrews and Dundee in the year 1651 be owned and stand in force until we shall call another General Assembly which we propose to do soon as our affairs will permit."¹³

In Scotland, as a result of the king's letter, greater division arose between the Resolutioners and the Protestors. Some Presbyteries went so far as to depose many of the Protestor Party. In Edinburgh many Protestors (including James Guthrie) were arrested and imprisoned. These actions were partly prompted by the fact that many Scots feared Charles because of their actions against his father. They sought by these acts of loyalty to gain a good standing with the returning king.¹⁴

When Charles II arrived in Scotland in January, 1661 he proved to be no better than his father before him. The Estates of Scotland were called into session from January until July, 1661. The first matter of business was to ratify or annul the Acts of Parliament since 1638. Charles took the position that all that had transpired in Scotland since that time were judgments of God against the nation for usurping royal prerogatives. God had ordained kings to rule and citizens to submit both in Church and State. A general Act of Rescissory was passed rescinding the actions of the "pretended parliaments" from 1640 to 1648.¹⁵ By this move, Charles reversed the legal standing of the Church of Scotland which would later serve as the basis from which to change the ecclesiastical structure of the Church. Nevertheless, the king promised "to maintain the true reformed protestant religion in its purity of doctrine and worship as it was established within this kingdom during the reigns of his royal father and grandfather of blessed memory....He will give all due countenance and protection to the ministers of the Gospel, they containing themselves within the bounds and limits of their ministerial calling and behaving themselves with that submission [that become good subjects]."¹⁶ By this statement, Charles warned all that the storm was upon them.

Oliver Cromwell was not a Scot, and he failed to understand the Scottish mind. The Scots would fight to the death for their cause in Christ and would be ardently opposed to a military machine more devastating than the monarch had been.

Many Presbyteries of Scotland were furious. They had been tricked once again. They sent, with little avail, a remonstrance to the king. The Scottish nobles, on the other hand, wanted an end to the strife and thought that the king's move, if accepted, would accomplish this end. Furthermore, James Sharp, originally sent to England as an emissary to preserve Presbyterianism, returned to Scotland having secretly been won over by English politicians in order to subvert Presbyterianism and aid in the effort to re-establish Prelacy. All the while concealing his intentions, Sharp worked to prevent the Scottish Presbyterians from protecting themselves against the planned usurpation and was later appointed Arch-

bishop of St. Andrews (only to meet a scandalous assassination).

Meanwhile, the English Parliament attended to its pressing business. The king began to reward the loyal royalists who had suffered under Cromwell. Charles began ridding the country of perceived traitors. The Marquis of Argyle who had labored for the king's return was executed

for the role he played in removing Charles I — "I set the crown on the King's head. He hastens me now to a better crown than his."¹⁷ Lord Wariston was hunted and later executed, and Samuel Rutherford and James Guthrie were tried and condemned. Rutherford died before he could be executed, and Guthrie offered his life a willing sacrifice for King Jesus.

The Execution of James Guthrie

James Guthrie's last words at his trial were, "My Lord, my conscience I cannot submit. But this old crazy body and mortal flesh I do submit, to do with it whatsoever Ye will, whether by death or banishment, or imprisonment, or anything else; only I beseech you to ponder well what profit there is in my blood. It is not the extinguishing of me or of many others that will extinguish the covenant or work of the Reformation since 1638. My blood, bondage or banishment will contribute more for the propagation of these things than my life in liberty would do, though I should live many years."¹⁸ It was not only those who would lay down their lives who suffered, but their wives and children also. Guthrie's wife, knowing it to be the last time she would see her husband alive, was concerned not to be a burden to him saying, "I do but trouble you. I must now part from you."¹⁹ His two children also came to bid their father farewell. William, his son, was only five years old and was named after his uncle William Guthrie, author of the great treasure *The Christian's True Interest* of which John Owen said that there was more divinity in that volume than in all of his own works. Guthrie took William upon

¹² Maclean, Fitzroy, *A Concise History of Scotland*, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1970), p. 136.

¹³ Burleigh, p. 234.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37.

¹⁷ Maclean, *Concise History*, p. 134.

¹⁸ Purves, p. 16.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

his knee and said, "Willie, the day will come when they will cast up to you that your father was hanged. But be not ashamed, lad. It is in a good cause."²⁰ After his death, Guthrie's wife and children were banished from Scotland, and anyone who would help them did so upon threats of death. His wife and children would be strengthened in their lot, both by so faithful a husband and father and also by his last letter he wrote to his wife just hours before his death:

My heart, — being within a few hours to lay down my life for the testimony of Jesus Christ, I do send these few lines as the last obedience of unfeigned and spotless affection which I bear unto you, not only as one flesh, but as a member with me of that blessed mystical body of the Lord; for I trust you are, and that God who has begun His good work in you, will also perfect it and bring it to an end, and give you life and salvation. Whatever may be your infirmities and weakness, yet the grace of God shall be sufficient for you, and His strength shall be perfected in your weakness. To me you have been a very kind and faithful yoke-fellow and not a hinderer but a helper in the work of the Lord. I bear you this testimony as all the recompense I can now leave you with.... Let not your wants and weakness discourage you. There is power, riches, and abundance with God, both as to the things of the body and things of the soul; and He will supply all your wants, and carry you through. It is like to be a most trying time but cleave you to God and keep his way, without casting away your confidence; fear not to be drowned in the depths of the troubles that may attend this land, God will hide you under His shadow, and keep you in the hollow of His hand.... You I recommend unto Him, and Him unto you: My heart! I recommend you to the Eternal Love of Jesus Christ — I am helped of God, and hope I shall be helped to the end. Pray for me while I am here, and praise with me hereafter. God be with you — I am yours.²¹

When James Guthrie mounted the scaffold stairs, hands tied behind his back, he showed no fear. He boldly turned on the steps and addressed the onlookers with one last faithful exhortation for his Lord and Savior. He addressed the crowd for over an hour. Both friend and foe were stunned in silence as were the Pharisees before Stephen. In time, God would bless the words of His Faithful Servant:

One thing I warn you all of, that God is very wroth with Scotland, and threatens to depart, and remove His candlestick. The causes of His wrath are many, and would to God it were not one great cause, that causes of wrath are despised. Consider the case that is recorded in Jer. XXXVII and the consequences of it, and tremble and fear. I cannot but also say that there is a great addition of wrath. (1) By that deluge of profanity that overfloweth all the land, in so far that many have not only lost all use and

exercise of religion, but even of morality. (2) By that horrible treachery and perjury that are in the matters of the covenant and cause of God. Be ye astonished, O ye heaven at this! (3) By horrible ingratitude. The Lord, after ten years oppression, hath broken the yoke of strangers from off our necks; but the fruit of our delivery is to work wickedness, and to strengthen our hands to do evil, by a most dreadful sacrificing to the creature. We have changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of a corruptible man, in whom many have placed almost all their salvation. God is also wroth with a generation of carnal, corrupt, time-serving ministers. I know and do bear testimony, that in the Church of Scotland there is a true and faithful ministry, and I pray you to honor these for their work's sake. I do bear my witness to the National Covenant of Scotland and Solemn League and Covenant betwixt the three kingdoms. These sacred, solemn, public oaths of God, I believe can be loosed or dispensed with by no person, or party, or power, upon earth, but still are binding upon these kingdoms, and will be so for ever hereafter, and are ratified and sealed by the conversion of many thousands souls, since our entering thereinto. I bear my testimony to the protestation against the controverted assemblies and public resolutions. I take God to record, upon my soul I would not exchange this scaffold with the palace or mitre of the greatest prelate in Britain. Blessed be God, who hath shown mercy to me such a wretch, and has revealed His Son in me, and made me a minister of the everlasting Gospel, and that He hath deigned, in the midst of much contradiction from Satan, and the world, to seal my ministry upon the hearts of not a few of His people, and especially in the station wherein I was last; I mean the congregation and Presbytery of Stirling. Jesus Christ is my light and my life, my righteousness, my strength, and my salvation, and all my desire. Him! Oh Him! I do, with all the strength of my soul, commend to you. Bless him, O my soul, from henceforth, even forever! Now lettest Thou thy servant depart in peace, for my eyes have seen thy salvation.²²

As the hangman placed the noose around the faithful servant's neck he cried, "The Covenants, The Covenants, shall yet be Scotland's reviving."²³ Guthrie was one of the first of some 18,000 who over the next twenty-eight years would be martyred for the cause and sake of Christ. James Guthrie provides for us a taste of that spiritual resolve that would cause Scotland to pass triumphantly through the storm of persecution which lay ahead. King Charles would, as we will see in future articles, Lord willing, try every means at his disposal to quench the spirit of Presbyterian Scotland. All to no avail. Δ

²² *Ibid.* p.68-73. also Howie, John, *The Scots Worthies* (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, N.D.) p. 265-266.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 73,266.


²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 18.

²¹ *Naphtali* (author unknown) (Glasgow and London: W.R. M'phum, 1862) pp. 66-67.

Tony Curto is pastor of Covenant Community Church, Orange County, CA, and a Senior Editor of Antithesis.

CANON PRESS

& B O O K S E R V I C E



Fruit of the Cross

This book is an exposition and defense of the thesis that the only nature indwelling the regenerate man is the new nature given at conversion.....\$6

No Stone Unturned

The authors of the essays in this anthology are all six-day creationists who have considered the implications of such a belief for their respective disciplines.....\$5

The Forgotten Heavens

This is a Biblical and scholarly tour of what C.S. Lewis argued was an essential view of the heavens. The writers bring out many interesting insights regarding Hell, Hades, principalities, cherubim, satyrs, Lilith, divination, and angels.....\$8

How to be Free from Bitterness

Bitterness is a common problem, so we have lots of copies of this one.....\$1.20

The Loveliness of Christ

This small book contains excerpts from Rutherford's famous *Letters*. In these pages, the reader will be encouraged particularly in times of trial and affliction.....\$6

Withhold Not Correction

Have you ever wondered why the children of so many Christians are undisciplined? Or perhaps why your own children are undisciplined?.....\$3.96

The Mother At Home

First published 158 years ago, this book illustrates Biblical expectations of a child's behavior, and enunciates the principles of discipline necessary to bring your children up to that standard.....\$5.56

Recovering the Lost Tools of Learning

Russell Kirk comments, "Good at diagnosing our educational afflictions, Douglas Wilson is still better at finding remedies. His Logos School provides a model, a practical design, for the restoration in the curriculum of Christian humanism — as contrasted with what Christopher Dawson called secular humanism.".....\$9.95

J U S T R E L E A S E D ! !

Easy Chairs...Hard Words

In this work, the reader will find an unapologetic treatment of many of the hard words in Scripture. Perhaps the discovery will be made that our difficulty with them is not in the text, but rather in our hearts.....\$6.95

Also available, a four-tape series:

Biblical Child Rearing

Walt Hibbard in Great Christian Books catalog says, "In listening to these tapes, I have encountered an amazing degree of biblical insight and understanding of the art of training children as God would have parents do it. Wilson goes far beyond the usual proof text method of applying the Scriptures and comes up with the most helpful series on this subject that I have heard in a long time." \$10

Call our TOLL FREE number to order and we will bill you for the books and postage.

1-800-488-2034

If you wish to order by mail: Canon Press, P.O. Box 8741, Moscow, ID 83843

The Feminist Flaw

**Feminist antagonism
is driven by a non-
Christian fixation
with rights, but a
sound theology of the
Cross liberates us
from politicizing the
purposes of God.**

J. Daryl Charles

Whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be slave of all. For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many (Mark 10:43-45).

In a recent batch of personal mail, I received an announcement for the upcoming Institute of Biblical Research annual meeting to be held in Kansas City in November. IBR is a society of Christian scholars, most of whom are professors of theology or Biblical studies at universities and seminaries across the U.S. and Canada. The annual meeting normally consists of a Friday evening banquet and speaker, followed Saturday by several seminar presentations. One of the Saturday presentations scheduled for this year's meeting is by a self-professed "Biblical feminist" who teaches at an evangelical seminary on the East Coast. Her topic: "God as Mother, Not Mother as God: A Biblical Response to the New Feminism."

This speaker doubtless views herself as providing a great service to the convening IBR members, hoping to adjust the focus of what she believes to be a distortion of theology. Even with a brand of feminism which is perhaps less shrill than that of her non-religious counterparts, she is nonetheless one among many who have adopted prevailing social currents in the realm of theology.

Several months ago I was asked to edit a chapter of a book written by a well-known evangelical leader. This excerpt was being published separately in booklet form by a prominent evangelical publishing house in the Midwest. The editorial staff, without notifying the author, had taken the liberty of changing numerous words (mostly pronouns) — I counted approximately forty such cases in this short booklet — in order to conform to a more "inclusive" canon of language. The author, from whose best-selling book this chapter had been excerpted (with permission), was appalled to learn after the fact that such editorial license was taken without so much as a phone call or letter of request. While not altering the

author's basic thesis, the gelding of the text had effectually, in the opinion of the outraged author, changed the tenor and force of his argument. Evidently, his language was deemed by this evangelical publisher to be "politically incorrect." The ethical implications of such aggressive and unsanctioned editing, to say the very least, are disturbing.

What these two instances underscore is the extent to which the feminist mindset has penetrated Christian, indeed evangelical, circles. With the full incursion of feminist thought into the evangelical world, one is forced to consider the driving impetus behind this phenomenon. The stridency of feminist conviction, to be sure, is not confined to religious feminism. However, with minimal interest in Biblical literature, the Church has good reason to scrutinize a construct of feminism which purports to have "Biblical" justification, since whatever prevailing social currents are at work in modern culture will *inevitably* come to roost at the Church's doorstep.

Historically, challenges to orthodox faith were viewed as matters of "heresy" and met with a Christian apologetic; today, they are accommodated as being in step with the times, and any counter-response by the Church is vigorously condemned as socially "reactionary" and obscure. The whole debate over "inclusive language" may serve to illustrate this point. At stake is not merely an issue of linguistic precision. Rather, the aims of the "inclusivists" are ideological. It can be argued that the problem has even less to do with the Church's understanding of ministry, important as that is, than with its understanding of the nature of man and the nature of *God Himself*. Indeed, the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Christ are the fundamental beliefs upon which historic Christianity rests.¹ Thus, for the feminist, a process of doctrinal reconstruction must be applied to the very heart of Biblical revelation itself. In the end, the question comes down to this: Are we prepared to receive God's revelation of Himself? Writing in the late 1940's, C.S. Lewis noted:

Christians think that God Himself has taught us how to speak of Him. To say that it does not matter

¹ The issue is not whether traits which we normally describe as masculine or feminine are inherent to the character of God. By virtue of the fact that both sexual characteristics have been granted creation, this is a given. Rather, it must be emphasized that throughout history, God has revealed Himself as male. In the Old Testament, He stands in counterdistinction to creation, which in the language of revelation is understood as feminine (see, for example, her personification in Proverbs 8, especially vv. 22ff). The nation of Israel, God's own peculiar people, is presented as female in the magnificent nuptial imagery of Song of Songs and Hosea. In the New Testament, God's identity is foremost that of the Father. In becoming flesh, the eternal Logos is incarnated as the image of the Father. Jesus speaks and acts in the authority of the One Who sent Him — the Father.

The Church, as the full expression of the people of God, is viewed similarly to the Old Testament covenant community — in nuptial terms (Eph. 5:22-23). She is described as being prepared by and for the bridegroom (Eph. 5:26-27; cf. also John 3:29). As a virgin, the Church is to be obsessed with the love of her Spouse, for Whom she awaits with great anticipation, and in Whose name and identity she derives her deepest satisfaction.

is to say that all the masculine imagery is not inspired, is merely human in origin, or...quite arbitrary and unessential. And this is surely intolerable; or, if tolerable, it is an argument not in favour of Christian priestesses but against Christianity.²

Due to the sheer volume of literature feminists are publishing, whether secular, religious, or so-called "Biblical" in orientation (discussions of oxymorons aside), I cannot hope to examine the available literature in the scope of this essay.³ In general terms, however, what is perhaps most striking about feminist dogma is the *stridency* with which it promotes itself. It is incumbent upon the Church to consider not only the nature of the arguments feminists set forth but also the *spirit* in which such arguments are couched. Sadly, the great majority of feminists drive their impetus from a reaction *against* something: they are, by and large, *driven* by an overriding sense of *hostility*. Reduced to its essence, feminism would appear to be a "chip on the shoulder disguised as a philosophy, a misguided conviction that rage is the proper response to...society...."⁴

By cultivating anger and self-pity, not tolerance and Christian service, the feminist aims to create a consciousness which can shed the shackles of oppres-

sive patriarchy. One feminist is explicit: "How," she asks, "could feminist consciousness have developed without anger? ...To submit to the guidance of traditional religion is to become vulnerable to a kind of spiritual rape."⁵ The feminist, then, fights the battle of the sexes in deadly earnest. "It is hardly possible," notes a feminist writer, "to call to mind a single feminist theologian, whatever her phase of development may be, who does not find the image of the Father-God a challenge and a direct confrontation."⁶ Indeed to perceive or acknowledge God as Father would confirm the status quo of "patriarchal" society. It is this fundamental dilemma which gives birth to the feminist response illustrated by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenze in her book *In Memory of Her*,⁷ in which the New Testament undergoes a curious "reconstruction."⁸

Thus, in analyzing the resultant antagonism which undergirds the feminist mindset, one is left to question the spirit with which feminists aggressively promote their agenda.

Before the advent of deconstructionism,⁹ meaningful communication stressed the significance of not only what was being said but also how it was being

² C.S. Lewis, *God in the Dock* (London: Macmillan, 1979) p. 90. For an excellent treatment of feminist dismantling of Biblical revelation, see William Oddie, *What Will Happen to God? Feminism and the Reconstruction of Christian Belief* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988).

³ Several feminist works which have served as "primers" for religious feminism include Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of Woman's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); Rosemary Radford Ruether, *New Woman, New Earth* (New York: Seabury, 1975); idem, *Womanguides: Readings Toward a Feminist Theology* (Boston: Beacon, 1985); Letty Russell, *The Liberating Word* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976); Naomi Goldenberg, *Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions* (Boston: Beacon, 1979); Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, eds., *Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); Linda Clark et al., eds., *Image-Breaking, Image-Building* (New York: Pilgrim, 1981); and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her* (London: SCM, 1983).

Among Christians who argue for a virtually complete uniformity in sexual roles are Letha and John Scanzoni, *Men, Women and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976); Aida B. Spencer, *Beyond the Curse* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1985); Gilbert Bilezikian, *Beyond Sex Roles: A Guide for the Study of Female Roles in the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985); idem, "Hierarchist and Egalitarian Inculturations" *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 30 (1987) pp. 423-24; Patricia Gundry, *Neither Slave nor Free: Helping Women Answer the Call to Church Leadership* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); idem, *Woman Be Free! The Clear Message of Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988); and idem, *Heirs Together: Mutual Submission in Marriage* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988).

Added to this list are egalitarians who assume that Paul is in conflict with himself in various texts — e.g., Krister Stendahl, *The Bible and the Role of Women* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966); Paul K. Jewett, *Man as Male and Female* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975); and Virginia Mollenkott, *Women, Men and the Bible* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1977).

⁴ Kersten, Katherine "What Do Women Want?," *Policy Review* (Spring 1991) p.4.

⁵ Paula, Fredricksen Landes, book review, *Signs: A Journal of Women and Culture* 6/2 (1980) pp. 328-29.

⁶ Halkes, Catharine "The Themes of Protest in Feminist Theology against God the Father," *God as Father* (eds. Metz, J.B. and Schillebeeckx, E.; Concilium 143; New York: Herder and Herder, 1981) p. 103.

⁷ (London: SCM, 1983).

⁸ It is a notably rare occurrence to encounter a feminist who comes from a home environment in which there was to be found a firm and loving father. This familial element is frequently coupled with pressure from professional peers to adopt current prevailing social trends. It would seem, based on the proliferation of "Women's Studies" programs in the last ten years, that the academy provides the ideal environment in which feminists can pool resources to begin reconstructing society.

⁹ An intellectual sleight of hand, deconstructionism seeks to "dismantle hierarchies" in literature and life. It entails a sort of devil's advocacy taken to the extreme — and perhaps beyond. Deconstructionism has taught a generation of literary critics that there is no "text" apart from the subjective interpretation of the reader, that the author has no more authority than the reader. The movement believes there is so little connection between words and reality that meaning is absolutely up for grabs. Historians have also discovered that history as well can be deconstructed. Gertrude Himmelfarb, the distinguished professor emerita of history at the City University of New York, aptly notes: "In one discipline after another, the deconstructionists promise to do what Marxists before them tried to do: to 'demystify' received truth and liberate us from the tyranny of 'facticity'" ("The Right to Misquote," *Commentary* [April 1991] p. 34).

In some institutions, deconstructionism is past its prime; in others, it is only now coming into prominence, achieving in some intellectual circles almost talismanic status. The movement initially appeared among French pseudo-intellectuals, before being brought to America by Jacques Derrida, who presently teaches at the University of California at Irvine.

Any connection between deconstructionism and feminist thought is not incidental. Endemic in feminist and deconstructionist thinking is a hostility toward "hierarchical" structures. Paramount to both is the quest for freedom from patterns of authority which involve some sort of subordination, whether of ideas or humans beings. This very striving for autonomy is what makes feminism — in its more secular and religious forms — so antithetical to the Christian tradition. Structures of authority, whether in the political sphere, the

expressed. Such basic rules of dialogue, of course, are not limited to the interpretation of literary texts, nor are they confined to "professional counseling" techniques; indeed, they govern the whole of normal discourse. In writing to the Christians at Ephesus, Paul admonished the Church to "speak the truth in love" (Eph. 4:15). The fundamental idea expressed by the Apostle is not that love and truth stand in a tension, rather that they facilitate one another. Truth expressed through love, i.e., in an appropriate Christian fashion, allows truth's application to be most effective. Thus, *how* we communicate is an evidence of the *validity* of our argument as well as the level of our *maturity* (Cf. Eph. 4:13-16).

The Hermeneutics of Suspicion

Central to any feminist presentation, whether religious or secular in character, is the language of "rights" and entitlement. Even according to the more "benign"¹⁰ forms of religious feminism, the message is clear. Women have been deprived of their share. Curiously, religious feminists, many of whom would ordinarily reject the authenticity of the Pauline epistles, harken madly to Galatians 3. They commonly argue that Christ has removed any prejudicial distinctions between male and female.¹¹ On this score, feminists, regardless of their personal view of Scripture, are partially correct. Prejudice indeed has been dealt with by God at the cross. That role distinctions are obliterated by Christ, however, is not found in the Galatian epistle.

Broadly speaking, there is a tendency among "Biblical feminists" to utilize a flawed hermeneutic. Texts which do not seem to suit their philosophical aims are conveniently — and often conspicuously — avoided, or they are dismissed as cultural anomalies. Such is practiced, for example, by Gretchen Gaebelein Hull in her book *Equal to Serve*:¹²

church or the family, are not to be abolished but *redeemed*.

Deconstructionists hold all texts to be equal; thus, we cannot make value judgments. Any attempt at a value judgment is consequently to be viewed as a play for power and position. Literary criticism, then, can easily be converted into a litmus test whose only purpose is to uncover "sexist" evidences. So thoroughgoing is deconstructionist scepticism, that it tends to *silence* all of language, thereby destroying meaningful communication. The resultant intellectual void must be filled with some type of belief, and often a greater degree of intellectual and cultural oppression will ensue.

¹⁰ In truth there is no relatively "benign" form of feminism, in light of its foundational assumptions — non-differentness, cultural determinism of the sex roles and certain changeability (see Levin, Michael, "The Feminist Mystique," *Commentary* [December 1980] p.25). These unswerving tenets form an uncompromising empirical doctrine leading to social action which is intended to transform culture.

¹¹ The core assumptions of contemporary feminist thought are that male oppression of females governs all of social intercourse and that patriarchal social institutions (of which the church is a prime example) inhibit women from attaining a just and egalitarian world. In contradistinction, the Bible does not accord the status of demonic to either sex — male or female. Rather, *both sexes*, fallen and in need of redemption, stand indicted before a holy God.

¹² (Old Tappan: Fleming H. Revell, 1987). The title itself

Everything I know about God indicates that He is indeed love, so loving that He came Himself to die for me. Therefore, I put to one side passages like the Imprecatory Psalms or the Canaanite Wars that I do not understand. But I do not throw out the truth "God is love," simply because some passages about the nature of God puzzle me.

So we should also treat the three "hard passages" about women [1 Cor. 11:2-16; 14:33b-36; 1 Tim. 2:8-15], which we find in the New Testament and which appear to place specific restrictions on women only. To these we could add Colossians 3:18; Ephesians 5:22-23; and 1 Peter 3:1-6... Therefore we may legitimately put these Scripture portions aside for the very reason that they remain "hard passages" — hard exegetically, hard hermeneutically, and hard theologically.¹³

A very typical feature of the "Biblical feminist's" hermeneutic is her handling of Galatians 3:28. This will more than likely entail an uncritical reading of Paul's thought in Galatians 3,¹⁴ predicated on the faulty premise that role distinctions, leading to male "domination," were introduced first as a result of the *fall*,¹⁵ not at creation.¹⁶

is a bit odd, since genuine servanthood does not look over its shoulder to monitor fairness.

¹³ Sadly, such an approach to the Scriptures is irresponsible, at the very least, and dishonest, at worse. To dispute some passages which are "hard" and conveniently set them aside as unauthoritative in the formulation of Christian sexuality, and hence, not worthy of Christian obedience, is to overthrow the truth of God.

¹⁴ Paul's argument in Galatians 3 is not that Christians will treat each other identically in some sort of mechanical fashion. Rather, *all* qualify as heirs of God in Christ; *all* are Abraham's offspring. The error of a feminist reading of Galatians 3:28 is that social theory is imported to the text. Paul is not saying that all in Christ are *homo-sexual*. Galatians 3:28 must square, for example, with 1 Peter 3:1-7.

Evidence would indicate that the feminist minimization of sex role differentiation contributes to a confusion of one's sexual identity. Given this disorientation, it is not uncommon for individuals who have grown up in more conservative evangelical traditions eventually to affirm homosexual relationships. See, for example, Scanzoni, Letha and Mollenkott, Virginia *Is the Homosexual My Neighbor? Another Christian View* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978). Along similar lines, the October 3, 1986 issue of *Christianity Today* contained an article reporting a split in the Evangelical Women's Caucus over the question of whether there should be "recognition of the presence of the lesbian minority" ("Gay Rights Resolution Divides Membership of Evangelical Woman's Caucus," *Christianity Today* [October 3, 1986] pp. 40-43).

¹⁵ Modern feminists have expunged the rather bothersome notion that *all human beings*, not merely males, are inherently flawed and hence incapable of producing a truly just society.

¹⁶ Sin, not distinct sexual roles, has falsified human sexuality. In addition to feminism's disregard for collective human fallenness, it denies divinely given (and limited) attributes. To deny the distinctiveness of the sexes is to deny the richness of God and His creation. Human sexuality, *from the very beginning*, is sacramentalized in the balance of the masculine and feminine. The words of Genesis before the fall emphasize the distinct role of the sexes: "God created man in his

We can grant that forms of sexual bias, and hence, forms of discrimination, are affected by the atonement. Precisely how the Cross applies to the sexes in bringing about unity and equality is in need of further definition. Let us consider, then, the basis for this unity and equality.¹⁷ How has Christ achieved such? And what is to be our (men's and women's) response?

"Rights" and the Self-life

Underlying much of Paul's theology, in Galatians as well as in his other letters, is a psychology of the atonement. That is, the Apostle sets forth the very constitutive nature of propitiation, forgiveness, cleansing and justification. The individual who confesses Christ's lordship has bowed his (her) knee at the cross. For the apostle, the Cross represents the place of total brokenness, for it is at the Cross that the self-life is acknowledged and abandoned. Thus Jesus, in presenting the cost of discipleship, could speak of taking up one's cross and denying himself (herself). Christian discipleship is nothing less than forsaking one's personal claim to rights on his (her) life; this, then, is following Christ as Lord.

The implications of abandonment of the self-life were very real for Saul of Tarsus. He could state autobiographically that he had *thoroughly* died to Christ (see, for example, Phil 1:20-21 and 3:10). Anything of the flesh which was formerly dear to him was laid at the foot of the Cross. This was no sentimental journey down

own image and likeness... Male and female he created them" (Gen. 1:27). The irony of feminism is that its proponents adopt characteristics which traditionally have been considered masculine, not those considered feminine. In countering the libertine spirit in the Corinthian church which was inhibiting corporate worship, Paul reminded his readers that bearing the image of God sexually was based on the creation model (11:7-9). For the Apostle, that model was still standing firm and bearing on the context of public worship in the Corinthian assembly.

¹⁷ It should be noted that even the duties and practices of Christian husbands and wives, between whom there exists some overlap in terms of responsibilities, are not purely identical or interchangeable (see, for example, apostolic teaching in Ephesians 5, 1 Corinthians 7, Colossians 3 and 1 Peter 3). A mature Christian marriage will manifest neither a domineering spirit nor egalitarianism. Husbands will be seeking to minister uniquely to the needs of their wives as Christ sacrificed Himself for the Church, and wives will be seeking to love their husbands uniquely as the Church loves Christ.

If a woman is subordinate to a man, a man is subordinate to Christ, Who has voluntarily subordinated Himself to God the Father (see 1 Cor. 11:3 and 15:24-28). None of these "hierarchical" relationships are demeaning. We are speaking here of a subordination *wholly consistent* with the unity and equality of the nature existing between members of the Godhead. Yet such an understanding of equality, as William Oddie (p. 58 [see n. 2]) notes, requires that we distance ourselves from any merely human or ephemerally political understanding of the Word. Our relationships are to be viewed "in Christ." Based on the overwhelming affirmation of sexual distinctions throughout the Bible, the "Christian feminist" faces a dilemma: how to live out this distinction (acknowledged or not) against the background of a culture whose proclivity is to obliterate *all* human distinctiveness.

memory lane for the Apostle. It meant total brokenness in everything intimately associated with his personhood. Moreover, death to the self-life for Paul was an ongoing process (I Cor. 15:31 and Col 3:5).

In the letter of I Corinthians, a notable thread running throughout much of the epistle is the discussion of personal freedoms. The Corinthians prided themselves conspicuously on their inherent "freedom" in Christ. This posed, however, difficulties for the community as a whole. Individualism, at the expense of corporate edification, was destroying the collective life of the Church. Many in the Corinthian church deemed individual liberties more precious than the building of the whole Body of Christ. In the midst of his impassioned correspondence, Paul injects a very transparent piece of testimony. Chapter nine records the Apostle taking great pains to describe the process in his own life by which he had laid aside various claims to apostolic "rights." Legally, at least in the courts of heaven, any personal rights or privileges inherent to his office were justifiable. Practically, however, Paul was moved to forego some of these rights *for the sake of others*.

The force of the Pauline polemic aimed at the Corinthians was designed to offset the strident libertinism characteristic of that community. Rather than be obsessed with "rights" and personal liberties, the Corinthians were to humble themselves, seek the interests of others, and strive to edify the whole church. In short, this would entail a dying to self. The material found in 11:2-16 is a window into the clash between individual rights and corporate edification which was taking place in Corinth. Paul, while assuming and acknowledging the ministry of women already operative within the assembly (note, for example, 11:5), admonishes the church nonetheless to honor a traditional social norm and thus maintain the highest-degree of unity in the body by preventing *distractions* based on sexual liberty which resulted from unloving insistence on rights.

Paul's own convictions about "rights" are instructive. They square with Jesus' teaching on servanthood. Servanthood is foreign to the human spirit. Rights are inherent to the self-life, a life which, for the Christian, is initially crucified by an act of faith and subsequently requires ongoing recrucifixion in response to the demands of Christian discipleship. This understanding is integral to Jesus' imperative of taking up one's cross. For Christians, the "cross" of discipleship which we carry is *not* our sexuality or our identity; rather, it is *how* we handle our sexuality, how we represent Christ through our lives in the context of a fallen world. Moreover, Jesus' Cross is not *our* Cross. *He* bore sin and injustice;¹⁸ we do not. We are to *rest* in His salvation, otherwise we run the risk of negating his atoning work. Historic Christianity, it should be noted, while it always freed men and women from the bondage of sin, *never* eradicated distinctions of sex roles. It is because of human alienation from God, *not patriarchy*, that the Cross was necessary.

It is also highly instructive that modern feminism was not born in African, Asian, or East European

¹⁸ That men and women have differing roles in the liturgy of the Church does *not* constitute "injustice."

cultures, where the plight of women, viewed in relative and global terms, might seem appalling.¹⁹ Rather, it emerged initially in western culture some twenty-five years ago, gaining a foothold formally in the social sciences and subsequently spilling over into other domains. As is characteristic of the disciplines of theology and Biblical studies, which tend to embrace prevailing cultural trends often ten to fifteen years subsequent to their introduction in the secular realm, feminism has in recent years become a "major hermeneutical player." Religious forms of feminist thought, following suit ideologically with their secular counterparts, have imported the totalitarian language of rights and entitlement. "Biblical feminists" argue that women's ministry has been suppressed by the traditional male-dominated Church.

Servitude or Service?

An important observation needs to be made at this point. The vast majority of lay women in the Christian Church are *not* striving after rights. They are not seeking to establish within the Church a caucus for power politics. Rather, they recognize, and are operating in, their "rightful" ministry as women liberated at the Cross from the bondage of sin — liberated to *serve* Christ and others by the power of the Holy Spirit.²⁰ This is the liberation of which Jesus spoke. And this is the liberation to which all true disciples are called. John 13 affords us a portrait of bona fide discipleship — a call to lay down one's rights and *serve*. Such entails no less than a dying to self. The call to Christian discipleship which takes seriously the crucifixion of the self-life and its accompanying demand for "rights" most assuredly will not fill up auditoriums with crowds seeking a feel-good religion. Nor will it attract the multitudes worshipping at the altars of self-affirmation.

Although in the eyes of the world servanthood is demeaning and hence to be absolutely loathed, in the eyes of God it is a state of exaltedness. Servanthood, properly seen, is the ultimate expression of true freedom.

¹⁹ Many Communist societies — notably the Soviet Union, China and Cuba — have shown themselves to be truly abysmal regarding the plight of women, despite their rhetoric of sexual neutrality. In practice, they turn out to be more "patriarchal" than most western nations! The simple fact is that a genuine matriarchy does not exist anywhere in the world — it never has, and this is based on universals rooted in creation. The closest model of egalitarianism to which feminism has looked for the purposes of articulating a utopian expectation is the Israeli Kibbutz. For a discussion of feminist research findings pertaining to the Kibbutz, see Davidson, Nicholas, *The Failure of Feminism* (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1988) pp. 233-34, and Ayers, David J., "The Inevitability of Failure: the Assumptions and Implementation of Modern Feminism" (unpublished paper), pp. 14-18. On biological and psychological aspects of the egalitarian question, see Goldberg, Stephen, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy* (New York: William Morrow, 1974); Neely, James C., *Gender: The Myth of Equality* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); Konner, Melvin, *The Tangled Wing* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982); and Davidson, Nicholas ed., *Gender Sanity* (Lanham: University Press, 1989).

²⁰ What is inspired by the Holy Spirit is not driven by coercion, rather it is led and gently prodded. On this count,

Whereas preoccupation with self will necessarily breed a fixation with rights, a healthy preoccupation with the theology of the cross will liberate us from politicizing the purposes of God. In their critique of precisely this "politicization," Brigitte and Peter Berger comment:

Sexist language is an invention of the feminist movement...[It] is a theory that elevates infantile misunderstandings to the level of hermeneutics... What matters...is that the theory legitimates a linguistic offensive that is part of a general political strategy. In this strategy, every pronoun purged from a text, every insertion of "person" as a general suffix, constitutes a symbolic victory in the larger struggle.²¹

It is precisely from this politicization — a profaning of creation and the divine economy²² — that feminism must be saved. Surely the result will be dramatic. Rather than vying to see who will be *leading* the Church or exercising power, we will be far more concerned about *serving* one another.²³ Δ

feminism fully disqualified itself based on *fruit* alone. There are two types of wisdom, according to James: the earthly variety, which breeds envy, ambition, disorder and a denial of truth (3:14-16), and a heavenly counterpart, which is pure, peace-loving, considerate, submissive and full of mercy (3:17-18).

²¹ *The War over the Family* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983.) p. 48.

²² It should not be surprising that *sexual* revolt is the most profound expression of human rebellion. In creating us male and female, God has made human sexuality integral to our very being — a reality which is owing not to the fall, rather to human creation itself. And this creation is the very *crown* of divine handiwork. Our human and sexual dignity are rooted in our being created in God's image and likeness (Gen. 1:27). This creative genius is "good," and our sexual identity, which entails both equality and distinction, is proportional to our acquiescence to this glorious fact. For this reason, Paul can write that a distortion of human sexuality constitutes the ultimate in rebellion against God's authority (Rom. 1:18-32). To deny the realities of male and female sexual identity is to mock the Creator and languish in the futility of a darkened understanding (1:21), resulting in the exchange of truth for a lie and ultimate depravity (1:25-28).

²³ For an excellent discussion of the interconnection between the institutions of the family and the church, see Poythress, Vern, *The Church as Family* (Wheaton, IL: Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, 1990). Assuming that Ephesians 5:22-33 presents us with a permanent model for irreversible roles in marriage, Poythress attempts to demonstrate that such irreversibility carries over into the context of the life of the church. Precisely the converse can be argued as well: if, in fact, distinct roles exist in the life and function of the church, then they exist as well for the family. The theme of family relationships is particularly prominent in Paul's first letter to his "son" Timothy. The interconnection between family and church is assumed in 3:2-5, especially v. 5: "If anyone does not know how to manage his own family, how can he take care of God's church?"

J. Daryl Charles is a Lecturer in New Testament at Chesapeake Theological Seminary and Scholar-in-Residence at Prison Fellowship Ministries, Washington, D.C.

Consumer or 'Consumerist'?

There is a difference.


If you're a consumer who doesn't feel represented by much of what passes for "consumerism" these days . . .

If you don't believe that piling on more government regulations is the answer to your problems . . .

If you want accurate, up-to-date information on a wide range of consumer topics . . .

Then there is a consumer magazine that's written and edited for you. It is, in fact, the pioneer consumer publication, which has been helping consumers since 1928.

CONSUMERS' Research



In every issue, CR offers hard-hitting reports, based on the latest studies and scientific data, concerning subjects such as:

- How federal regulations cause airline congestion
- How farm subsidies raise consumer food prices
- Why auto insurance is so expensive
- What's causing medical costs to skyrocket

If you would like to see a consumer magazine that really takes the side of the consumer, favors America's system of competitive enterprise, and casts a searchlight on the forces currently affecting your spending dollar, then you should be a subscriber to *Consumers' Research*.

In fact, for new subscribers, we have a special offer: A one-year subscription for \$18. That's a savings of \$12 off the cover price!

And, if you enclose payment with your order, we'll send you, free, your choice of two of the reprints listed in the box below.

Simply clip and mail the coupon below with your payment, and the reprints you want. We'll send you the reprints, and enroll you immediately as a subscriber, and start you receiving a consumer magazine that's on your side. And that's a wise decision for any consumer.

Best wishes,

M. Stanton Evans
Publisher

FREE OFFER

If you send payment with this coupon you can receive two of any of the following reprints, **free!**

- ☐ The Cable TV Tangle
- ☒ Does Everything Cause Cancer?
- ☒ The Free Market and the Consumer
- ☒ The Greenhouse Effect: Science Fiction?
- ☐ The High Cost of Catastrophic Insurance
- ☐ Nuclear Energy: How Safe Is It?
- ☒ The Real Cause of Airline Delays
- ☐ What's Behind the S&L Crisis?
- ☒ Why Your Phone Bills Keep Going Up

Circulation Department
Consumers' Research Magazine
800 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

AAT

Please send me the next twelve issues of *CR* magazine for only \$18.

- ☐ Payment enclosed.
- ☒ Please bill me.

Name

Address

City State Zip

- ☐ I have enclosed payment. Please send me two of the reprints I have checked.

Please allow up to 6 weeks for processing.

Challenging 'Compassion' in Crisis Childbearing

**A Biblical notion
of "compassion"
stands as a
challenge to the
Pro-Life move-
ment and the
statist spirit of
our age.**

Susan and Marvin Olasky

The problems of unwed pregnancy are growing more severe, not because solutions are unavailable to us, but because the dominant worldview finds those solutions intolerable. Those who challenge the conventional wisdom are fighting against a slavish academic and media devotion to ideology rather than good sense.

Cultural changes that have glorified unrestrained sexuality and minimized the importance of marriage while legitimizing single-parenting, easy divorce, and abortion have had a tremendous social, cultural, and economic effect. Educated women weathered feminist advances fairly well, but as Christopher Jencks acknowledged in *The New Republic*, "for less privileged couples, the demise of traditional norms about marriage and divorce posed more serious problems."¹

Jencks went on to note that in these days of liberation, boyfriends felt "freer to walk out after they conceive a child.... [P]oorly educated ex-husbands can seldom afford to support two households, and they seldom make adequate child support payments."² This breakdown of social pressure to "marry, to live together, and to support children" has led to increased economic vulnerability for children, especially those in the black community: "Single parenthood has always been much more common among poor blacks than in any other group, so doubling its frequency for everyone hurts poor black children more than any other group."³ In 1970 a

gap of 26 percent existed between the percentage of black (36 percent) and white (10 percent) never-married mothers who were single-parenting. By the mid-1980's the white rate had doubled to 20 percent and black rate had increased by two-thirds to 59 percent, so the racial gap had stretched to 39 percent.⁴

Overall, many more black children are being raised in poor, mother-headed families where they are "virtually programmed for juvenile delinquency."⁵ Many white children seem headed in the same direction. Conventional solutions that ignore morality merely make things worse. Jencks argues:

Even when almost every "respectable" adult thought unwed parenthood, desertion, and divorce immoral, it was hard to keep families together in poor communities. Now that the mass media, the schools, and even the churches have begun to treat single-parenthood as a regrettable but inescapable part of modern life, we can hardly expect the respectable poor to carry on the struggle against illegitimacy and desertion with their old fervor. They still deplore such behavior, but they cannot make it morally taboo. Once the two-parent norm loses its moral sanctity, the selfish considerations that always pulled poor parents apart often become overwhelming.⁶

Some conservatives with materialist orientations have reacted to a perception that welfare is the culprit and have called for "workfare rather than welfare." Certainly, an emphasis on gaining economic independence rather than fostering dependence is vital; yet, as urban analyst William Tucker has noted, "Workfare will do nothing to put the black family back together. The main problem with single mothers, after all, is not that they don't work, but that they don't get married."⁷

Until Christians once again support those struggling to uphold marriage and Biblical values in the face of widespread disregard for them, and until society responds, the problems of unwed parenting will get worse. Some academics like to talk about complicated structural causes of poverty, but the key factor stares us in the face. Divorce and unwed motherhood, both resulting from individual decisions, account for essentially all the growth in poverty since 1970. Revisions in divorce laws and welfare policies are important, but large-scale change is likely only if revival and reformation touch the hearts of millions of individuals, as well as thousands in academia and the media who crucially influence long-range trends. "Every child a two-parent child" should be our goal, with the understanding that tragedy sometimes interferes. Christians particularly need to stress the crucial role of fatherhood in developing the attitudes we have towards both God and man. The Westminster Shorter Catechism's discussion of the first clause of the Lord's Prayer ("Our Father who art in Heaven") notes that it "teaches us to

¹ Jencks, Christopher, "Deadly Neighborhoods," *The New Republic*, June 13, 1988, p. 29. Jencks's article also critiques economic determinist explanations of delinquency and crime.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Tucker, William, "Our Homestead Plan for the Poor," *The American Spectator*, July, 1988, p. 28.

⁶ Jencks, "Deadly," p. 30.

⁷ Tucker, "Homestead".

draw near to God with all holy reverence and confidence – as children to a father, able and ready to help us.”⁸ It is harder for children to glimpse the nature of God the Father when they have no experience of drawing near to an earthly father with respect and with confidence.

While most Americans profess belief in God as revealed in the Bible, antipathy to Biblical norms of conduct is widespread and deep. It comes out in statements like this one, made often by pregnant women considering abortion: “I could never place my baby for adoption once it was born. I have to have an abortion.” Pro-life counselors, surprised by the seeming illogic of the statement often conclude sadly: “They’d rather kill their babies than place for adoption.” That common attitude exemplifies the egocentric spirit of philosophies that value self-fulfillment and autonomy above anything else. As former NIMH analyst Joanne Greer noted, “Giving birth has become a self-focused act, and one which should be avoided unless it is self-aggrandizing.... One is struck by the reasoning that ‘a child of mine who cannot live with me can give me no joy, and therefore he cannot and must not exist at all.’”⁹

That same “spirit of the age” has weakened the traditional commitment to marriage. Christopher Jencks notes that “shotgun weddings and lifetime marriages caused adults a lot of misery, but they ensured that almost every child had a claim on some adult male’s earnings.”¹⁰ Jencks argues that, historically, the unabridged right to conceive children carried with it the responsibility to care for them within marriage. This unstated contract was enforced through “very strong social pressure on couples to marry if they conceived children and to stay married thereafter.”

The Horrid Consequences of “Compassion”

But what can Christians do when sexual intercourse becomes more common in courtship than flowers? Over the past twenty years, powerful forces in academia, media, law, social work, and government have led a systematic assault on the two-parent family. Piece by piece, they have dismantled the Biblical foundation supporting families in order to set women and children free to be...whatever. Instead of freedom, we have reaped sorrow. Families have been thrust into poverty. Children have suffered from neglect, abuse, and instability. Millions of babies have been aborted.

Now the chickens are roosting. It is relatively easy to be pro-life when we are thinking about middle-class white women whose babies will be loved either by them or by one of a hundred couples yearning to adopt. It is another thing to be pro-life when standing in a room full of “boarder babies” – newborns of crack-using mothers – in an inner-city Washington, DC hospital. Each boarder baby shows how dangerous a little knowledge, without wisdom or compassion, can be. His

or her pregnant, cocaine-addicted mother knew that smoking a large amount of crack would send her into premature labor. When she tired of pregnancy, that’s what she did – she smoked, and then she walked into the hospital and gave birth. The next day, anxious for more crack she checked out of the hospital, leaving her cocaine-addicted baby behind.

What happens next? The baby suffers withdrawal pains and sometimes needs phenobarbital. He has what nurses call “gaze aversion” – something is wrong neurologically, and he cannot bear to make eye contact. And the mother? Typically, the hospital hears nothing from her for close to thirty days. But just as she knew the crack can bring on labor, she knows the rules. If she makes contact with the hospital, even by telephone for a minute once a month, she can hold onto custody of the child. Selfish, but knowing that she has left her possession behind, she calls the hospital every four weeks – often enough to insure custody, but not often enough to get tied down.

The baby, meanwhile, spends his vital first few months under the harsh glare of unrelenting hospital lights and constant noise. Nurses try to provide continuity of care for these boarder babies, but emergency labor or a thousand other things force them to help someone else with immediate needs. The nurses cry out for help. Volunteers come in to hold the babies. They try to make up for the absence of parents, an hour at a time. But they are not parents, and the baby stays in the hospital, a boarder.

Even when the mother stops calling – if she does – DC social service officials say they are overloaded with abuse and neglect cases. District officials say they have neither the resources to license foster care homes, nor the personnel to do the necessary work to place these babies. Foster parents licensed in the Virginia or Maryland suburbs have to be relicensed in the District; that takes time. And the months roll by, and the baby stays on, a boarder.

No one knows the long-term effect of fetal crack addiction combined with newborn social deprivation, but here is one instance in which the sins of parents are clearly visited upon children. Other sins also have an effect; babies born HIV-positive also face frequent abandonment. Occasionally a large-hearted relative will take home an HIV baby. One grandmother did so. She received training on how to keep that baby well and avoid opportunistic infections. But when she applied for Social Security funds to pay for the baby’s care, she was told, “You cannot get money unless the baby has an opportunistic infection. Come back then.”

What can we do? Part of the problem is public policy. A law that allows a mother to make a telephone call once every thirty days in order to avoid losing custody of her children is not a pro-family law, but an abuse of parental rights. Foster care rules that tie children up in a DC hospital rather than getting them into a home are not pro-family, but bureaucracy run amuck. It’s crazy that a foster care license in one jurisdiction isn’t good in the neighboring one. It’s crazy that babies who are HIV-positive cannot get Social Security benefits unless they show evidence of an “opportunistic” disease. But even when these policy matters

⁸ *The Shorter Catechism*, Question 99.

⁹ Greer, Joanne, “Adoptive Placement: Developmental and Psychotherapeutic Issues,” *Pregnancy in Adolescence* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982), p. 398.

¹⁰ Jencks, “Deadly,” p. 30.

are changed, there will have to be people willing to care for these children. And so, we must confront the issue of what it means to be *compassionately* pro-life, to meet the challenge of affirming that all children, even these from the most difficult of environments, need not only protection in the womb but nurturing afterward.

"Compassion" in Newspeak

A search through newspapers and magazines shows that the word *compassion* has a variety of loose usages these days.¹¹ It is used frequently as a synonym for "leniency." The *Los Angeles Times* reported that when a sheriff's deputy was to be sentenced for selling cocaine, the judge was asked to be "compassionate." It is used as a synonym for warm feelings that cannot be expressed in words. A California musical group attempted to "communicate" the idea of compassion in a "non-cognitive way" by playing gooeymelodies. It is used to convey a certain attractive pose. An actor was described as perfect for a role because "he's got the strength, the compassion." (Actresses are taught to give come-hither looks, actors, looks of compassion.)

Compassion also has a political meaning. The word is used as a bulwark by those on the left who want Americans to remain "unshaken in liberalism's belief in governmental compassion for the weak and poor." The word also is a prop for some conservatives. In the fall of 1989, as Jim Courter ran away from his previous pro-life positions and lost the gubernatorial race in New Jersey, he told reporters, "I'd like to be considered as a person who is compassionate...." Sometimes, the word *compassion* is merely the verbal equivalent of elevator music, a throw-in for a speech or article stuck in a shaft. A music reviewer in Chicago complained that an LP record was filled with "make-out ballads" for "the wine-and-cheese crowd," but was saved by "the mix of spiky aggression and compassion."

Sadly, all of these loose usages have created a flabby word out of one that could once pump iron. *Compassion* has become like Shakespeare's Globe The-

The Christian emphasis, clearly, is on individual involvement with those in need, and not a delegation of activities to government, philanthropic bureaucracies, or other designated helpers.

atre, the ruins of which were excavated in 1989; what remained of the theater was covered over by a parking lot. And yet, if we look at the first definition of *compassion* offered by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, we see something magnificent: "*Compassion*: Suffering together with another, participation in suffering." The emphasis, as is evident from the derivation of the word — "com," with, and "passion," from the Latin *pati*, to suffer — is on personal involvement with the needy, suffering *with* them as Mother Teresa does, not just having warm feelings or putting a check in the mail.

The idea of "suffering with" is central in Christianity because it was central in the life of Christ. Question 27 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, which dates from the mid-seventeenth century and is one of the central Reformed documents, indicates well the nature of Christ's compassion. The question is, "How was Christ humiliated?" The answer in a modern English version is, "Christ was humiliated: by being born as a man and born into a poor family; by being made subject to the law and suffering the miseries of this life, the anger of God, and the curse of death on the cross; and by being buried and remaining under the power of death for a time." Paul put it this way in his letter to the Philippians: "Your attitude should be the same as that of Christ Jesus — Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death — even death on a cross" (Phil. 2:5-8). What we celebrate in the incarnation, in short, is humiliation, God coming to earth to *suffer with*.¹²

Nineteenth Century Compassion

In the nineteenth century, Christians gleaned several important lessons from the Scriptures that guided them in administering charity:

- Charity begins with the gospel. Christ, God Himself, gave up His glory for sinful men and women who were "dead in our transgressions" and "following the ways of this world." All of us naturally are "gratifying the cravings of our sinful nature and following its desires and thoughts," but "God, who is rich in mercy, made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions" (Eph. 2:1-5).

When we extend kindness to others, we are identifying with Christ's suffering and endeavoring "to live a life worthy of the calling you have received" (Eph.

¹¹ The following discussion of compassion is taken from a lecture, "Reclaiming Compassion: A Christmas Meditation," given by Marvin Olasky at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, on December 5, 1989, and published as Heritage Lecture 228.

¹² Jesus suffered *with*, and, throughout His life on earth, He told parables about the *suffering with* of Good Samaritans and others. (Note that the Samaritan in Christ's story bandages the victim's wounds, puts him on a donkey, and takes him to an inn — the Samaritan walks alongside — nurses him there, pays incurred and future costs, and only then goes on his way, with a promise to stop back.)

4:1). We are called to "be imitators of God, therefore, as dearly loved children and live a life of love, just as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:1,2).

• Charity is personal. Nineteenth-century ministers such as William Ruffner fought against the tendencies to think of Christian duty primarily in terms of money:

To cast a contribution into the box brought to the hand, or to attend committees and anniversaries, are very trifling exercises of Christian self-denial and devotion, compared with what is demanded in the weary perambulations through the street, the contact with filth, and disease, and distress, and all manner of heart-rending and heart-frightening scenes, and all the trials of faith, patience, and hope, which are incident to the duty we urge.¹³

Ruffner also argued that professionals should be involved as facilitators, not major or sole suppliers:

There must, of course, be officers, teachers, missionaries employed to live in the very midst of the wretchedness, and to supervise and direct all the efforts of the people. And it is just here that the Church ought to connect herself directly to the enterprise. The leading officers should be appointed by the Church... but mark you! These officers are not to stand between the giver and receiver, but to bring *giver and receiver together*.¹⁴

The Christian emphasis, clearly, is on individual involvement with those in need, and not a delegation of activities to government, philanthropic bureaucracies, or other designated helpers.

• Charity is predominantly local. In 1844, William H. McGuffey placed in one of his *McGuffey's Readers*, a wonderful little dialogue between a "Mr. Fantom" and a "Mr. Goodman." Parts of it went like this:

Mr. Fantom: I despise a narrow field. O, for the reign of universal benevolence! I want to make all mankind good and happy.

Mr. Goodman: Dear me! Sure that must be a wholesale sort of job: had you not better try your hand at a *town* or *neighborhood* first?

Mr. Fantom: Sir, I have a plan in my head for relieving the miseries of the *whole world*....

Mr. Goodman: The utmost extent of my ambition at present is to redress the wrongs of a poor apprentice, who has been cruelly used by his master....

Mr. Fantom: You must not apply to me for the redress of such petty grievances. It is provinces, empires, continents that the benevolence of the

philosopher embraces; every one can do a little paltry good to his next neighbor.

Mr. Goodman: Every one *can*, but I do not see that every one does ... [you] have such a noble zeal for the *millions*, [yet] feel so little compassion for the units....¹⁵

Christians also understood that charity was to begin with members of the church. In Galatians we read, "Therefore, as we have opportunity, let us do good to all people, especially to those who belong to the family of believers" (Gal. 6:10).

• Charity is to be given in accordance with God's Law. Throughout the Bible we are shown that sin has consequences, but that when man cries out to God in distress, God is merciful. II Chronicles 30:9 states the process precisely: "The Lord your God is gracious and compassionate. He will not turn his face from you if you return to him." Nehemiah 9:27 notes that "when they were oppressed they cried out to you. From heaven you heard them, and in your great compassion you gave them deliverers...." God's refusal to be compassionate at certain times makes the pattern even more evident. Isaiah 27:11 describes Israel as "a people without understanding; so their Maker has no compassion on them...." In Jeremiah 15:6, God tells Israel, "You have rejected me....I can no longer show compassion."

Similarly, it's important to note that Jesus' miracles, like those of His Father, were never at random or universal. For example, Jesus certainly had the power to feed everyone...but He did not. Only after people had studied with Him for three days and had nothing to eat did He say — in Matthew 15:32 — "I have compassion for these people." (Then from seven loaves and a few small fishes, He created enough to feed 4,000 men, plus women and children.) Jesus could have healed everyone, but He did not. Matthew 20:30-34 tells us that Jesus had compassion on two blind men who kept following Him and shouting, "Lord, Son of David, have mercy on us!"

The Biblical picture is not one of God frantically rushing around trying to save mankind from the effects of sin. Rather, God often let mankind suffer to the point of repentance. Early American Christians understood that compassion must be warm-hearted but hard headed. One early nineteenth-century program was described as "thoroughly Christian in its severity and its generousities." And we too should not worry about being labeled severe within God's commands, as long as we are generous under God's grace. The principle of suffering with, but at times refusing to suffer with, must go together in any realistic program to help crisis childbearers and their children. Otherwise, good intentions will actually cause those in need to lose ground.

Recovering Biblical Compassion

How, then, can we apply the Biblical and historical Christian understanding of charity and compas-

¹³ Ruffner, William, *Charity and the Clergy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1853), pp. 142-143.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ McGuffey, William H., *Newly Revised Eclectic Reader* (1844), pp. 50-53, reprinted in O'Connell, Brian, ed., *America's Voluntary Spirit* (New York: The Foundation Center, 1983), pp. 59-61.

sion to the problems of crisis childbearing? What is our responsibility when we see fathers refusing to accept their responsibility, or crack mothers abandoning their babies? Do we show compassion by bulwarking irresponsibility? Here, again, we must closely look, not at contemporary ideas of offering help, but at the Biblical meaning of compassion.

First, we cannot just give money to those in need, though we must support Biblical ministries. Providing money alone implies that the major problem confronting pregnant women is material. We know that is not true. The problem is spiritual. When we administer charity personally, we also are in a position to share the gospel in word and deed. Peter wrote that we should "live such good lives among the pagans that, though they accuse you of doing wrong, they may see your good deeds and glorify God on the day he visits us" (1 Pet. 2:12). If those in need are to learn about God through our good works, they have to see us and see what motivates us — we can't be hiding in our church buildings. As Paul wrote, we need to be in position to "hold out the word of life" (Phil. 2:16).

Second, we cannot refuse to help a woman because we think she is beyond help. After all, since Paul writes about himself, "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am the worst," we need to see ourselves that way also (1 Tim. 1:15). We do not know who has been called by God, so we have to be wherever sinners are. The writer to the Hebrews reminds us "to entertain strangers, for by so doing some people have entertained angels without knowing it. Remember those in prison as if you were their fellow prisoners, and those who are mistreated as if you yourself were suffering" (Heb. 13:2,3).

Third, we must not be promiscuous in our charity. It is only by knowing those with whom we work that we can guard against subsidizing the idlers. Paul warned the Thessalonians about idleness: "If a man will not work, he shall not eat" (II Thessalonians 3:10). The Bible teaches that wrongful charity undermines character — idleness breeds gossip and busybodies. The people who receive services from Christians should be known by them — or willing to become known. Otherwise we risk subsidizing a sinful lifestyle. In order for Timothy to follow Paul's instructions on supporting widows, he had to know that the widow "is over sixty, has been faithful to her husband, and is well known for her good deeds, such as bringing up children, showing hospitality, washing the feet of the saints, helping those in trouble and devoting herself to all kinds of good deeds" (1 Tim. 5:9,10).

It is relatively easy to be pro-life when we are thinking about middle-class white women whose babies will be loved either by them or by one of a hundred couples yearning to adopt. It is another thing to be pro-life when standing in a room full of "boarder babies" — newborns of crack-using mothers — in an inner-city Washington, DC, hospital.

Since God is not indiscriminate in His compassion, those who embrace a Biblical worldview should not be indiscriminate either. God does not discriminate in His compassion on the basis of race, sex, or any other natural characteristic. He does not offer grace *because* of any action of ours, but He does have rules that we must obey. It is wrong for us to help other individuals to live apart from those rules. God defines for us what a family is; it is wrong for Christians to support those who think they can ignore God's rules and still live harmonious lives.

In an age of self-seeking, both among yuppies and among crack mothers, many commentators think *compassion* is a winny word — and it is, when a Biblical understanding of compassion is gone. Without the Biblical understanding, textbooks teach students about "the incompatibility of policies that simultaneously preach compassion and stress deterrence." Yet, properly understood, *only* those policies that stress deterrence are truly compassionate. We are told that "the spread of fear and the kindly treatment of decent poverty could not coexist." But just as God is both fearful and kind, so compassion and fear can — *must* — go together. We need to learn that we do not increase compassion by letting everyone have a claim on it. Instead, we kill a good word by making it mean too much, and nothing.

To accept the challenge that crisis childbearing offers to the pro-life movement generally, and to Christians specifically, we need to shift our societal understanding of what "compassion" for young unwed mothers and their infants means.

The common Planned Parenthood-inspired understanding today is that unmarried young people *will* have sexual relations, and that those who care for their welfare will make sure that they use contraceptives. The common understanding is that some will become preg-

nant, and the caring response in that situation is to make abortion available. The common understanding is that some will choose not to have abortions and that the caring response in that case is to provide accepting support for never-wed mothers and their children. Underly-

ing these responses is the belief that nothing is intrinsically right or wrong; individuals choose and should be supported in whatever their choice is.

Biblically, however, we are not to accept or even applaud whatever a person chooses to do. Biblically, the strong emphasis should be on abstinence, and those who choose to sin need to face the major consequences of their actions. Biblically, we are not to murder, so a child who is conceived must be carried. Biblically, that child should be part of a family with a mother and father whenever possible, so adoption or marriage is preferable

to single-parenting. Biblically, work is a vital part of life, and economic independence whenever possible a vital goal, so single-parenting dependence on government is to be discouraged. Throughout, the emphasis should not be on picking up the pieces "downstream" at the end of a series of rapids and hazards created by wrongful activities. The emphasis should be "upstream," so that every young person is aware of the dangers, aware that no one can fall hundreds of feet and crash into rocks without being severely damaged.

Many leaders in government and at major foundations now seem unwilling to state that the two-parent family must be supported. Many federal officials, ever since the Carter administration, have tended to talk about "families" rather than "family" — as if children do equally well in households led by never-wed mothers or by homosexual couples or by other Biblically deviant groupings. Christians and other pro-lifers need to anger some on the right by saying that government can have a role in helping those endangered by crisis childbearing, as long as it is a Biblically positive role. The pro-life coalition should be willing to anger some on the left by saying that governmental and philanthropic programs based on a non-Biblical understanding have often done far more harm than good.

Those public policy questions, while vital, are, in many ways secondary, however. As we have said before, real change will come about as hearts change, and when, as a society, we stop trying to make it easy to sin.

Christians have fought valiantly against abortion. But to the extent that "pro-life" has implicitly gone along with societal trends in the encouragement of single-parenting, we have been losing the war; to the extent that we have sat back and complained instead of suffering with children both unborn and born, we have been dishonoring Christ's suffering. When Nehemiah repaired the wall of Jerusalem, he repaired the whole wall, and he called on each family to reconstruct the portion of the wall near to its home (Neh. 3:10; 6:15). American culture has no security if most of the wall is falling while one piece is propped up. American churches have no strength if those who sit in them are hearers of

the Word and contributors to its preachings, but not doers.

When it comes to caring for the children born out of crisis pregnancies, some Americans apparently want to give up. Columnist Carl Rowan warned that pro-life efforts would merely yield "a multitude of children who will be hated by many and loved by so few that they can never become educated enough to become more than the beasts of burden and the producers of more doomed babies."¹⁶ Lobbyist Lloyd Cutler scolded pro-lifers for their "moral zeal" which should be tempered "by the realization that for every unwanted child they force into this world, they may be piling huge future obligations on all of us that our government would be bound to satisfy."¹⁷

But giving up is not a Biblical option. Pro-lifers can and must be pro-challenge. "Stop bringing meaningless offerings!" God declared through Isaiah. Instead, "Seek justice, encourage the oppressed. Defend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow" (Is. 1:13, 17). These are commands, not suggestions, and they are commands that we need to act on personally. In this sense, when pro-abortionists sneer, "Have you adopted a needy child?" they may be the burr we need.

All of us need to go back to the Bible to gain the wisdom, knowledge, and confidence to be not only pro-life, but consistently pro-family. The challenge must be accepted, or the pro-life movement and our entire culture will fail. Δ

¹⁶ Rowan, Carl, *Dallas Morning News*, July 5, 1989.

¹⁷ Cutler, Lloyd, *The New York Times*, July 7, 1989.

Susan Olasky co-founded and chaired the Austin Crisis Pregnancy Center and was a volunteer crisis pregnancy counselor in Newark, Delaware. Marvin Olasky is a professor at the University of Texas and the author of The Press and Abortion 1838-1988 and five other books. He is currently a resident scholar for Americans United for Life. The foregoing is a revised version of an essay published in More Than Kindness: A Compassionate Approach to Crisis Childbearing (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1990).

ANTITHESIS GIFT SUBSCRIPTIONS AT UNBEATABLE PRICES!

\$18.50 for the first one-year gift subscription

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____ CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

\$14.00 for a second one-year gift subscription

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____ CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

\$12.00 for a third one-year gift subscription

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____ CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

\$10.00 for a fourth one-year gift subscription

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____ CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

Mail to: ANTITHESIS, 4521 Campus Dr. #435, Irvine, CA 92715

OR NOW YOU CAN PHONE IN YOUR SUBSCRIPTIONS TOLL-FREE! 1-800-788-0038

My 'Final' Offer: A Moral Critique of Bluff in Negotiations

**Some of the
harder questions
about commonly
accepted forms of
"bluffing" demand
a more careful
Biblical analysis.**

David Hagopian

Consider, if you will,
three scenarios.

Scenario One:

The sun is beating
down on you as you stand in
the car lot listening to the
salesman drone on about the
virtues of his wares. You have
been at it for over an hour as
almost every salesman on the
lot has tried to close the deal –
to no avail. All you want is the

best price on that new family mini-van and all you have
heard so far is the party line. Though the salesman offers
the van at \$18,000, you know that his cost on the van
was only \$14,000 and that, given current economic
constraints, he would accept any offer above \$15,000.
You offer \$15,500. He counters with \$16,500.

Though the van is a steal at \$16,500, and
though you are perfectly willing to pay \$16,500 for it, you
grab your spouse and storm off the lot saying "My final
offer, pal, is \$15,500. Take it or leave it."

Query: Have you crossed the line?

Scenario Two:

You are selling your three thousand square foot
home which overlooks the Puget Sound on the Washing-
ton coast. Comparable homes have sold for \$200,000
and your asking price is \$210,000.

Lo and behold who comes to your door but
yuppies straight from Southern California who want to
get out of the rat race and enjoy more "quality time" with
their children. Armed with nothing but their distorted
(read: inflated) notions about real estate values (occa-
sioned perhaps by smog inhalation), it is obvious to you
that this couple doesn't really know what comparable
homes in the Pacific Northwest have sold for in recent
months.

You know this is going to be a memorable day
since opportunities like these only come along once in a
life time. As you hear the undeniable sound of cash
registers ringing in your head, you inform the inquirers
that your asking price is \$500,000; you also remind them
that a comparable home in Southern California would
cost more than \$1,000,000. They counter by offering
\$450,000 thinking that they are getting a great deal. You
put on the age-old hesitant seller act, you know, the "I-
am-really-making-a-big-mistake" routine. After a brief
pause, your reluctance hits a perfectly timed crescendo
at which point you hesitantly blurt out – "Okay, but I get
the curtains."

Query: Have you crossed the line?

Scenario Three:

You are an attorney for a day (perish the thought!).
Your client is a Christian college which desires to relocate
to another state, purchase several contiguous parcels,
and build a modern complex which will become a leading
institution of Christian higher education.

Only one glitch: before your negotiations ever get
underway, you discover for the first time that the parcels
your client has targeted are owned by numerous card-
carrying members of Atheists United. Were they to learn
the true identity of your client, they would either refuse
to sell or would price their properties such that the
transaction would be cost-prohibitive. As long as they
never learn the true identity of your client, however, they
will gleefully sign the dotted line.

Given this information, you counsel your client
to adopt the Disneyworld land purchase strategy¹ by
forming a number of different holding companies (each
with a different name) and having those different compa-
nies purchase the property over a protracted period of
time so that the owners will never even suspect that a
single purchaser orchestrated the purchase.

Just as the negotiations get under way for the
final parcel, the attorney representing the owners leans
over the table, and as he prepares to sign the purchase
and sale agreement, he blurts out, "Boy, I am sure glad
that you don't represent one of those good-for-nothing
Christian colleges." You lean over as he signs the
agreement and assure the poor old fool (in the Biblical
sense, of course) by saying: "You know you're right, some
of those Christian colleges out there really are good for
nothing!"

Query: Have you crossed the line?

While most Christians may never represent the
interests of others in a professional capacity, most, at
one time or another, have bargained or negotiated with
others to secure a result.² If you found yourself in one or

¹ I have referred to this strategy as the "Disneyworld"
strategy since The Walt Disney Company used this strategy to
purchase the land required to develop Disneyworld in Florida.
Of course, Walt Disney is by no means the only corporation to
have used this strategy.

² Negotiating does not fall within the sole domain of
attorneys, businessmen, or diplomats. Most of us negotiate
more than we think. From deciding where to go out to lunch to
which movie to rent to which child gets the car on Friday night,
negotiating is woven into our cultural fabric.

more of these three scenarios, would you have opted for one of the bluffing tactics noted above or would you have created your own poker-faced option? In other words, would you ever do or say something or fail to do or say something to cause or allow another to be misled so that you could secure a favorable result either for yourself or for a client? To step back a bit, and phrase the question in more general terms, may Christians — including Christian professionals who represent clients — ever bluff to secure a given result?

First Things First

A Bluff is a Bluff

Most people, of course, associate the word “bluff” with poker or a host of other games whereby a player with an inferior hand but with a lot of bravado can win by simply causing his opponent to drop his superior hand. Though the poker player is only playing a game, he shares one thing in common with those who bluff in “real life” situations: each bluffer says or does something or fails to say or do something so as either to cause or to allow others to believe something that does not accord with reality. The question before us, then, is whether Christians may ever cause or, by their actions, allow others to believe something that does not accord with reality when it is within their power to correct such misimpressions.

A Word about the Word

The question before us presents us with a tremendous challenge, to be sure. But, as with the rest of the challenges we face in life, we must take this one to Scripture, which is the supreme standard for all areas of life — that is, for all that we believe and all that we do. To say that Scripture is the standard for all areas of life, however, is not to say that Scripture speaks of everything explicitly. Scripture, for example, never explicitly discusses the actual value of a mini-van in twentieth century America, methods of appraising oceanfront property in the Pacific Northwest, or the technicalities of the attorney-client relationship. But Scripture does provide us with general principles which, when properly interpreted, apply to every situation we face in life — without exception — from economic value to appraisal methods to the limits of servicing clients.

Knowing Biblical principles, though, isn't enough. In order for Biblical principles to do us any good, we must also know a little bit about the various situations we face. And, we must also know a thing or two about ourselves. In other words, we need to see that a full-orbed Biblical ethic calls us, as ethical decision-makers, to apply Biblical principles to the various situations we face.

The question we must always keep before us, then, is “What does Scripture say to me in light of the situation I am facing?”³ Well, what does Scripture have

to say to us about bluffing? In this brief study, we will examine relevant Biblical principles regarding our general obligation to speak the truth. Then, we will apply those Biblical principles to the case of bluffing and examine the various rationales Christians offer to justify bluffing to see if bluffing is a morally permissible option for the believer.

Truly, Truly

We have defined bluffing as (1) doing or saying something that doesn't accord with reality (the truth) or (2) failing to do or say something that accords with reality so as either to cause or to allow others to be misled as to the truth. Given this definition, it would behoove us to examine what Scripture has to say about truth, including the different ways in which Scripture uses the word “truth,” our general obligation to utter the truth, and under what circumstances, if any, we may ever deceive others or allow them to be deceived.

A Look at the Trees

In order to discover what God says about our obligation to speak the truth, we must turn to Scripture which quite plainly informs us that we are generally obligated to speak the truth and to avoid lies.

At least two lines of Biblical proof lead to the undeniable conclusion that we are generally commanded to speak the truth. First, we are to imitate God who speaks the truth. Scripture teaches us that God is truth in the metaphysical sense (Jn. 14:6), that all of His ways are truthful in the ethical sense (Deut. 32:4; Ps. 111:7; and Is. 25:1), and that He speaks the truth and cannot lie (Rom. 3:4; Tit. 1:2; Heb. 6:18) in the epistemological sense. Although the character of God is a tall bill to live up to, Scripture nonetheless commands us to do so; put simply, we are to imitate God. (Matt. 5:48; Eph. 5:1). Just as we are to be holy for God is holy, so we are to be truthful and speak the truth because God is truthful and speaks the truth. Second, Scripture explicitly commands us to speak the truth (Zech. 8:16; Eph. 4:25).

Just as we are commanded to speak the truth, so we are forbidden to lie. This is true for at least two reasons as well. First, we are commanded to resist Satan (Js. 4:7) who is the father of lies (Jn. 8:44). Since lies emanate from Satan's very character, and since we are to resist Satan's wiles, it follows that we are to avoid lies. Second, Scripture rather explicitly commands us to lay aside falsehood (Eph. 4:25) and to refrain from lying (Ex. 20:16; 23:1; 23:7; Col. 3:9). Elsewhere in Scripture, we learn that lying is characteristic of those who are depraved (Ps. 58:3; Rom. 1:25; II Cor. 4:14), and that liars will be consigned to hell (Rev. 21:27; Rev. 22:15). From Joseph's brothers (Gen. 37:31-35) to Potiphar's wife (Gen. 39:13-18) to Pharaoh (Ex. 9:28) to Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5:3), we learn how lies destroy others, inflict pain, and result in punishment.

³ A full-orbed Biblical ethic involves three perspectives: the normative (deontological) perspective, the situational (consequentialist) perspective, and the existential (personalis-

tic) perspective. Simply put, a Biblical ethic looks at principles, problems, and people.

A Look at the Trees

Having focused briefly on the forest, we must now take a quick look at the trees. No doubt we are generally commanded to speak the truth and to avoid lies, but are we always obligated to reveal the truth to others? *Does Scripture, in other words, ever permit us to utter a falsehood or conceal the truth if doing so may create false impressions?* Only after we answer this all-important question, will we be in a position to examine the legitimacy of bluffing and the various rationales offered to justify it. Consequently, let's turn to the spectrum of views regarding when, if ever, we may utter a falsehood or conceal the truth from others.⁴

The Absolutist View

At one end of the spectrum is the view that believers may never utter falsehood or conceal the truth. This obligation, we are told, is absolute and admits of no exceptions whatsoever. According to this view, we cannot do or say anything that will prevent the truth from being known and must do everything within our power to remedy falsehoods and perpetuate the truth. Central to the absolutist view is the idea that when we speak, we must make sure that what we say is always true. If this view is correct, bluffing, as we have defined it, is impermissible to the extent that it involves uttering falsehoods to or concealing the truth from others.

The Almost-Absolutist View

While some believers exclaim that we may never utter falsehoods or conceal the truth, others claim that Biblical injunctions to speak the truth and to avoid lies are close to being absolute. These believers reject the literalism inherent in the absolutist view and consequently qualify the absolute requirement by allowing for exceptions for such things as playing games which require the players to put on airs (e.g. poker), using rhetorical devices (e.g. hyperbole, satire, irony, fantasy), playing practical jokes, enjoying surprises (e.g. surprise parties), making false comedic claims (e.g. "The funniest thing happened to me..."), acting, and faking a move in sports. Aside from such narrow exceptions, however, the almost-absolutist view proclaims that we must always affirm and reveal the truth.⁵

This view, therefore, would condemn bluffs to the extent that they involve affirming a falsehood (affirmative misrepresentation) or concealing the truth (non-disclosure). If however, one could successfully characterize bluffing as falling within one of the noted exceptions — for example, if bluffing were analogous to poker or hyperbolic speech — then bluffing might be permissible after all.⁶

⁴ By "conceal" I do not mean mere silence (which is rarely deceptive in and of itself). Concealment and its synonym, nondisclosure, as used in this study, refer either to silence coupled with some form of behavior (expression, mannerism, etc.) or the utterance of a half-truth.

⁵ The exceptions noted above do not rise to the level of culpable deception because nobody thereby intends to communicate anything about reality. See the discussion of the relevant benchmark below.

⁶ We will examine these rationales below.

The Half-and-Half View

While both the absolutist and almost-absolutist views hold that believers may neither utter a falsehood nor conceal the truth, the half-and-half view holds that while we may not utter falsehoods (except as noted above), we may, under some circumstances, conceal the truth from others, that is, from those who are not entitled to it. Of course, if the half-and-half view is correct, bluffing would be permissible not only if it could be characterized as falling under one of the noted exceptions above, but also if it simply involves concealing the truth from others who have no rightful claim to the truth.

The Biblical View

As illustrated by the chart below, we have seen that some believers claim that we are forbidden to utter falsehoods or conceal the truth while others claim that we may not utter falsehoods but may conceal the truth from those not entitled to it. Nonetheless, others claim that under very narrow circumstances, believers may both utter falsehoods and conceal the truth from those not entitled to it. We shall refer to this view as "the Biblical view," because, as I will argue, this is the view that Scripture teaches, when Scripture is rightly understood.

View:	Allows for:		
	games, rhetorical devices, etc.?	affirmative, misrepresentations?	non-disclosure?
Absolutist	No	No	No
Almost-Absol.	Yes	No	No
Half-and-Half	Yes	No	Yes
Biblical	Yes	Yes	Yes

According to the Biblical view, the ninth commandment (prohibition of bearing false witness) is a general commandment subject only to the exceptions laid down by the Lawgiver Himself. In this way, the ninth commandment is analogous to the sixth commandment which generally prohibits killing, but allows for three exceptions: capital punishment, personal self-defense,⁷ and national self-defense (just war). In the same way, while the ninth commandment generally forbids affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosure, it allows for both under very narrow circumstances: to preserve and protect human life from unjust aggressors. As we shall see below, the Biblical view does not require the believer to choose between the "lesser of evils" any more than exercising legitimate self-defense involves the "lesser of evils." In neither situation does the believer sin, provided

⁷ By self-defense, I mean both defending oneself and/or others.

his behavior falls under the umbrella of a legitimate exception to the general rule.⁸

Though an exhaustive survey of the textual support for the Biblical view is beyond the ambit of this study, one need only think of the following exemplars: (1) the Hebrew midwives who were specifically blessed by God for not only allowing Hebrew male babies to live contrary to the king's edict, but who thereafter lied to Pharaoh by telling him that they could not kill the boys who were born because they were born too fast (Ex. 1:15-20); (2) Elisha who deceived the army of Syria that sought to capture and kill him by leading them — with the help of God — right into the hands of the King of Israel who released them after letting them know who was boss (II Kg. 6:8-23); (3) Rahab who is twice commended in the New Testament (Heb. 11:31; Js. 2:25) for deceiving the king's representatives by hiding Israelite spies, saying that she did not know where they were (when she knew exactly where they were), and helping them escape (Josh. 2:1-24); (4) Joshua, the military strategist, who deceived the city of Ai by means of an ambush (Josh. 8:3-29); (5) Samuel who, in order to save his own life, was instructed by God Himself to mislead others by creating the false impression that he was only offering sacrifices when, in fact, he was anointing the king-elect of Israel (I Sam. 16:1-5); (6) Jael who was praised as "the most blessed of women" after she deceptively promised to protect the wicked tyrant Sisera and then gave him a splitting headache by driving a peg through his temple (Judg. 4-5); (7) Michal, David's wife, who put a fake body in David's bed after David fled for his life from Saul's henchmen (I Sam. 19:12-17); (8) David himself who feigned insanity to deceive the King of Gath (I Sam. 21:10-15; 22:1); and (9) Jeremiah who was commanded by King Zedekiah to lie so that he would not die (Jer. 38:24-28).

When John Murray, the chief proponent of what I have termed the half-and-half view, surveys most of these Biblical exemplars, he concludes that in no instance did anyone utter a falsehood and thereafter receive divine blessing indicative of divine approval. According to Murray, the only lesson to be gleaned from these exemplars is that we are entitled to conceal the truth from those who are not entitled to it. Murray's analysis is questionable for at least three reasons.⁹

First, Murray appears to read his conclusion into some of the texts he interprets, as when he tries to link the divine approval showered on the Hebrew midwives (Ex. 1:20) with their disobedience alone (Ex. 1:17) when they were clearly blessed for both their disobedience and their justifiable deception (Ex. 1:19). Much the same can be said with respect to his analysis of Rahab's disobedience and consequent deception.

Second, Murray's distinction between affirmative misrepresentation and nondisclosure — as illus-

trated by his analysis of Samuel's God-instructed half-truth — is untenable. Quite frankly, his distinction resembles medieval scholasticism by focusing on form (the mode of communication) as opposed to content (the substance of the communication). In layman's terms, both affirmative misrepresentation and nondisclosure involve communication which can be calculated to deceive. Nondisclosure, in fact, can be and often is every bit as deceptive as an affirmative misrepresentation, as was the case with Samuel's intentional half-truth. Sometimes, in fact, nondisclosure can even be more deceptive than an affirmative misrepresentation.

Third, until Murray provides criteria for distinguishing those who are entitled to the truth from those who are not, his distinction, taken at face value, may result in the exception swallowing the rule. Though Murray is guided by a passionate and admirable desire to safeguard truth, the half-and-half view he articulates could ironically permit nondisclosure in all negotiation encounters provided that one could stretch the elastic label "not entitled to the truth" to cover his counterpart. By contrast, the Biblical view is much more narrowly circumscribed: it would allow for affirmative misrepresentations or nondisclosure only to protect human life from unjust aggression.¹⁰

Determining the Relevant Benchmark

Before analyzing the various rationales offered to justify bluffing, we must determine the relevant benchmark for determining whether an affirmative statement or a given nondisclosure culpably crosses the line between right and wrong. The benchmark should consist of two prongs. First, it must consist of a *subjective focus* which, in turn, has a dual focus: (a) whether *the actor intends to deceive* the recipient, and (b) whether *the recipient will, in fact, be deceived*. Second, it should consist of an *objective focus*: whether that which is said or concealed accords with reality and is logically consistent.

When we combine the subjective and objective focal points, the benchmark that emerges is as follows: *Only if we intend to communicate anything (verbally or nonverbally) about reality, must we be sure (1) that we communicate that which accords with reality and that which is internally consistent (objectively true), and (2) that we do not intend to deceive the recipient and that we do not actually deceive the recipient (subjectively true).* This benchmark helps to explain our general obligation to speak the truth and to avoid lies. It also explains why games, rhetorical devices, practical jokes, surprises, and fake moves in sports are morally permissible since

⁸ We will counter the "lesser of evils" theory below when we examine the "Bluffing as Advocacy" rationale.

⁹ Murray, *Principles*, pp. 135-45. I offer the following criticisms of Murray's view with no slight trepidation since I consider him to be among the most gifted theologians of this century. Nonetheless, I am constrained to take even Murray's conclusions to the standard of Scripture to see "whether these things [are] so" (Acts. 17:11).

¹⁰ Of course, were adherents to the half-and-half view to claim that the category of persons not entitled to the truth is limited to unjust aggressors, then the half-and-half view and the Biblical view would both permit nondisclosure to unjust aggressors. They would differ only when it comes to affirmative misrepresentations vis-a-vis unjust aggressors which the Biblical view allows while the half-and-half view does not. For an interesting debate between advocates of these respective views, see "Issue & Interchange: Are We Ever Morally Justified In Deceiving Others?" *Antithesis*, Vol. I, No. 3, May/June, 1990, pp. 42-46.

nobody thereby intends to communicate anything about reality.

Baiting the Bluff

So far we have seen that the absolutist view does not allow for any exceptions but that the almost-absolutist, half-and-half, and Biblical views all allow for games, rhetorical devices, and the other noted exceptions. The almost-absolutist view is limited to such exceptions and would condemn bluffing to the extent that it involves affirmative misrepresentations or nondisclosure. The half-and-half view would allow for nondisclosure from those not entitled to the truth, but would condemn affirmative misrepresentations (provided that none of the noted exceptions apply). Finally, the Biblical view would allow for the noted exceptions as well as for affirmative misrepresentation to and nondisclosure from unjust aggressors.

The distinctions between the four views are important because they largely determine under what circumstances a bluff would be permissible. Were a police negotiation team, for example, to negotiate with a kidnapper who is about to kill his hostages, the Biblical view would allow the negotiators the full panoply of options while the absolutist, almost-absolutist, and half-and-half views would not.¹¹ Since most negotiation encounters, however, do not involve protecting life from unjust aggressors, we will hereafter focus on the exceptions the latter three views hold in common: games, rhetorical devices, and the rest. But since these noted exceptions provide some of the more sophisticated rationales which have been offered to justify bluffing, we should first dispense with some rather unsophisticated rationales.

Off the Deep End: More Simple Rationales

The Bluff is Harmless

Believe it or not, some have held to the belief that bluffing is morally permissible because it is harmless. By what standard? The bottom line is that what seems right isn't necessarily right. "There is a way which seems right to a man," the book of Proverbs twice warns us, "but its end is the way of death" (Prov. 14:12; 16:25).

The Bluff is Successful

Some try to justify bluffing because it works. Unfortunately those who try to justify bluffing by appealing to its success have been duped by a utilitarian definition of truth which is foreign to Scripture. Utilitarians to the contrary, the moral permissibility of an act does not solely depend on its consequences; that is, the ends don't justify the means. Paul condemned those who accused him of adopting the view that we may "do evil that good may come" (Rom. 3:8). Maybe it's time more Christians imitated Paul in this respect (I Cor. 11:1).

¹¹ It almost goes without saying that a crisis negotiation team may not want to deceive a given suspect since doing so may reduce its credibility in future situations. As always, we must consider the consequences of our behavior before we launch into a given course of conduct.

Most People Bluff

So what? Popularity does not determine the moral propriety of a given act. Were popularity to distinguish right from wrong, we should throw Scripture away and adopt the Gallup Poll as our authority for all of faith and practice. As Christians we need to realize that the voice of the people is not the voice of God. Maybe if more Christians obeyed the voice of God in Scripture, the trend toward moral compromise would be reversed.

The Bible Offers Little Guidance

Sure we should obey Scripture, claims one Christian attorney, Jeff Van Duzer, but when it comes to the conflict between personal ethics and professional loyalties, "[t]he Bible offers very little guidance . . .".¹² Since Scripture is our standard for all of life and not just the source of warm fuzzies on Sunday mornings, then believers have an obligation to study Scripture diligently so that they need not be ashamed, handling accurately the word of truth (II Tim. 2:15). Contrary to Van Duzer's assertion, Scripture is profitable for "teaching, reproof, correction, and training in righteousness" so "that the man of God may be adequate, equipped for every good work" (II Tim. 3:16-17). Thus, those who claim that Scripture offers little guidance deny that Scripture equips us for every good work. Van Duzer's problem is not that Scripture is unclear; Van Duzer's real problem is that Scripture is all too clear.

God Leads Us Moment-by-Moment

After building his house of bluffing on the quicksand of speculation, Van Duzer concludes that his failure to find black and white on this issue has taught him two important lessons:

First, my failure to find black and white lines along my journey has reminded me that God leads not so much by a code of ethics, which I can refer to as if he were absent, but rather by a personal moment-by-moment involvement in my life. Second, it has taught me humility. . . . and . . . the depths of God's grace.¹³

This rationale seriously errs on at least two scores. First, Van Duzer misunderstands the transcendence and immanence of God. Scripture teaches us that God is transcendent (that He is the covenant Lord, creator of the universe, the One who is not dependent upon his creation). But it also teaches us that He is immanent (that He is Immanuel — God with us). Just as Van Duzer errs with respect to the nature of God by failing to see that God is both transcendent and immanent, so he also errs with respect to the nature of God's Word which reflects the very character of God. Instead of taking into account the normative, situational, and existential perspectives in Christian ethics, Van Duzer sadly ignores the normative perspective altogether (i.e.,

¹² Van Duzer, Jeff, "Personal Ethics and Professional Loyalties: A Case Study," *Christian Legal Society Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer, 1989, p. 14.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

what Scripture requires of us — apparently because he doesn't think that Scripture offers any concrete guidance on this issue) and focuses exclusively on the *existential perspective* (how God works in us moment-by-moment). Unfortunately for Van Duzer, though, the choice is not between a code of ethics out there and God's leading in here; the transcendent and immanent God of Christianity leads us moment-by-moment precisely by His code of ethics found in Scripture.

Second, we should not be confused by the false humility inherent in Van Duzer's view. There is nothing humble about neglecting Scripture and trying to resolve ethical dilemmas on our own. Quite the opposite is true. A believer who is genuinely humble and who truly appreciates the depths of God's grace submits to God as He has revealed Himself in His Word.

Scripture Sanctions the Bluff

Some may attempt to argue that Proverbs 20:14 sanctions bluffing: "Bad, bad," says the buyer; but when he goes his way, then he boasts."

Far from sanctioning the bluff, this verse, when interpreted in light of the Book of Proverbs as a whole, provides no justification for bluffing at all. Those who conclude that Proverbs 20:14 sanctions bluffing commit the naturalistic fallacy by leaping from what is described to what is prescribed without providing adequate Biblical warrant in support of their leap. The Book of Proverbs often describes an activity in one place, and goes on to condemn it elsewhere.

Take, for example, the issue of bribery. Proverbs 17:8 describes a bribe as "a charm in the sight of its owner" which prospers him wherever he turns.¹⁴ Yet, just because a bribe may be a charm and may, in fact, lead to apparent prosperity, it does not follow that Christians may justifiably take bribes. In no uncertain terms, Proverbs 17 later condemns bribes (Pr. 17:23; see also, 15:27 and 29:4).

What is true regarding bribes is equally true regarding bluffs. One of the most frequent themes in Proverbs is truth. Often Proverbs commands us to speak the truth and to avoid lies. To be sure, buyers often feign disappointment to reduce a purchase price, and many such buyers thereafter boast; but Scripture nowhere condones or approves of such conduct. After all, there is a difference between describing the way things are and prescribing a code of conduct. Those who appeal to Proverbs 20:14 need to sit up and take notice of this all-important distinction.

¹⁴ Elsewhere Proverbs also explains that a bribe subdues strong wrath (Pr. 21:14).

The Upper Crust: More Sophisticated Rationales

Having examined some of the less sophisticated rationales Christians have offered to justify bluffing, we must also briefly turn our attention to some of the more sophisticated rationales which have been offered in defense of bluffing: bluffing as a game, bluffing as hyperbole, and bluffing as advocacy.

Bluffing as a Game

Many games require their participants to bluff, the most notable of which is poker. As we observed at the outset of this study, a poker player with an inferior hand may actually win the hand by bluffing, that is, by convincing his opponent with a better hand to fold. When it comes to games like poker, then, it is not always as important what hand you have as how you play the hand you have.

Seen in this light, it is not all too surprising that some have tried to justify bluffing by comparing it to poker or other games where

bluffing is commonplace and is not to be taken at face value. Van Duzer has compared the typical negotiation encounter between trained attorneys to a poker match:

In many ways, legal negotiations resemble a poker game. Negotiations are generally clearly demarcated as such; each lawyer knows that the game is underway. Statements made and impressions created are not to be taken at face value.¹⁵

In all fairness, Van Duzer proceeds to note some of the weaknesses of the game analogy:

The analogy is not exact, however: The accepted "rules" of negotiating are much less clear than poker rules, and not everyone will recognize the game. When one moves from the paradigm of two lawyers negotiating on behalf of sophisticated clients down the scale toward one-sided negotiations between a lawyer and the un- or under-represented individual, reciprocal awareness of the game and its rules diminishes substantially. Thus, the negotiating ploy is not deceptive per se; its potential to deceive will depend upon the setting and approach.¹⁶

The game analogy is particularly appealing because it is sensitive to the fact that ethical principles are not applied in a vacuum. The game analogy appropriately takes varying situations into account; it acknowledges that actions cannot be evaluated outside of their

¹⁵ Van Duzer, p. 14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

proper context. Yet that is also where its weaknesses begin. For while we must carefully apply our ethical principles to the various situations we encounter, we cannot allow our situation to dictate our ethical principles. Unfortunately, however, that is what the game analogy encourages. Even worse, the game analogy may very well lead its proponents down the infamous slippery slope since it justifies any falsity as long as such falsity can be construed to be an indispensable part of a game. O what a tangled web we weave

The game analogy also errs by focusing exclusively on whether the recipient is actually deceived by a given bluff. Basically, what Van Duzer is saying is that as long as the recipient is not actually deceived, the bluff is morally acceptable. But does this reasoning stand up to scrutiny? On Van Duzer's reasoning, an outright lie would also be justified, provided that the recipient sees through it. As opposed to Van Duzer's errant standard, the relevant benchmark for determining whether a given statement involves culpable deception should focus on both subjective and objective considerations.¹⁷ What makes an outright lie wrong is the fact that its perpetrator ostensibly intends to communicate something about reality and proceeds not to do so.

True, games do not violate the relevant benchmark because game-playing occurs in an artificial environment where the rules are understood and arbitrarily agreed to by each player before the game gets underway. In other words, game-players, by definition, do not intend to communicate anything about reality. But can the same really be said with respect to negotiators? Don't negotiators use bluffs specifically because they want (bluffer's intent) their counterparts to rely to their detriment upon them (recipient's reaction)? In the end, the game analogy breaks down precisely where it is most needed. Hence, negotiating in "real life" is not really a game at all.

Bluffing as Hyperbole

Some may suggest that bluffing is akin to various rhetorical devices, and in particular, to hyperbolic speech whereby a speaker resorts to an extravagant exaggeration which he does not intend to be taken at face value.¹⁸ When a mother claims, for example, that she has told her child a million times to clean up his room, she does not intend to suggest that she has literally told him a million times; and if her son is linguistically adept enough, he will never be deceived by the exaggeration. Thus, hyperbolic speech passes the test since, by definition, it is never to be taken at face value. The exaggeration can usually be separated from the deeper truth it communicates.

This is not so with bluffing. Unlike hyperbolic speech, the typical bluff is used precisely because the bluffer intends for it to be taken at face value. Otherwise, why would he use it? And a bluff could only be taken at face value if it did not consist of an extravagant exaggeration — in which case it is not really hyperbolic at all.

Thus, the hyperbole analogy has gone the way of the game analogy by breaking down where it is most needed.

Bluffing as Advocacy

While Van Duzer vigorously argues that bluffing does not involve deception because its propensity to deceive will vary from situation to situation, he argues in the alternative that "[e]ven where a bluff would be deceptive, however, it may still be ethical."¹⁹ How does Van Duzer support this claim? Allow him to explain for himself:

When I became a lawyer I took an oath to represent my clients "zealously within the bounds of the law." In representing my client, I promise (both implicitly and explicitly) to act on my client's behalf to the best of my ability.

In light of these promises, if my personal standards prevent me from using a legal negotiating ploy, I have lied to my client. . . . Indeed, I may have violated my solemn oath.

Van Duzer then attempts to support the duty an agent has toward his principal by arguing that in Scripture, slaves are to serve their non-Christian masters, citizens are to honor pagan rulers, and soldiers are to serve in oppressive armies. Thereafter, he correctly notes that "there are limits to the loyalty owed to a principal" but then mistakenly adds that "these limits cannot be determined in the abstract from Scripture."²⁰ When it comes to representing non-Christians, Van Duzer rejects (1) shunning representative occupations (because it would lead to abandoning the world) and (2) dividing our lives between the sacred and the secular (because it would lead to a dual morality). Finally, he recommends that the only "Biblical approach is to grope forward, cognizant of the inherent conflict and trusting God to use us to work out His will."²¹

Just so we are clear, Van Duzer argues (1) that a bluff, even if deceptive (i.e., even if the game analogy doesn't apply and even if bluffing violates our personal standards), is ethical because of the attorney's duty to abide by his oath to represent his clients zealously and (2) that our only option as believers is to grope forward and hope against hope that we do what God expects of us. Several difficulties plague this argument.

First, Van Duzer's use of the term "ethical" is at odds with Scripture. Bluffing may be "ethical" according to man-centered codes of legal conduct (which is Van Duzer's standard for purposes of this argument), but it is by no means "ethical" according to the supreme standard of Holy Scripture.

Second, since what is "ethical" is to be judged by Holy Scripture, unjustified deception is never "ethical." What Van Duzer is really saying is that his duty to his client imposes a moral obligation on him to engage in deceptive bluffing. Van Duzer, though, errs grievously since we are never under a moral obligation to sin. Van

¹⁷ See the discussion of the relevant benchmark above.

¹⁸ I have not seen this rationale in print anywhere. I offer it as one possible rationale for justifying the bluff.

¹⁹ Van Duzer, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

Duzer's argument thus assumes that God puts us in situations where we must choose between the lesser of evils. This assumption is unfounded for three reasons. (a) The God of the Word is the God of this world. He sovereignly created and providentially governs this world in such a way that His Word and His world work in harmony together. On Van Duzer's view, God either isn't sovereign or isn't capable of providing infallible revelation to guide His people. (b) God's revelation itself provides that sin is never inevitable because God — who is completely faithful and trustworthy — has promised that He will always provide us with a way of escape (I Cor. 10:13). Van Duzer better start looking! (c) To suggest that we are put in situations where we must choose the lesser of evils seriously undermines the Biblical doctrine of Christ who was tempted in every way as we are tempted yet was without sin (Heb. 4:15). If we face temptations where we must choose the lesser of evils, then Christ, in order to be tempted in every way as we are tempted, must have also faced such a situation. But if Christ faced a situation where he had to choose between the lesser of evils, then Christ had to sin (contrary to Heb. 4:15); if, however, Christ did not face such a situation, then he was not tempted in every way as we are tempted (contrary to Heb. 4:15).²²

Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that God does put us in situations where we must choose between the lesser of evils, the present case of bluffing is distinguishable because the bluffer has voluntarily put himself in the moral dilemma by undertaking an unbiblical oath or by unbiblically construing a legitimate oath to require obedience to man as opposed to God. Contrary to Van Duzer's assertions, Scripture provides very clear guidance on these issues. While oaths are not evil per se, Scripture quite clearly tells us that we may never bind ourselves to sin.²³

Fourth, Van Duzer stumbles on his view of oaths because he stumbles on his view of the limits of an agent's obedience to principal. According to Van Duzer, "these limits cannot be determined in the abstract from Scripture." Sadly, Van Duzer's defective view of Scripture has reared its ugly head again. Van Duzer needs to stop and realize that Scripture, as God's perspicuous Word, actually has a lot to say about the limits of the obedience an agent's obedience to a principal. To begin with, Scripture informs us that we are first and foremost agents of God in this earthly realm — ambassadors for Christ — whose citizenship is in heaven (II Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:20). Moreover, as ambassadors for Christ, Scripture generally commands us to obey those in authority over us, and directs us to disobey such authorities only when they command us to sin (either by commission or omission) and when we have no means by which we can obey God.²⁴ Thus, a Christian agent may do what a non-

Christian principal requests him to do except when a non-Christian principal requires him to sin and the agent has no means by which he can obey God. Furthermore, because the attorney-client relationship, for the most part, is voluntarily assumed in America, attorneys have tremendous control over whether or not they will represent a given client at the outset. Christian professionals should not represent non-Christian clients or Christian clients, for that matter, if such clients will require them to sin.

Fifth, though Van Duzer tries his best to steer clear of a dual morality, he inevitably swallows dualism whole hog by putting his client's interests above his personal standards. As R.L. Dabney pointed out over a hundred years ago, if something is wrong for the attorney to do personally, it does not become right if it's done on behalf of a client.²⁵ We are morally responsible for everything we do. Agents cannot sin and lay the responsibility for that sin on their principals. In the chilling words of Dabney,

Let every man rest assured that God's claims over his moral creatures are absolutely inevitable. He will not be cheated of satisfaction to his outraged law by the plea that the wrong was done professionally; and when the lawyer is suffering the righteous doom of his professional misdeeds, how will it fare with the man?²⁶

Conclusion

God never intended the Christian life to be a grope in the dark as Van Duzer wrongly claims. Instead, we are to bask in the light of God's Word. When we reject that light, however, we consign ourselves to the darkness and futility of a godless ethic. It is no surprise, therefore, that Van Duzer feels as though he has to grope in the dark. But praise be to God who is not only the light of light but is also the Truth. And as the Truth, He personally indwells us so that we may learn to walk in the truth and speak the truth.

So the next time you find yourself on the car lot, at the front door, or across the table, pause for a moment and pray that God would lead you in His truth (Ps. 25:5) so that your "mouth will utter truth" (Prov. 8:7). For "[t]ruthful lips will be established forever, but a lying tongue is only for a moment" (Prov. 12:19). Δ

²⁵ Dabney, R. L., "Morality of the Legal Profession," *Discussions*, Vol. III, Philosophical, pp. 10-16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²² For a more thorough critique of the lesser of evils theory, see Frame, John, *Medical Ethics*, (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co., 198-), pp. 8-10.

²³ See Hagopian, David, "So Help Me God: A Biblical View of Oaths," *Antithesis*, Vol. I, No. 1, January/February, 1990, pp. 42-47.

²⁴ See Hagopian, David, "Forgive Us Our Trespasses? A Biblical View of Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue," *Antithesis*, Vol. I, No. 3, May/June, 1990, pp. 9-14, 33-39.

David Hagopian, B.A., J.D. is an attorney with a Los Angeles-based law firm and a Senior Editor of *Antithesis*.

For the Record

This regular feature is an attempt to provide an elementary Biblical analysis of various topics in Christian theology and practice. We anticipate that this and future contributions will be helpful in explaining fundamental theological issues to those who may be relatively unfamiliar with them.

Understanding the Will

Douglas Wilson

Free will. Who could be against it? But there is a better question than this to ask. Free will. What is it?

Many of the staunchest advocates of "free will" encounter immediate difficulties when they are asked to explain what they defend — the embarrassment of Erasmus in his debate with Luther may be the archtypical example. Upon any close examination of proposed explanations it soon becomes apparent that "free will" (as commonly understood) is a philosophical chimera — it will be a long time before there is a rigorous apologetic in defense of this, the evanescent god.

Fortunately, the Bible does not leave us without teaching on this important subject of human choices. Jesus explains, in very plain terms, the mechanics of the will — and it is not what many suppose. In Matthew 12:33-37, Christ says:

Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or else make the tree bad and its fruit bad: for a tree is known by its fruit. Brood of vipers! How can you, being evil, speak good things? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. A good man

out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth good things, and an evil man out of the evil treasure brings forth evil things. But I say to you that for every idle word men may speak, they will give account of it in the day of judgment. For by your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned.

Christ teaches here that choices come from the heart. The will does not command the heart; rather, the heart commands the will. Consider these key points of Christ's doctrine:

- Choices and actions are the fruit of our human nature — they are a revelation of that nature. A good nature will result in good choices, and an evil nature will result in evil choices. Good trees produce good fruit, and evil trees produce evil fruit. Our words and actions, therefore, are not determined by an autonomous will, but rather by the nature of the tree.

- Consequently, Jesus says, someone with an evil nature is incapable of speaking good things. But this inability, this bondage, is caused by the nature of his own heart. He is bound by what he wants; it is a self-limitation. It is not external compulsion. Evil men are therefore free to do what they want, but they are not free to do what they should.

- Moreover, the fact that our choices proceed from our hearts does not limit our responsibility before God in the slightest. Our words are determined by our hearts, and we will be judged on the basis of our words. Indeed, we are judged on the basis of our words because they proceed straight from our hearts.

Suppose I offered a man a bowl of cockroaches to eat, and he refused. Why did he refuse? Because he didn't want them. Suppose further that I therefore accused him of having an enslaved will. He wonders why I think this. I reply that I think he is enslaved because he didn't use his will to decide to eat the cockroaches. He replies, quite justly, that his will is working perfectly well. The will chose just what the man wanted, and he didn't want a cockroach.

Jesus used another example besides that of fruit-bearing trees. If a man were to reach into a chest, he could only bring out what was already inside the chest. Different chests contain different things, and consequently, different things are brought out. Different hearts contain different things, and consequently, different choices are

made. The will is simply the arm God has given us to reach into our treasure chest (our heart), in order to bring out the contents. The will has no power to determine the contents of the chest; it only has the power to reveal the contents, and this it does very well.

So when God saves a man, He does not give him a new will. There is no need: the old will works just fine in doing what wills were meant by God to do — which is to bring out the contents of the heart. What God does in salvation is this: He gives us new hearts. As a result, the new Christian begins making new choices.

No man is capable of making a choice contrary to the strongest desire of his heart. This is an inexorable law; there are no exceptions — even God's choices proceed from His immutable and holy nature. A person may certainly have other desires, and they may be very strong desires (Romans 7:18-23). But what he finally does is what he wanted to do most, and he is therefore responsible for the choice.

If the choice were not his strongest desire, he would not have chosen it. Let us return to our example of the bowl of cockroaches for a moment. Suppose a man said, in order to refute this teaching, that he didn't want to eat a cockroach, but that he was going to do so anyway — so there. Is this a refutation? Not at all. It simply means that his will acted on the basis of his strongest desire, which is now to win the debate.

If we take these factors together, we see that it is nonsense to talk of a free will, as though there were this autonomous thing inside of us, capable of acting in any direction, regardless of the motives of the heart. If there could be such a thing — a creature who made choices not determined by the desires of its heart — we would not applaud this creature as a paragon of free will, but would rather pity it as a collection of random, arbitrary, insane choices. Such a creature would not be, and could not be, a free and responsible agent. We would recoil in horror from an exhibition of such autonomous free will. Choices made apart from the desires of the heart? They would be an exhibition, not of freedom, but of insanity. "Why did you throw the vase against the wall?" "Because I wanted to go for a walk."

So a far more Biblical way of speaking is to speak of free men, and not of free will. And what is a free man? He is someone who is free from external compulsion and is consequently at liberty to do what his heart desires.

This is a natural liberty, and all men are in possession of it. It is the only kind of liberty possible for us, and it is a gift to us from God. Under the superintendence of God, all men, Christian and non-Christian, have the freedom to turn left or right, to choose chocolate or vanilla, or to move to this city or that one — depending entirely upon what they want to do. The foreordination of God does not violate this; it is the cause of this — but more on this in a moment.

Notice that this natural liberty is not the same thing as the freedom from sin, i.e. moral liberty. In Romans 6:20,22, Paul makes the distinction between natural liberty and moral liberty. He says:

For when you were slaves of sin, you were free in regard to righteousness... But now having been set free from sin, and having become slaves of God, you have your fruit to holiness, and the end, everlasting life.

Slavery to sin is true slavery, but even sin does not negate natural liberty — the slave to sin is free from righteousness, but is still not free from his own desires. This slave to sin is one who loves sin, and consequently obeys it. As a creature, he is free to do what he wants, which is to continue in sin. But he is not free to desire righteousness. Why is he not free to do right? Because his sinful heart does not love what is right. Like all men, he is not free to choose what is repulsive to him, and true godliness is repulsive to him. So in the realm of morality, he is therefore free in a limited sense — free from the control of righteousness. When God, by grace, liberates him from the bondage of his own sin-loving heart, he is then a slave to God. As a slave to righteousness, the Christian freely, out of a new heart, follows Christ.

The True Ground of Freedom

Some people almost automatically yet mistakenly conclude that any assertion of foreordination along with any clarification of "free will" implies that human beings have no true freedom at all. This is quite false, and can easily be shown to be false. For example, when the Westminster divines affirmed the sovereignty of God's eternal decree, they went on, in the same breath, to say this: "...nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather

established."

Now the writers of the Confession were not merely saying that creaturely liberty was consistent with the Bible's teaching regarding God's sovereignty (although it certainly is), but rather that the Biblical doctrine of divine sovereignty was the *foundation* for human liberty. Consequently, according to this view, those Christians who dispute the doctrine of divine sovereignty are attacking more than God's sovereignty; they are attacking the only ground and foundation of true human liberty. So the debate is not between those Christians who want to affirm the liberty and responsibility of creatures, and those who do not. It is between those who consistently ground the liberty of creatures in the strength and power of God, and those who inconsistently ground it in the strength and power of man.

I have been in discussions where this affirmation of creaturely liberty was dismissed as something "tacked on" to the Biblical position — as sort of a sop to common sense. It is important to note the word "dismissed," and remember that it is not a synonym for "argued." The reason it is dismissed is because it is easy to assume that divine sovereignty is inconsistent with true human responsibility — but to argue for it is ultimately impossible.

For example, I have been told that to assert divine sovereignty and true human freedom is "illogical." There is a very simple answer to this: If this is illogical, then what is the name of the fallacy? There is a vast difference between logical contradictions and those high mysteries which must necessarily be contained in the infinite wisdom of God.

It is true that this sort of objection is quite a natural mistake to make, and people have been making it since the time of Paul at least (Rom. 9:19). When we consider the relationship of the infinite Creator to the finite creature, we do have a problem understanding how true natural liberty can co-exist with a sovereign God superintending all events in the universe. But the reconciliation of these two Biblical truths is ultimately to be found in the mind of God; it is not a problem that is keeping Him up nights, and we must recognize that our finite minds are not capable of penetrating the glories of the infinite. The sovereign prerogatives of the Creator, and the natural liberty and true responsibility of creatures are not inconsistent. How could they be? The Bible teaches them both, sometimes in the same verse.

We can, however, approach the subject obliquely. Instead of demonstrating that human liberty and divine sovereignty are consistent, it would be far more fruitful to show that all denials of divine sovereignty destroy true human liberty. In other words, it can be shown that the only hope for any kind of true human liberty is in the exhaustive sovereignty of the living God.

In the previous section, I argued that choices proceed from our hearts. It is impossible for a true choice to be autonomous in the sense of being independent of our heart desires. If there were a choice for which no reason at all could be given, we could no longer call it a choice. We would have to say it was a random event — Henry random-vented chocolate instead of vanilla. To say "autonomous choice" is as contradictory as to say "round square."

Now because all the influence is from the heart to the will, and not the other way around, the question is now this: since the will does not determine the direction of the heart, what does? The Bible teaches that God superintends the choices made by men. He may do so immediately through providential intervention or mediately through the use of secondary agents. What is the alternative to God's sovereignty over all events?

We have already shown that a man cannot autonomously choose to push his heart in a certain direction. And if we remove, for the sake of argument, God's personal and loving sovereignty from the one choosing, what is left? Only a blind, rigorous, inexorable, deterministic fatalism. Picture cupped hands around a guttering candle in a strong wind. This candle flame is the human will. The wind is the typhoon of the world around us. The cupped hands are the Lord's. Within Christianity, advocates of "free will" want the Lord to remove His hands so that the candle may burn more brightly. The history of modern philosophy should teach us better than this. Those who begin these optimistic crusades in the name of free will always end up in the fever swamps of blind behaviorism and determinism. The candle is out.

The conclusion then is that man, as creature, is free to do as he pleases. He has this freedom only because God grants and sustains it — and perfectly controls it. Δ

Douglas Wilson is a Contributing Editor of Antithesis

ISSUE AND INTERCHANGE

The goal of this regular feature is to provide our readers with opposing arguments on topics pertinent to the Christian life. We hope to encourage the reader to focus on the arguments involved in each position rather than on personal factors. The authors selected for the respective sides in the debate are outspoken supporters of their viewpoints.

Douglas Jones opens the interchange by sketching the argument for the Christian critique of non-Christian thought. Douglas Jones, an

elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, is the editor of *Antithesis* and a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Idaho and Lewis-Clark State College.

Keith Parsons offers the first of the two atheistic responses to Jones's essay. Keith Parsons, Ph.D., (Queen's University, Ontario, Canada) is the founder of Georgia Skeptics and teaches philosophy at Berry College (Rome, Georgia). He is the author of *God and the Burden of Proof* (Prometheus), and *Science,*

Confirmation, and the Theistic Hypothesis (Peter Lang).

Michael Martin presents the second atheistic critique of Jones's essay. Michael Martin is Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, Ph.D. (Harvard University), author of *The Case Against Christianity* (Temple University Press, 1991) and *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification* (Temple University Press, 1990).

To close out the interchange, Jones responds to the essays of Parsons and Martin.

ISSUE: Is Non-Christian Thought Justifiable?

Jones: The Futility of Non-Christian Thought

Biblical Christianity, properly defined in terms of classical Protestantism, offers a radical philosophical critique of non-Christian thought. This Christian critique is radical in the sense that it challenges the very core of non-Christian pretensions and demonstrates that non-Christian thought, whether atheistic, agnostic, or religious, ultimately destroys rationality, science, ethics, and every other aspect of human experience.

Moreover, since a properly Biblical critique ought to attack the heart of non-Christian thinking, it may not assume the very standards it demonstrates as futile (à la Aquinas, Swinburne, etc.) or capitulate to relativism or fideism (à la Plantinga; Kierkegaard, etc.) or subserviently argue that the Christian worldview is merely "probable" (à la Clark, Montgomery, Geisler, Moreland, etc.). A properly Biblical critique will not only demonstrate the utter futility of non-Christian thought, it will positively demonstrate that the Christian view of reality is intellectually *incapable*. As Cornelius Van Til has argued, "Christianity can be shown to be, not 'just as good as' or even 'better than' the non-Christian position, but the *only* position that does not make nonsense of human experience."

I will begin with a brief elaboration of a Christian critique of

non-Christian thought and then turn to summarize the positive argument for the Christian view of reality. Though I focus on "secular" non-Christian outlooks in the history of philosophy, the same types of problems arise in "religious" non-Christian outlooks (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.), but that discussion is the topic of a different essay.

Sketch of the Christian Critique of Non-Christian Thought

The Apostle Paul famously challenged: "Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?" (I Cor. 1:20). The Biblical outlook rejects non-Christian claims to knowledge as "knowledge falsely so-called" (I Tim. 6:20) and "vain deceit" (Col. 2:8), since such claims are allegedly justified autonomously rather than by the standard of God's knowledge (Prov. 1:7; Rom. 1:18-25; Col. 2:8). In this perspective, then, the chief traits of non-Christian thought are *rebellion* and its concomitant, epistemological *autonomy* (self rule).

Epistemological autonomy is the view that the human mind is the final criterion of knowledge. According to this view, common to non-Christian thinkers from Thales to Derrida, the Christian God has to be

either non-existent or irrelevant to epistemological concerns. Human categories alone are necessary to determine modality, truth, and value. From a Christian perspective, autonomy is a rebellious attempt to deify human categories or some aspect of creation by attempting to usurp the Creator's functions — i.e. replacing the Creator with the creature (Rom. 1:25). Nevertheless, the result of this attempt to be epistemologically independent of the Christian God is epistemological futility.

The basis for the foregoing conclusion may be sketched as follows:

(I) Non-Christian autonomy may exemplify itself in three primary ways — epistemological *competence*, *incompetence*, or a *mixture of competence and incompetence*.

(A) Non-Christian thinkers who emphasize the first of these three options are those who maintain that the human mind is *competent* to interpret, evaluate, and describe reality (e.g., Parmenides, Aristotle, the Rationalists, the Empiricists, etc.).

(B) Non-Christian thinkers who emphasize the second of these three options are those who maintain that the human mind is *incompetent* to be determinative for reality since humans are finite and reality is characterized by chance eventuation (e.g., the Sophists, various subjectivist traditions, Nietzsche, the Exis-

tentialists, the later Wittgenstein, Derrida).

(C) Finally, non-Christian thinkers who consciously aim to synthesize the first two options are those who admit that the human mind is *partly competent* and *partly incompetent* (e.g., Plato: the realms of Being vs. Becoming; Kant: the realms of the Phenomena vs. the Noumena).

(II) Each of these three non-Christian emphases ultimately destroys knowledge and leaves the non-Christian with radical ignorance about the world, truth, and values.

(A) Those thinkers who maintain that the human mind is *competent* to serve as its own criterion of truth ultimately encounter their own finitude; their particular rational scheme cannot account for everything since the autonomous theorist does not have God's abilities. Instead of the proposed exhaustive scheme of reality, the non-Christian will either deny or ignore whatever doesn't fit his rational scheme, thus compromising the proposed scheme (e.g., Parmenides' "illusion" of change; Aristotle's unformed matter; the Logical Positivists' "rejection of metaphysics") and radically limit knowledge to trivial and/or unsubstantive claims that will apparently fit within the scheme (e.g., Descartes' "cogito"; the Empiricists' vacuous sense perceptions).

But whatever the particular tack, the presumed autonomous *competence* finally reduces to epistemological *incompetence* — the rational scheme fails leaving subjectivism and skepticism.

(B) Those thinkers who maintain that the human mind is *incompetent* to serve as its own criterion of truth do not fare any better. Though apparently more humble in their refusal to make the human mind schematize reality, they nonetheless determine to play the autonomous God in their own subjective reality. Nevertheless, they cannot defend their claim to autonomous *incompetence* without invoking some of the objective standards of their "opponents," the autonomous *competents*. In other words, autonomous *incompetents* must turn to objective, rational schemes in order to defend their opposition to objective knowledge (e.g., Protagoras' de-

fense of "better" views in the midst of a radical relativism; the later Wittgenstein's "proper use" of language; Derrida's use of logocentrism to urge us to abandon logocentrism). Similarly, autonomous *incompetents* evidence the weakness of their subjectivism by their practical inconsistencies (e.g., Marx's opposition to injustice; Derrida's support for Nelson Mandela).

In a direct reversal of the first non-Christian option, the presumed autonomous *incompetence* finally reduces to epistemological *competence* — subjectivism needs objective schemes. Non-Christian *incompetence* fails and starts the circle all over again.

(C) Perhaps the way out of this non-Christian futility is a conscious synthesis of the first two options along the lines of a Plato or Kant. But futility plus futility will not rescue the non-Christian thinker. The same problems raised against the first two options will arise again. For example, Plato's attempt to exhaustively explain reality in terms of a synthesis of Forms (unchanging; immaterial; human *competence*) with the realm of Becoming (constant change; material; human *incompetence*) must have, but cannot have, an unchanging Form of change. His whole synthesis collapses.

Similarly, Kant's synthesis of *competence* and *incompetence* demands that we can say something rational about the noumenal realm (knowledge of the unknowable) and denies that we can ultimately know the "things-in-themselves" of the phenomenal realm (no-knowledge of the knowable). Autonomous syntheses such as these merely compound the epistemological futilities of non-Christian thought.

Van Til noted that "all the antinomies of antitheistic reasoning are due to a false separation of man from God." Such a separation inevitably leads to the destruction of knowledge. I turn now to briefly examine a particular, contemporary example of non-Christian thought.

Case in Point: Paul Kurtz

Paul Kurtz (*The Transcendental Temptation*) is well known for his strident philosophical defenses of humanism and atheism, so he is a

prime candidate for a Christian critique. If, in general, non-Christian worldviews destroy knowledge, then we should expect to find the same epistemological futility in Kurtz' worldview; he doesn't let us down.

Kurtz' text noted above is replete with examples of how the commitment to autonomous *competence* gives way to autonomous *incompetence* and the destruction of knowledge. Consider his comments regarding the knower and the standards of knowledge:

The Knower: On the one hand, we as supposedly autonomous beings have knowledge because "experience and reason are drawn upon in ordinary life and in the sophisticated sciences to establish reliable knowledge" (p. 23); "There is a well-established body of knowledge" (p. 37). Moreover, Kurtz advocates an epistemology of "the act" which rescues us from the "traps of earlier theories of experience" (e.g. the ego-centric predicament) in that the "external world is a precondition for internal awareness" (p. 32). Autonomous, *competent* knowledge is so reliable that Kurtz can unhesitatingly describe religious opponents as mystics living in "a world of fantasy" and "romantic superstition" (p. xi).

Yet on the other hand, this *competent*, robust account of knowledge encounters its finite limits and admits its *incompetence*: "many things in the universe remain beyond our present understanding, transcending the present boundaries of knowledge" (p. 316). In fact, human knowledge "is not an absolute picture of reality" (p. 34), nevertheless, the skeptic's more heroic stance is to deny that transcendental "forms of reality are knowable or meaningful" (p. 26).

Obviously Kurtz is embroiled in a vitiating tension. His commitment to the *competence* of human categories is undermined by their finitude. If autonomous categories are so limited as to leave, now or forever, much of reality "unknowable" then Kurtz cannot speak with any boldness whatsoever about our present knowledge since there might be some factor in this unknown realm which makes our robust claim to knowledge false. Kurtz simply can't justify the claim of epistemological *competence*. On his own terms, then,

we can have no knowledge.

Even if we ignore this tension, how does Kurtz' epistemology of "the act" give us any non-trivial knowledge? Though he claims to get beyond the ego-centric predicament, he doesn't get anywhere important. In generous terms, the most his view provides us with is the bare knowledge that there are external objects. But there are light-years between this trivial claim and a "body of well-established knowledge."

The Standards of Knowledge: Knowledge requires objective standards, and, on the side of epistemological *competence*, Kurtz speaks of "deductive necessity" (p. 38), "logical consistency" (p. 46), "canons of induction" (p. 55), "the rule of contradiction" (p. 28), "simple and beautiful mathematical and causal laws" (p. 292), "the magnificent splendor of nature and the order and regularities we discover in it" (p. 316), and the cosmos appearing "to behave in terms of immutable and universal laws" (p. 288).

Yet with equal vigor, on the side of epistemological *incompetence*, he must defend the view that "there are no firm and unchanging, absolute binding principles involved in scientific inquiry" (p. 44). "There are failures in nature and there are fluke occurrences.....Chance factors intervene" (p. 291). Moreover, evolution is a "key principle in interpreting the universe" (p. 288) and most notably, "Change is not a human invention, but a cosmic fact, applying to all forms of life" (p. 289).

Such horrendous epistemological conflicts within a non-Christian worldview are common;

they are results of epistemological autonomy. First, we can challenge the non-Christian to justify the standards of rationality he appeals to. Kurtz ultimately justifies the standards of inductive and deductive logic as "simply convenient rules of inquiry, vindicated by their consequences" (p. 88). Aside from Kurtz' question-begging appeal to pragmatic "vindication," if the standards of rationality are merely convenient rules, then we need not take anything Kurtz says seriously, including his objections to Christianity.

But even more damaging on this score is the metaphysical conflict between logical laws which are supposedly necessary and unchanging that magically appear in a non-Christian cosmos of "no unchanging principles," where change applies to all of life. Which is it? Whichever path Kurtz follows will lead to the destruction of rationality, science, ethics, etc.

None of the above criticisms and challenges are unique to Paul Kurtz. You will find the same problems in atheists such as Nielsen, Flew, Parsons, Martin, and throughout non-Christian philosophies and religions. Non-Christians need to justify these elementary concerns about their worldview before they attempt to foist their secular myths upon Christians. To reverse a line from Kurtz, "[Christian] skeptics ought to refuse to be lured by the [autonomous] myths of the day."

The Inescapability of Christianity

In brief, Biblical Christianity avoids the futilities of non-Christian philosophies by rejecting

epistemological autonomy. In contrast to a futile epistemological *competence*, the Christian acknowledges that the universe is fully knowable to the Christian God and to us as far as He reveals his knowledge to us. Hence, Christian philosophy does not destroy knowledge by means of the self-vitiating finite criteria or impotent knowledge claims. Moreover, in contrast to a futile epistemological *incompetence*, the Christian acknowledges that the human mind must look to the objective standard of God and His revelation, thus not falling prey to subjectivistic dilemmas which vex non-Christian thought.

Hence, instead of hopelessly attempting to determine truth by means of finite products of chance, a Christian view of reality acknowledges the Christian God as the inescapable precondition of all thought. Thus we offer a *transcendental argument* to establish the truth of Christianity: If the Christian view of reality is not true, then knowledge is impossible. Only the Christian view of reality provides the conditions necessary for logic, induction, scientific progress, ethics, history, and the arts. As Van Til says, "Science, philosophy, and theology find their intelligible contact only on the presupposition of the self-revelation of God in Christ." Hence, a consistent Christian philosophy takes most seriously Christ's claim that "without Me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). Though non-Christians will strenuously object to such claims, their objections against Christianity will all the while presuppose the truth of Christianity.

Parsons Responds: Is Non-Christian Thought Futile?

Readers of recent theistic philosophers are likely to be struck by contrast between the sophistication of the logical machinery employed and the modesty of the claimed results. Alvin Plantinga expends vast labors of modal logic to argue that theism is no less rational than atheism. Richard Swinburne devotes his enormous expertise in Bayesian confirmation theory to the claim that God's existence is rather more likely

than his non-existence. In such a context, Douglas Jones's claim is truly breathtaking: "...non-Christian thought, whether atheistic, agnostic, or religious, ultimately destroys rationality, science, ethics, and every other aspect of human experience." Further, "A properly Biblical critique [of non-Christian thought] will not only demonstrate the utter futility of non-Christian thought, it will positively demonstrate that the Christian

view of reality is intellectually *inescapable* [emphasis in original]." All this in a little over two pages!

Clearly, Jones is making some very big claims, and very big claims take a lot of proving. Further, philosophical claims are like the proverbial prizefighter: The bigger they are, the harder they fall. Jones's claims fall very hard.

According to Jones, the fatal flaw of non-Christian thought is

"epistemological autonomy," which he defines as follows:

Epistemological autonomy is the view that the human mind is the final criterion of knowledge. According to this view, common to non-Christian thinkers from Thales to Derrida, the Christian God has to be either non-existent or irrelevant to epistemological concerns. Human categories alone are necessary to determine modality, truth, and value.

Odd. I thought Thales flourished circa 600 B.C. and so would be most unlikely to have any sort of opinion about the Christian God. Anachronisms aside, there are a number of puzzling things about this remarkable passage. For one thing, what are we to make of the charge that non-Christians regard the human mind as the "final criterion for knowledge"? We have to know what Jones means by this last phrase before we can understand his accusation.

Perhaps, and this seems the most reasonable construal of Jones's meaning, he is accusing non-Christians of recognizing no higher authority for their judgements about truth, value, etc., than what their own minds tell them is true, valuable, and so forth. As a non-Christian, I hasten to plead guilty to this accusation.

All I want to know is, what is the alternative? Should I believe that something is true or valuable that my mind tells me is not? Should I suspend my own judgements about truth and defer to some alleged revelation? How, then do I know that it is a true revelation? Jones cannot say, on pain of appealing to the very criterion he rejects, that I could trust my own mind to tell me that it is a true revelation. Could another revelation tell me that the first revelation is true? But how, then, would I know that *that* revelation is true? Surely we are on the road to an infinite regress.

The upshot is that nobody, not even Jones, has any choice in the matter. We *must* trust our own minds about what is true, even if there is

revealed truth. Purported revelations are a dime a dozen. As Mark Twain allegedly said, "Mankind has discovered the one true religion. Lots of 'em." Why should we believe in Christ rather than Quetzalcoatl? The only possible answer is that our minds tell us that the Christian revelation is true and the Aztec one not. Hence, epistemological autonomy must be exercised to discover the true revelation, if there be any. Thus, it is Jones, not the non-Christian, who is in an epistemologically self-vitiating predicament.

In the main part of his article, Jones pillories Paul Kurtz, holding up Kurtz's book, *The Transcendental Temptation*, as exhibit number one in his prosecution of the case against non-Christian thought. Now Paul Kurtz is certainly capable of defending himself, so I would not have much to say here except for the fact that Jones tells us that Kurtz's errors are also common to such other atheistic miscreants as "Nielsen, Flew, Parsons, [and] Martin." What, then, are Kurtz's epistemic sins that we others have shared in?

Jones claims to perceive a tension in Kurtz's thought. On the one hand, Kurtz emphasizes the *competence* of the autonomous human mind to arrive at reliable knowledge: Science and common sense employ objective standards to arrive at reliable knowledge. On the other hand, Kurtz emphasizes the *incompetence* of human knower: There is much that we do not and perhaps cannot know. Epistemological standards change and we cannot ever say that human beliefs represent an absolutely correct picture of reality. Jones sees such alleged tensions as "horrendous epistemological conflicts."

What exactly is the problem here? How is my claim to know some things in any way vitiated by my admission that there are many things I do not know? Suppose I even admit that there are some things, like, say, how bread and wine can simultaneously be the body and blood of a man crucified 2000 years ago, that utterly transcend my understanding. Does my inability to fathom the mysteries of transubstantiation mean that I must, for instance, entertain serious doubts about the

existence of gravity? Does the fact that epistemological standards change mean that I am incompetent to judge the validity of *modus ponens*?

Jones tells us that "If autonomous categories are so limited as to leave, now or forever, much of reality 'unknowable' then Kurtz cannot speak with any boldness whatsoever about our present knowledge since there might be some factor in this unknown realm which makes our robust claim to knowledge false." In other words, if we don't know everything, we can't know anything. The fact that I cannot conclusively demonstrate that I am not a brain in a vat means, according to Jones, that I can make no confident claims to knowledge at all.

In short, Jones is reviving the old project of Descartes's *Meditations*: Knowledge is defined as absolute certainty. How, then, can we be absolutely certain that we are not the dupes of an evil genius, an omnipotent demon who amuses himself by making us err in all our knowledge claims? The only way, Descartes realized, is to become absolutely certain that an omnipotent *good* being exists who will not allow us to err in all our judgments about truth. But there's the rub; how can we be absolutely certain that such a good omnipotent being exists? Descartes's theistic "proofs" are embarrassingly weak, and his whole project founders on them.

As with Descartes, the only way out of the dilemma Jones sets for the secular thinker—absolute certainty or complete skepticism—is absolute certainty about the existence of God. Where, then, are Jones's proofs? To escape from the dilemma we must have absolutely indubitable theistic proofs, and Jones provides none. If Jones replies that, unlike Descartes, he does not equate knowledge with certainty, then what is the force of his objection to Kurtz? Why, in that case, cannot Kurtz and the rest of us make bold, confident knowledge claims even though we cannot be absolutely certain that they are not wrong?

Finally, and fatally, Jones's argument is self-defeating when addressed to non-Christians. Jones's conclusion is that non-Christian thought is futile. The non-Christian

can evaluate this conclusion only by employing those very criteria and categories stigmatized as futile by that conclusion. Hence, if the conclusion is true, the non-Christian's attempt to evaluate the claim "all non-Christian thought is futile" is futile. It follows that if Jones's argument is sound, the non-Christian must necessarily lack rational grounds for accepting its conclusion.

Surely I am justified in dismissing out of hand any argument that guarantees that I cannot rationally accept its conclusion.

In conclusion, Jones has shown absolutely no problems with the sort of fallibilistic epistemologies favored by many secular thinkers. Worse, an appeal to revelation, if it is not to be completely irrational, must be judged by the autonomous human

mind. Without such judgements, what is Revealed Truth to you will only be hearsay to me. Finally, as a polemic directed to non-Christians, Jones's argument is an utterly self-defeating failure. Thus, in his effort to prove the futility of non-Christian thought, Jones only succeeds in tying himself in conceptual knots. There certainly is evidence of futility here, but not on the part of non-Christians.

Martin Responds: Is A Non-Christian Worldview Futile?

Douglas Jones' "The Futility of Non-Christian Thought" raises important epistemological questions that both Christians and non-Christians need to address. However, as I will show, Jones' argument for his main thesis that non-Christian worldviews destroy the possibility of knowledge rests on unsound arguments and confusions. In addition, it contains false implications and leads to inconsistencies.

The Transcendental Argument

Jones' main argument, what he calls a transcendental argument, proceeds as follows:

- (1) If the Christian view of reality is not true, then human knowledge is impossible.
- (2) Human knowledge is possible.
- (3) Hence, the Christian view of reality is true.

Non-Christians would have no problem in accepting the validity of this argument, i.e. accepting that *if* the premises were true, *then* the conclusion would be true. The question is not, then, the validity of the argument but its soundness, i.e. whether the premises are true. Since, many non-Christians would accept premise (2), the key problem for most non-Christians is the truth of premise (1).

Two Indirect Arguments Against Premise (1)

Before I directly consider the first premise of Jones' transcendental

argument, two lines of reason should be noted that indirectly tell against it.

First, if Jones' argument is sound, the Christian worldview is true. But there is excellent reason to suppose that it is false. So it follows that Jones' argument is not sound. Since the most problematic aspect of Jones' argument is premise (1), it is likely that (1) is false. Why do I say that there is excellent reason to suppose that the Christian view of reality is not true? As I argued in *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification* (1990), traditional arguments have failed to prove the existence of God. Moreover, there are good reasons to suppose that the concept of God is incoherent. In addition, the argument from evil and other inductive arguments make the existence of God unlikely. Furthermore, in *The Case Against Christianity* (1991) I have shown that the major doctrines of Christianity are improbable. The strength of my detailed arguments developed in approximately eight hundred pages of text should be weighed against the force of the argument sketched in three pages by Jones.

Second, the great ancient, modern and contemporary Christian apologists have not used Jones' transcendental argument. Although it is possible that philosophers from Aquinas to Swinburne, from Descartes to Plantinga have overlooked it, this seems unlikely. It is much more plausible to suppose that these thinkers rejected premise (1).

The Possibility of Human Knowledge

Preliminary to a direct evaluation of premise (1) it is neces-

sary to say a few words about premise (2), for Jones' reasons for accepting (1) seem to result from confusions concerning the meaning of (2) and what it entails. First of all, to say that human knowledge is possible is not to assume that human knowledge claims can be made with absolute certainty. Many people, e.g. those trained in scientific method, would admit that any claim of the form "X knows that p", although justified in light of present evidence, might have to be withdrawn in the course of further inquiry. New evidence might induce us to change our minds. However, this does not mean that truth is relative. What is relative here is knowledge *claims*, for these are dependent on the amount and quality of available evidence. The thesis that knowledge claims are always subject to revision in the light of new evidence is known as fallibilism.

Furthermore, to say that knowledge is possible is not to assume that humans know, or some day will know, everything. There will always be something more to be known even if fallibilism is true. Again this does not entail that knowledge is relative in any sense but the following: We may know certain propositions in the future that we do not know today or did not know yesterday. Naturally there may be some propositions that we will never know. Humans are not omniscient. I will call this the thesis of human epistemic limitation.

Neither of these theses entails skepticism. That is, the view that human knowledge is impossible. What they do entail is that certainty and complete knowledge

are impossible for human beings. However, this view is not very controversial and has in fact been embraced by many Christians. Nor do these theses entail subjectivism, that is, the view that there are no objective standards of knowledge and no norms for reconciling disagreements between knowledge claims. The use of objective standards, e.g. intersubjective testability, is compatible with the theses of fallibilism and human epistemic limitation.

Direct Challenge to the Transcendental Argument

On what direct grounds can premise (1) be challenged? The arguments Jones provides for (1) are unsound and premises that seem as justified as (1) can be used in other transcendental arguments with conclusions that conflict with (3).

The Argument From Finitude

Although I find Jones' reasoning unclear, one of his arguments for premise (1) *seems* to be the following. Non-Christians assume that human beings are competent to achieve knowledge without God. ("According to this view, common to non-Christians... the Christian God has to be either non-existent or irrelevant to epistemological concerns.") However, the knowledge claims of non-Christians are limited. ("Their particular rational schemes cannot account for everything since the autonomous theorist does not have God's ability.") If non-Christians' knowledge claims are limited, then the knowledge claims of non-Christians could not really be knowledge. ("Instead of the proposed exhaustive scheme of reality ... the rational scheme fails leaving subjectivism and skepticism.") Therefore, human knowledge is impossible in a non-Christian view of reality.

Many non-Christians would agree with the first two premises. But the third premise is questionable. There is no reason to suppose that limited knowledge claims cannot be true. As I have already argued, the truth of premise (2) is compatible with the theses of fallibilism and human epistemic limitation and these do not entail skepticism, relativism, or subjectivism. Jones seems to be confusing the competence to

achieve *limited* knowledge with the competence to achieve *total* knowledge or else the competence to make *probable* knowledge claims with the competence to make *certain* knowledge claims. Humans have the competence to make probable knowledge claims and achieve limited knowledge but not to make certain knowledge claims and achieve unlimited knowledge.

The Appeal to Trivial Knowledge

Another consideration used by Jones to bolster his case is that non-Christian schemes of knowledge omit what does not fit and limit knowledge to trivial and/or unimportant claims. ("...the non-Christian will either deny or ignore whatever does not fit his scheme, thus compromising the proposed scheme....and radically limit knowledge to trivial and/or unsubstantive claims that will apparently fit within the scheme...")

Apart from citing a few names and ideas, e.g. the Logical Positivists' rejection of metaphysics as examples of this charge, this position is not argued for in Jones' essay. In order to substantiate his charge Jones has his work cut out for him. He would have to *argue for*, and not just assert, the particular claims made in his article — for example that the Logical Positivists were wrong — which at the very least would involve refuting my long and detailed defense of their program. (See *Atheism*, chapter 2). He would also have to show that non-Christians *must* radically limit knowledge to trivial and/or unsubstantive claims. This he has not done.

It is important to notice that the thesis of human epistemic limitation does *not* entail this charge. From the fact that human knowledge is limited it does not follow that it is trivial or unsubstantive. Indeed, scientific knowledge is limited but hardly trivial or unsubstantive. Jones may wish to argue that scientific knowledge is only possible with God's help. But this argument is not made in his paper.

The Argument from an Unknown Factor

In discussing Paul Kurtz's view Jones presumes what seems to be a different argument but is not.

Pointing out that Kurtz admits that many things in the universe are unknown, Jones argues that Kurtz "cannot speak with any boldness whatsoever about our present knowledge since there might be some factor in the unknown realm which makes our robust claims to knowledge false." However, the possibility that an unknown factor might undermine our knowledge claims is just another way of pointing out that our knowledge claims are uncertain and limited. Yes, there *might* be such factors. If there were, our knowledge claims would be false. But this should not prevent us from making tentative claims in light of present evidence and arguing in its light that we are probably correct. I cannot speak for Kurtz but I would think that he would say something similar. That Jones finds this position incoherent seems to be a function of the confusions that have already been noted.

Inconsistencies and the Transcendental Argument

It is difficult for one to see why the basic idea behind Jones' transcendental argument is particularly Christian. God of the Jews or Islam would also seem to provide the epistemological foundation that Jones wants. For example, it would seem that premise:

(1') If the Islamic view of reality is not true, then human knowledge is impossible.

could be substituted for (1) and combined with (2) would entail:

(3') Hence, the Islamic view of reality is true.

The same arguments that are used to support (1) could be used to support (1'). However, since (3) and (3') are incompatible, Jones' mode of argument leads to inconsistencies. Jones surely owes his readers some explanation of why his Christian transcendental argument is permissible but an Islamic or Jewish one is not. Unless objective grounds for distinguishing the two cases are provided, one is entitled to conclude that the exclusion of Islamic and Jewish uses of the argument is arbitrary. Failure to provide such

grounds would in turn provide reasons for claiming that a Christian based epistemology is a subtle form of subjectivism.

Christianity and Subjectivism

Are there other reasons to suppose that a Christian based epistemology provides no objective foundation for epistemology? A cursory glance at the controversies within the Christian religion must surely banish any illusion of the objective

nature of Christian belief. The many sectarian and denominational squabbles, the numerous heresies, the schisms within the major churches shows that any certainty associated with Christian belief is nonexistent. Indeed, even in the pages of *Antithesis* (March/April 1991) one finds deep controversy over whether the Bible permits moderate drinking of alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, there seems to be no objective means of reconciling

any of these differences. If this uncertainty and the lack of objective standards of reconciliation are found at the very heart of basic Christian doctrine, there seems to be small hope that the Christian religion can provide any objective foundation of epistemology in general. Yet Jones remains confident that a non-Christian based epistemology leads to subjectivism whereas a Christian based epistemology does not. One can only wonder why.

Jones Responds

Apart from the more serious concerns, I find it quaint that both Parsons and Martin apparently hold to the notion that truth is in part determined by the number of pages one writes. Though my opening essay is directed to a non-technical audience, perhaps no such discussion need take many pages given the inability of the non-Christian program to get off the ground. Nevertheless, neither of my interlocutors chose to sketch how their particular epistemological standard might aim to justify knowledge of any sort. I will begin by examining and rejecting Parsons' two primary objections (a remaining concern will be examined under Martin) and then turn to do the same for Martin's four.

Parsons 1: Autonomy is inescapable — Parsons (1) pleads guilty to epistemological autonomy, "recognizing no higher authority for...judgments about truth, value, etc.," since it is inescapable and (2) argues that a Christian alternative would produce an infinite regress.

(1) Parsons here at least recognizes that some knowledge involves certainty even though he later attempts to deny it; nonetheless, the Christian challenge isn't whether one should ultimately choose between a competent autonomous standard and a subordinate revelation but rather: where is a competent autonomous standard? For example, if Parsons, not being a subjectivist, seeks to determine knowledge by means of an empirical criterion, then he needs to demonstrate how he gets from particular perceptual states ("appearing redly") to general propositions of common experience, logic, mathematics, and values; alternatively, if he seeks to determine knowledge by means of some modern Rationalist line ("self-evident", a priori general truths, etc.) and deduce a system of knowledge, then he needs to

demonstrate how he gets beyond the most trivial generalities to knowledge of particular facts. Whichever option or variation on these themes the non-Christian takes will end in skepticism, as the history of philosophy demonstrates so aptly. In contrast, the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions which make these sorts of knowledge possible.

(2) Parsons' argument threatening an infinite regress rests on a confusion over the nature of ultimate standards. Parsons argues for his ultimate standard by making it self-validating ("nobody...has any choice in the matter"), and Christians argue for theirs in the same way. Neither group could do otherwise. Hence, an infinite regress does not threaten either, but the pressing question is: which view of reality provides the preconditions of knowledge which we all agree that we have? The answer: Christianity.

Parsons 2: Self-defeating futility — Parsons argues, "finally and fatally," that if the Christian argument regarding the futility of non-Christian categories is sound, then the non-Christian is "justified in dismissing... any argument that guarantees that I cannot rationally accept its conclusion."

First, note that Parsons doesn't follow his own *reductio* in his objection; on the one hand he claims that he would have no rational criteria available, but then he also claims to be "justified in dismissing" the argument. Which is it? To be more consistent, he should either be philosophically silent or reject the non-Christian principles which led to such an absurd position.

Second, the Christian critique recognizes that Christians can reason with non-Christians only because the latter don't act in accord with their basic principles. Non-Christians can reason, do science, ethics, etc. be-

cause they live in a Christian universe which makes these activities possible (as opposed to a non-Christian universe where, for example, materialism precludes universal and necessary logical principles or a eastern monism which obliterates ethical and mathematical distinctions). Moreover, Christians maintain that this sort of "rebellious borrowing" from the Christian view of reality has occurred since the Fall of man, and, hence, would include all non-Christians (including Thales, contrary to Parsons' rather narrow understanding of a Christian God who just pops onto the historical scene during the Roman Empire).

Martin 1: Indirect Arguments — Martin begins his discussion by offering two indirect arguments against the claim that knowledge presupposes the Christian God: (1) His own arguments (over "eight hundred pages" remember) allegedly demonstrate that (a) traditional arguments have failed, (b) the concept of God is incoherent, and (c) the argument from evil, etc. make God's existence "unlikely," and (2) no great apologist has used this sort of transcendental argument for Christianity.

None of these concerns, however, counts even indirectly against my case, given that (1a) traditional arguments fail in part because they are based on philosophical compromises with self-defeating non-Christian views, (1b) Martin's arguments for the incoherence of the concept of God begs-the-question (see below), and (1c) Martin cannot justifiably distinguish evil from good in order to raise the objection from evil. Finally, Martin's indirect argument (2) regarding the history of apologetics is really more of an autobiographical comment on what Martin has and hasn't read rather than an argument against the view I defend, given the rich development of this sort

of Christian outlook in the Scripture, Augustine, Calvin, Dutch Reformed and Princeton/Westminster theology.

Martin 2: Direct Arguments

— Martin's direct objections against a Christian transcendental argument fail because they do not address ultimate epistemological standards but instead focus on lower-level knowledge concerns. Christians obviously hold to some version of fallibilism and human epistemic limitation in regard to most knowledge claims, and so his three arguments miss the target.

Nonetheless, no one is a consistent fallibilist in regard to ultimate standards of knowledge — claims to certainty at some point are unavoidable. As we've seen, Parsons holds to epistemological autonomy with the utmost certainty, and Martin wants to defend objective standards of knowledge. Nevertheless, unless Martin distinguishes between lower-level knowledge claims and his ultimate objective standards of rationality, then his version of fallibilism will entail epistemological relativism. If "knowledge claims are always subject to revision in the light of new evidence," then Martin's "objective standards," which he defends with such zeal, are really just passing prejudices which will someday be rejected. If he's willing to adopt this sort of consistent Quinean relativism, then perhaps he ought to place disclaimers on his books warning readers that he only intends to offer contemporary logical prejudices.

So, though both Parsons and Martin argue that knowledge does not entail certainty in some Cartesian sense, they are partly right and partly wrong (Parsons' assertions regarding my attempt to resurrect some Cartesian argument is quite off the mark; Descartes used blatantly autonomous and anti-Christian categories, thus leading to skepticism, though it took the likes of Hume to point this out). Parsons and Martin assure us that "unknown factors" do not generally count against lower-level claims; this would just be silly. But, "unknown factors" may count against ultimate standards since we are dealing with universal and certain claims. And this is one place among many, where non-Christians will make sweeping claims to knowledge but cannot deliver what they promise. In short, we should compare the opposing Christian and non-Christian claims to certainty, and choose the one which doesn't vitiate science, logic, history, ethics, language, art, etc.

Finally, on this score, Martin

challenges me in regard to the claim that non-Christian philosophies produce, at most, trivial knowledge claims. He insists (1) I haven't argued for this claim or (2) refuted his "long and detailed defense" of the Logical Positivists.

(1) Though I did argue for this claim, the burden is really on non-Christians to defend their own worldview. Though a thorough survey of every non-Christian thinker is not possible, let me, once again, just challenge two strains of non-Christian thought: rationalisms and empiricisms. If Martin is so confident in non-Christian knowledge, then he should show us how we get anything beyond the most general platitudes in rationalism and vacuous perceptual states of empiricism. As Martin himself says, "scientific knowledge is limited but hardly trivial or unsubstantive." Exactly. So how does the consistent empiricist (or modern Logical Positivist) ever get there on the basis of his autonomous standard?

(2) In *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification*, Martin defends a revised version of verification principle which focuses not on meaning in general but on *factual* meaning (i.e., a criterion of what sentences express statements) in which meaningful statements are those which are "confirmable or disconfirmable in principle by nonreligious, straightforward, empirical statements." He concludes, not surprisingly, that "religious language is...factually meaningless."

First, how does this formulation not rule out the standards of logic? Has Martin confirmed or disconfirmed the law of non-contradiction and a host of other similar criteria? How would one find an "empirically determinate state of affairs...to count against" the truth of a foundational statement like this? Second, the standard begs-the-question against the Christian in the most egregious fashion: "The very notion of referring assumes some temporal or spatial or spatial-temporal scheme." With that sort of guiding dogma, how could one not be an atheist?

Martin 3: Alleged Inconsistencies — Martin's third argument against the Christian critique I offer is that it is too general since, he claims, that the "God of the Jews or Islam would also seem to provide the epistemological foundation that Jones wants."

First, Islam vitiates knowledge as much as any non-Christian "secular" philosophy. Though a detailed

analysis is beyond the scope of this discussion, the Islamic God is not the God of the Bible, and so we should expect that it undermines knowledge. For example, depending on the version of Islam one focuses on, the general and absolute unity of Allah is so guarded against the imperfections of plurality that Allah cannot be said to know any particular items or facts, including the historical Muhammad. This has long been a vigorous problem in Islamic philosophy/theology. The implication of this and similar problems are many, but Allah in no way provides a transcendental foundation for knowledge as we find in the triune God of Christianity. Beyond this, Christians also rule out Islam on the basis of its gross theological departure from the Old Covenant.

Second, since Christianity in its best form is the most orthodox form of Judaism, i.e., the fulfillment of the Abrahamic Covenant, Christians have no philosophical dispute with a faithful Judaism since the two would ultimately be identical. Nevertheless, until we reach that point, our disputes will be exegetical and only philosophical to the point where Judaism (or Christianity) compromises with non-Christian thought. In short, Martin's arguments again misfire.

Martin 4: Christianity and Subjectivism — In his most disappointing section, Martin argues that Christianity fails to provide an objective foundation for epistemology given even a " cursory glance at the controversies within the Christian religion." Consider what Martin's reasoning would do to numerous historical disputes in science: As James Rachels has argued, "We cannot conclude that the world is shapeless simply because not everyone agrees what shape it has." Moreover, Martin himself answers opponents of his verification principle who claim that "since some people disagree over whether some examples of putative statements are factually meaningful, one cannot appeal to any examples to support this principle. But this is a non-sequitur." Well said.

In all, neither Parsons nor Martin come close to getting the non-Christian program off the ground. Their criticisms are either irrelevant, beg-the-question, or rest on confusions. They have yet to meet the Christian challenge head-on or justify their own standards of knowledge. As the Apostle Paul declared, we should look to Christ for "all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Δ

Journal Journal

David Hall

"Calvin Bibliography 1990" compiled by Peter De Klerk; *Calvin Theological Journal*, Nov. 1990, vol. 25, no. 2

In one of the very nice annual features of this journal, Peter De Klerk, Emeritus Librarian of CTS, has saved the Calvin student hundreds of hours with the compilation of this excellent bibliography. Since 1973 De Klerk has supplied these in CTJ. This one (actually spanning about 5 years) records the recent publication of Calvin's Works, biographies, writings on his relations with other reformers, studies of his theology, and writings on various theological loci. This well-organized bibliography is a must for further studies. And De Klerk has done most of the work for us.

Also from CTJ, vol. 25, no. 2, Nov. 1990 in an article on Calvin's integration of the intellect and the will, Richard Muller concludes, lest we imagine Calvin as a hardened, disconnected cerebrum with no feeling or will, "These conclusions confirm the basic insights of Doumergue and Lobstein concerning the experimental and practical character of Calvin's thought and indicate the need to modify somewhat the frequent claim that Calvin equates faith with knowledge and adopts an essentially cognitive approach to doctrine: Calvin's language of faith as *cognitio* tends to balance intellect and will rather than to emphasize intellect alone, while Calvin's soteriological interest creates, in the doctrine of faith itself, an emphasis on the primacy of the will in the cognitive act. Finally, if this perspective on Calvin's concept of faith is accepted, then the attempt to create a contrast between Calvin's thought and the voluntaristic leanings of later Reformed theology must also be reassessed and, most probably, set aside" (p. 224).

Richard Muller is a scholar that reformed persons should know. In a recent book by Muller, *Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins* (1986, Labyrinth Press), his apology for scholastic orthodoxy, Muller makes this insightful remark, which is a good come-back to our Neo-Orthodox friends: "...the dictum *finitum non capax infiniti* (translated loosely as "the finite mind is unable to comprehend the thought of the infinite") used by later exponents of Reformed doctrine... does not appear to have been used by Calvin himself. Several modern scholars have argued that the phrase is not even a proper description of Calvin's doctrine.... The phrase *finitum non*

capax infiniti is better rendered 'the finite is unable to grasp the infinite.' As Oberman argued of Calvin, the inverse, *infinitum capax finiti* reveals the positive implication of the doctrine. The infinite God grasps finite human nature *sola gratia*" (p. 21). That's worth re-quoting.

"Was Jesus a Disciple of John?" by William B. Badke; *The Evangelical Quarterly*, July 1990, vol. 62, no. 3

Don't be alarmed by the title. Far from diminishing the Deity of Christ, this article by a Canadian theologian is a short one, containing great substance. It argues that the earliest meaning of Baptism is "adherence", and that there were two kind of Johannine disciples: (1) followers, and (2) remote disciples who adhered to the teaching of the Baptist, but remained in their homes. Badke argues that Jesus was one of these disciples of John and that explains why the Baptizer had such difficulty baptizing Jesus. If Jesus was declaring His adherence to John, the Baptizer would certainly feel uncomfortable with that. However, if Jesus insisted, and if it was understood that John was to decrease, that would go a long way toward explaining some other key NT passages. This is especially fruitful in explaining the disciples of John in Acts 19, still needing the Baptism of the Holy Spirit. This is an excellent article; well-researched and exegetically sound. It could also be instructive on the subject of Baptism (as was an earlier *EQ* article by this author).

"The Solidarity of Mankind in Jonathan Edwards' Doctrine of Original Sin" by Randall E. Otto

In the same journal, this author finds Edwards' metaphysic to be wanting, as he views the imputation of sin in rationalistic/realistic categories. This provides a good window into Edwards' work, as well as a suitable introduction to the topic itself. And, I must admit, it is refreshing to see Edwards, great as he was, criticized for a change.

"Wittgenstein: On Seeing Problems from a Religious Point of View" by Dallas M. High; *The International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion*, Oct. 1990, Vol 28, no. 2

An article on one of the most influential philosophers of the late 20th century is always welcome. However, what makes this one unusual is that the author has gathered comments about Wittgenstein's own life and views of religion, including the assertion by his sister that Ludwig was a Christian. Drawing widely from Brian McGuinness', *Wittgenstein: A Life*, High has provided an excellent article about the religious dimension and experience of this epic philosopher, an area much neglected. If this is true, Christians may want to review Wittgenstein in a different light. But recall the warning, "Not everyone whose biographer retrospectively says unto Me...."

Another insightful article on Wittgenstein, "Wittgenstein's Gift To Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Of Religion" by J. Kellenberger is found in *The International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion*, Dec., 1990. Vol 28, no. 3. In this article Kellenberger states, "The theology drawn upon by contemporary analytic philosophers of religion includes that

of Aquinas and others, but it is primarily the theology of John Calvin that is looked to. This is not to say that contemporary analytic philosophers of religion who cite Calvin always agree with him. Calvin, who, like Plantinga, was well aware of the distinction between belief in God and belief that God exists, says of the latter that 'this kind of faith is of no importance'—for this kind of faith is held in common with the devils who believe and shudder (James 2:19). Plantinga, on the other hand, acknowledges the distinction and then focuses on the belief that God exists. Most often, however, there is agreement. This is not accidental. Several of those following the new analytic approach to philosophy of religion—such as Plantinga and Wolterstorff—are seeking to develop a 'Reformed epistemology.' At times Plantinga appeals directly to passages in the *Institutes* that carry epistemological implications. Calvin is quoted affirming that there is innate or implanted awareness of God in human beings, and he is cited as one who discounted 'rational proofs' for God's existence as a basis for faith" (p. 154).

Kellenberger continues, "It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein agrees with the general direction of some of these intuitions. Wittgenstein agrees that faith does not need evidence in its support. While he allows that evidence may be spoken of, it is not what we 'normally call evidence.' For Wittgenstein, if religious faith were supported by evidence, it would be unreasonable. And, he says, 'if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business.' However, it is not clear that this is precisely Calvin's view. For, though Calvin discounts 'rational proofs' as irrelevant to faith, he allows that 'evidences' that affirm God's majesty are in abundance. For Wittgenstein, rational proofs are irrelevant to faith, or, worse, if construed as evidence, would destroy religion. Plantinga's rejection of arguments for God's existence is more circumspect. Plantinga, as a 'Reformed thinker,' agrees with Calvin that 'one needs no arguments to know that God exists,' but he allows that it is worth knowing whether any theistic arguments are good and that they may be useful in moving others toward religious belief. Still, it remains that Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophy of religion agree in rejecting the idea that proper religious belief requires evidence in its support, even if they come to this view from different quarters" (p. 155).

Although we do not see Calvin and Wittgenstein as operating from the same presuppositional grid, it is nonetheless gratifying to observe a modern philosopher recognizing the excellence of Calvin and other reformed thinkers, on par with Wittgenstein.

Warfield: "But let us equally loudly assert that progressive orthodoxy and retrogressive heterodoxy can scarcely be convertible terms" -- a helpful warning against all the new methods of the modern church, which may be ancient heresies, long since refuted, yet resurrected in new dress.

"Reflections on New Testament Testimony Concerning Civil Disobedience" by O. Palmer Robertson; *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*, Sept. 1990, vol. 33, no. 3.

In chronological succession, this author lists and summarizes the NT teachings which touch on this recently controverted ethical issue. Acknowledging that this question has been generated from the womb of Operation Rescue, Robertson, most deftly deals with most of the verses claimed by OR. He handles the texts with precision, without excessive verbiage, and with sound exegesis. This is an article to save, not only for this particular C-D issue, but for future ones as well. It also lends itself to use in an adult class, being non-technical.

Also of note, but not in the highest category of quality, in this same journal, is **"Toward an Evangelical Theology of Religions"**, Clark Pinnock's latest expression of broadening horizons, to put it charitably. Also the ongoing "battle" between Norm Geisler and Murray Harris over the nature of the resurrection body is capsulized by three articles: (1) "Identity and Resurrection: A Review Article" by Francis J. Beckwith, (2) "The Recent Evangelical Debate on the Bodily resurrection of Jesus: A Review Article" by Gary R. Habermas, and (3) "The Nature of Bodily Resurrection: A Debatable Issue" by Scot McKnight. These three short articles

will be enough for most to cry, "Uncle!". Sufficient for the day.

"A Precarious Balance: Two Hundred Years of Presbyterian Devotional Literature" by Mark A. Noll; *Journal of American Presbyterians*, Fall 1990, vol. 68, no. 3

As part of the ongoing reflection on the demise of American Presbyterianism, this article is also a portion of a recent presentation by Noll, on the predicament of the declining mainline Presbyterian church. This essay, which is somewhat anecdotal, analyzes classical Presbyterian devotional works, as well as their theological psyches. Noll characterizes traditional Presby piety as "affective objectivity", but observes a definite turn in the 1960's toward "affective subjectivity" (p. 213). The very language of devotion takes a noticeable turn, and a theology which is "impatient with traditional theological foundations for piety [becomes]...fascinated with the self" (p. 214). Besides faulting such spirituality with the "inability to lead the reader to the inestimable riches of Christ," Noll also sees devotional literature as an accurate barometer of the faith of a denomination. This article is helpful both in its analysis, as well as in its review of this oft-neglected topic. One can also find his

concluding observation, which sees the partition between 20th century Presbyterian conservative and liberal denominations along this axis, as insightful.

"Cephas and Peter" by Bart D. Ehrman; *Journal of Biblical Literature*, September, 1990, vol. 109, no. 3

In an absolutely enthralling, even if unconventional article, Bart Ehrman takes up one of those traditional interpretations and strings together a nearlyconvincing exegetical argument. His thesis is that contrary to the accepted interpretations, Cephas is a different character altogether from the Apostle Peter. As radical as that sounds, one ought to read this short and clear article. It may not persuade you, but it will certainly force you to return to Scripture. Except for the statement on John 1:42, Ehrman is quite compelling. He furthermore documents this two-person theory dating from the early second century AD. His article concludes with a listing of the exegetical implications of this theory. According to Ehrman, this view would simplify, as well as clear up a number of difficulties in harmonizing Galatians. If this is correct, it could revolutionize a few character studies (e.g on 1 Cor. 15). This is well worth fifteen minutes of your time.

"Collected Essays" — In a welcome feature of JBL, its editor has put together in only fifteen pages the summaries of twenty-three recent volumes of essays or Festschriften. This is a nice meta-library, albeit liberal in orientation.

"Sin, Narcissism, and the Changing Face of Conversion" by Donald Capps; *Journal of Religion and Health*, Fall 1990, vol. 29, no. 3

This professor of Pastoral Theology at Princeton Seminary has collected data on how people view their own sinfulness today. In contrast to the classic view of sin in William James' psychology, Capps claims that most no longer feel any sense of guilt. Instead sin, if felt at all, has come to be seen in narcissistic terms or as "destructive habits". The remaining sense of sin, therefore is that we hurt ourselves (not God) by sin, and sin is a deprivation of positive living. Capps rounds out this study with an application of the classic "Seven Deadly Sins" to the life-cycle of most people, again illustrating sin, not as an offense against God, but as self-oriented in definition. Contained in this article is some excellent homiletical fodder.

"Forward to Basics in Family Medicine" by Paul Glanville; *The Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine*, Summer 1990, vol. 4, no. 3

This is a radical article — self-consciously so. Dr. Glanville, a fugitive from statist thought, is seeking to have a thorough-going Christian medical practice. To do so, he must challenge many of the existing assumptions and practices. He calls for "a new missionary zeal in the medical profession, a fresh look at the ministry of medicine, and a turning away from the 'big business' approach to medical practice" (p. 47). This article will definitely challenge all of us, and enhearten a few. Could this Doctor be the Luther of the medical reformation? It will certainly be appreciated by Pastors who call all Christians to live out the Lordship of Christ.

"Behavior or Disease" by Martin and Deidre Bobgan; *The Journal Of Biblical Ethics in Medicine*, Fall 1990, vol. 4, no., 4

In an article which warns of the ever-encroaching attribution of "disease" to a behavior forbidden by Scripture, the Bobgans observe that according to one recent list, "the number of people with behaviors-called-diseases adds up to a whopping 390 million. Those numbers exceed the population of the US by about 140 million cases of disease, which until recently were not even considered disease" (p. 67). Further they cite one study which says, "By revising notions of personal responsibility, our disease conceptions undercut moral and legal standards exactly at a time when we suffer most from a general loss of social morality.... Disease notions actually increase the incidence of the behaviors of concern. They legitimate, reinforce, and excuse the behaviors in question." (p. 68). Later they remind us that "The Bible identifies behavior as sinful or not sinful.... Drunkenness is listed among the works of the flesh" and warn that "There is hardly a Christian leader who has not bought into the AA mentality and a Twelve Step world view" (p. 68). They quote Stanton Peele as: "Disease conceptions of misbehavior are bad science and are morally and intellectually sloppy.... Once we treat alcoholism and addiction as disease, we cannot rule out that anything people do but shouldn't, as a disease, from crime to excessive sexual activity to procrastination" (Ooh! Now he's gone to meddlin'). "With 'anything people do but shouldn't' labeled as 'disease', those who oppose Christianity may very well call prayer, worship, reading the Bible, faith in Christ... 'diseases' or symptoms of religious 'disease.'" One more quote and I promise to quit: "The psychotherapeutic and addiction industries are proliferating so rapidly that nearly every citizen will join the ranks of patients whether he wants to or not" (p. 69). These authors of *PsychoHeresy I and II* (probably with III on the way) have served the church well with this short article.

At a summer church meeting, someone cited the following quote from Warfield: "But let us equally loudly assert that progressive orthodoxy and retrogressive heterodoxy can scarcely be convertible terms" (cited by Mark Noll in *The Princeton Theology 1812-1921*). The citation is a helpful warning against all the new methods of the modern church, which may be ancient heresies, long since refuted, yet resurrected in new dress. Indeed that should be equally and loudly asserted. Δ

David Hall is a Contributing Editor of *Antithesis* and Pastor of Covenant Presbyterian Church (PCA) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He has contributed articles to various theological journals and is Editor of *The Presbyterian's Review*, a digest of theological journals.

Book Review

***The Reality of the Incarnation* by Oskar Skarsaune, trans. Trygve Skarsten**

Concordia, 1991, 176 pages, \$14.95, paperback

Reviewed by Norlan DeGroot

One product of twentieth-century thought is an abundance of questions concerning our idea of God. Pivotal to most of them is the concept of the incarnation. While the reality of the incarnation has been accepted for centuries, the debate is raging whether the incarnation actually took place or if it was simply the product of Jewish Messianic or Hellenistic thought.

This is the problem which Skarsaune addresses in his book, *Incarnation: Myth or Fact?* Specifically, he examines two related questions: 1) What was the Jewish understanding of the Messiah and to what extent did Jesus meet this expectation? and 2) Could the idea that Jesus was God incarnate have emerged from the Greek setting?

Skarsaune's answer to these two questions is the same. Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek mindset would have come up with such a radical concept as a God incarnate. It was a stumbling block to the Jews because they could not conceive of a human who was God. The Jewish Messianic confession depicts the Messiah as "nothing more than a human being like all of us, nevertheless chosen for his Messianic role" (p.15).

Likewise, the incarnation was a stumbling block to the Greeks because they could not conceive of a God who was human. "That which the philosophers found especially scandalous and impossible about the mythological gods was their pronounced human, yes, excessive human character....In contrast to this concept of deity, especially Platonic and Stoic philosophy developed an alternative, anti-mythological theology. God, or rather the divine, is far removed from human suffering and passion. God is 'beyond suffering'; He cannot suffer. He cannot be subject to another's power. God is pure reason and absolutely sovereign. He is apathês (not suffering). Any human curtailment of God was unthinkable" (p.16).

An understanding of the fully God, fully man, person of Jesus Christ was incomprehensible to both the Jew and the Greek, for reasons peculiar to them both. For this understanding of Jesus Christ to arise, it had to come from another source. Skarsaune finds this in the Old Testament understanding of wisdom of God.

The usual Jewish portrayal of the Messiah did not automatically lead to an understanding of a personal, preexistent, incarnate Messiah. For that, we must go back to the Old Testament itself and its concept of the Wisdom of God. The Wisdom of God, says Skarsaune, was active not only when God created the world but "was also active in the salvation history of Israel and is itself that history's creative power....Wisdom becomes the entity which holds creation and salvation history together. The God of creation, who with His Wisdom created the world, also broke into history with the same Wisdom" (p.31).

Skarsaune points out that Christ understood Himself as incarnate Wisdom. "He who said of Himself what was usually reserved only for Wisdom or Law could not be understood as anything less than the incarnation of Wisdom" (p.37). "He acted with an authority and power that can only be understood if He is the incarnated Wisdom of God" (p.43).

It is this understanding of the radical reality of an incarnate Christ, who came as the Wisdom of God, that was a stumbling block to both the Jews and the Greeks. For Skarsaune the scandal of the cross is matched only by the scandal of the incarnation. Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek mind would have made this up. "Both would have had the tendency to eliminate incarnation theology, but in different ways" (p.48). The Jews would have endorsed an adoptionist Christology; the Greeks, a docetic one.

Skarsaune dedicates a large portion of his book to discussion of how this scandal worked itself out in

the early Christological controversies and their culmination at Nicea and Chalcedon. But he does not stop with Chalcedon. Of special interest is the postscript where Skarsaune gives his understanding of the present, existential significance of the incarnation. This section is quite helpful and should not be skipped by even the most casual reader.

Skarsaune deals a heavy blow against a Bultmanian understanding of the development of Christian dogma. It was not developed from the mindset of the day, be it Hebrew or Greek. Rather, it came from Old Testament revelation itself and, particularly, from its revelation of the Wisdom of God. It is much too radical to have come from any source other than God's own revelation. Skarsaune's point is well taken.

However, one should add a word of caution. The incarnation is a fact, plain and simply because God reveals it as such. Skarsaune's development of the connection between the Old Testament Wisdom of God and the incarnation is a welcome addition to the debate, but should never be understood as the foundation for belief in the fact of the incarnation. The foundation is—and always will be—God and His own revelation of His dealings with man. We can understand the incarnation as a fact not because of any human argument, but because we have a God who tells us it is so.

The fact of the incarnation, for many, remains incomprehensible. But that it is a fact is certain. Skarsaune's book is helpful inasmuch as it refutes many of the opposing arguments. It deals with a subject that is basic to Christianity, but in a day and age when even the basics are being questioned, Skarsaune's book is a welcome addition to anyone's library.

Norlan DeGroot is currently an adjunct faculty member of Covenant College and Assistant Editor of CONTACT magazine.

Novelty, Nonsense, and Non-Sequiturs

Fearing God the Collectivist Way

Sojourners, the magazine so sensitive to oppression that it instructs its subscribers to correspond with it by using "gender-inclusive forms of address (i.e. 'Dear Friends')," is celebrating its twentieth anniversary of "bringing hope and healing to a broken world."

Recently, *Sojourners* Art Director, Ed Spivey, explained the need for changing the magazine's typeface, and, in so doing, he perhaps expresses the depth of collectivist reverence for the Savior:

"Our new typeface is called Times Roman (named, I think for the big-city paper that Jesus used to read with his morning coffee and bagel. He would send Bartholomew out everyday to get one, since they didn't have home delivery, but Bartholomew was a little absent-minded and sometimes brought back the *Post* instead. Or he would forget the newspaper altogether and just buy a couple of Slurpees and a chili dog. Maybe that's why you don't read that much about Bartholomew in the Bible...)."

No Wonder We Can't Privatize It

Columnist L.M. Boyd recently noted the sort of information that might make frustrated mail-order business owners wake-up screaming:

"One out of every 160 working American is on the US Postal Service Payroll."

Gorbachev Sticks to His Guns

In Leningrad, USSR, during the pre-referendum debate over whether to restore the name of "St. Petersburg" to that city, Soviet President and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mikhail Gorbachev argued in true progressive/reformist style:

"There are no moral or political reasons to change the name of the city, since Lenin was one of the great thinkers, politicians, and statesmen of the twentieth century."

An Erotic Presbyterian Environment

Amidst all the media attention given to the recent General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), the Commissioners did manage to officially adopt "A Brief Statement of Faith" into their Book of Confessions. The new confession explicitly adopts an egalitarian understanding of genders and opposes humans, who "exploit

neighbor and nature, and threaten death to the planet entrusted to our care." Jack Stotts, who chaired the committee that drafted the confession, hopes that the statement will be read as a regular part of Sunday worship: "I hope it would be used initially to the point where it almost breeds contempt." [We can only hope.] After the vote, the commissioners stood up and cheered.

Two days later, the Assembly adopted its first detailed policy on sexual misconduct by church officials. "We are facing a crisis terrible in its proportions and implications," reads the introduction to the policy statement. The *New York Times* reports that in "an informal church survey of 50 presbyteries, 60 reported cases of sexual misconduct were under investigation." But, hey, they're recycling aren't they?

If the West Won't Speak to Us...

Sergei Kapitza writes in *Scientific American* of the current "upsurge of the irrational" as Soviets race to embrace "ESP and UFO's, astrology and clairvoyance, mystic cults and mesmeric healers." On the back cover of the scholarly journal, *Social Sciences and Modernity*, published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. we read:

"I am not an executor of fate...I come from nowhere and there is nowhere I can go. I am beyond time and space...but I am always, at all times, with you as a small particle of the great thinking matter. You managed to wake me up in myself and now I am waking you up in yourself."

Beginning with No. 3, our journal, in its new department 'Problems of Higher Reality,' will publish dialogues with the Cosmic Mind, as received by the staff members of the All Union scientific coordinating study center for UFOlogy."

Orthodox Mathematics

In an excerpt from a sermon by Anthony Coniaris published in *Again*, a periodical of the Antiochian Orthodox Church, we learn:

"As Christians we would agree completely with those who say that without God man is a zero, an absolute zero. But the big difference with Christians is that we believe that God is the big ONE before the zero. And, as we know, it is the ONE before the zero that gives it worth. Christ is the ONE Who makes me something. Without the ONE and only God, I am nothing....This is the key to abundant living. My confidence in Him is the foundation, the beginning, of a healthy self-confidence and self-worth."

At Least They Can Write

Harper's Index reports:

"Average number of 'uhs' used by college science professors while lecturing, per minute: 1.39

Average number used by college humanities professors, per minute: 4.85"

We invite readers to submit items for this feature

Stock Up on Back Issues of ANTITHESIS

January/February 1990, Vol. I, No. 1 • At War With the Word: The Necessity of Biblical Antithesis -- G. Bahnsen • The Dawning Light: Reformation in Scotland— Overview of Scottish Presbyterian Hist. -- 1 -- L. A. Curto • Vietnam: Biblical Reflections on National Messianism -- R. Wagner • Behind the Scenes of an Abortion Clinic: An Ex-Director Speaks -- C. Everett • Puritan Jurisprudence: A Study in Progress and Inconsistency -- J. McClendon • The Biblical Offense of Racism -- D. Jones • Social Security and Its Antidote -- T. Harris • So Help Me God: A Biblical View of Oaths -- D. Hagopian • **For the Record:** Church Government Briefly Considered -- G. Bahnsen • **Issue & Interchange:** Tithing on Gross or Net?

March/April 1990, Vol. I, No. 2 • Environmentalism: A Modern Idolatry -- K. Clauson • John Knox: The Years of Preparation — Overview of Scottish Presbyterian Hist. -- 2 -- L. A. Curto • Has Roman Catholicism Changed? An Examination of Recent Canon Law -- T. Schirmacher • Helping the Poor Without Feeding the Beast -- G. Bahnsen • Cancel the Postal Monopoly -- L. Rockwell, Jr. • Reformed Royalty: Queen Jeanne d'Albret -- M. Manzer • **For the Record:** The Obligation to Attend Church -- G. Bahnsen • **Issue & Interchange:** Exclusive Psalmody

May/June 1990, Vol. I, No. 3 • Forgive Us Our Trespasses? A Biblical View of Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue -- D. Hagopian • John Knox: The Watchman of Scotland — Overview of Scottish Presbyterian Hist. -- 3 -- L. A. Curto • False Antithesis: A Critique of the Notion of Antithesis in the Apologetic of Francis Schaeffer -- G. Bahnsen • The Challenge and Beauty of Church Discipline -- T. Harris • Is Christianity Unintelligible? -- D. Jones • Homelessness, the Poor, and Local Property Regulation -- J. Rogers • **For the Record:** The Priesthood of All Believers -- D. Hagopian • **Issue & Interchange:** The Permissibility of Deception

July/August 1990, Vol. I, No. 4 • Samuel Adams: Re-evaluating a Journalistic Calvinist -- M. Olasky • The National Covenant: Lifeblood of Scotland Overview of Scottish Presbyterian Hist. -- 4 -- L. A. Curto • Population Growth as Blessing or Blight? -- E. C. Beisner • The Rhetoric of Rescue -- D. Hagopian • Apologetics and the Heart -- D. Wilson • **For the Record:** Unlimited Atonement -- G.I. Williamson • **Issue & Interchange:** The Permissibility of Birth Control

This Special Issue is Now in its Second Printing!

September/October 1990, Vol. I, No. 5 • The Three Kinds of Illiteracy -- R. Nash • NATO's Disappearing Mission -- D. Bandow • REFLECTIONS ON ROMAN CATHOLICISM • Romeward Bound: Evaluating Why Protestants Convert to Catholicism -- D. Hagopian • Addendum: Why I Left Protestantism for Catholicism -- J. Tucker • New Confusions for Old: Rome on Justification -- R. Wagner • Enduring Anathemas of the Roman Catholic Eucharist -- D. Jones • **For the Record:** The Nature and Scope of the Canon -- G. Bahnsen • **Issue & Interchange:** *Sola Scriptura*: D. Jones vs. G. Matatics

November/December 1990, Vol. I, No. 6 • Beyond Creation vs. Evolution: Taking the Full Measure of the Materialist Challenge -- T.M. Moore • The Second Reformation of Scotland — Overview of Scottish Presbyterian Hist. -- 5 -- L. A. Curto • The Biblical Antithesis in Education -- D. Wilson • The IMF: Pouring More Good Money After Bad -- D. Bandow • Chesterton Reformed -- J. Sauer • The Character of Inflation -- S. Samson • **For the Record:** What in the World is a Worldview? -- N. DeGroot • **Issue & Interchange:** The Permissibility of Gambling

January/February 1991, Vol. II, No. 1 • The Unchanging Character of God's Word -- S. Schlissel • The Puritan Approach to Worship -- J.I. Packer • Contrasting Islamic Revelation -- D. Bergsma • A Case Against Education Vouchers -- J. Phelps • Wrestling With Wesley -- D. Wilson • Purging a Problem -- J. Sauer • **For the Record:** The Meaning and Marks of the Church -- D. Hagopian • **Issue & Interchange:** The Ethics of Public Education -- D. Wilson vs. R. Simonds

March/April 1991, Vol. II, No. 2 • A New Perspective on the Problem of Evil -- D. Erlandson • Milton's Redemption of Epic Poetry -- W. Callihan • Christianity in Nineteenth Century American Law -- S. Samson • An Open Letter to a Morbid Introspectionist -- S. Schlissel • Calvin's Doctrine of the Spiritual Presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper -- B. Nicholson • **For the Record:** Total Depravity -- D. Wilson • **Issue & Interchange:** The Permissibility of Beverage Alcohol Use -- K. Gentry vs. S. Reynolds

May/June 1991, Vol. II, No. 3 • Restoring Sanity to Our Tort System -- E. C. Beisner • The Salt of the Earth — Overview of Scottish Presbyterian History - 6 -- L. A. Curto • A Free Market Energy Policy -- D. Bandow • The Resurrection of Thomism -- D. Erlandson • Covenant Evangelism -- D. Wilson • **For the Record:** Worthy Participation in the Lord's Supper -- J. Bordwine

NEW OFFER:

Interested in receiving a particular essay or debate? Now you can purchase individual copies of the articles you need for \$2.00 each. (You can even receive articles from "Out of Print" issues.) Simply list the title of the essay or debate, include payment, and forward your order to the address below.

Please send me the back Issues of ANTITHESIS circled below. Each Issue is \$4.00.

January/February 1990, Vol. I, No. 1	Sept./Oct. 1990, Vol. I, No. 5
March/April 1990, Vol. I, No. 2	Nov./Dec. 1990, Vol. I, No. 6
May/June 1990, Vol. I, No. 3	Jan./Feb. 1991, Vol. II, No. 1
July/August 1990, Vol. I, No. 4	March/April 1991, Vol. II, No. 2
	May/June 1991, Vol. II, No. 3

SUB-TOTAL	_____
SHIPPING ADD	\$2.00
TOTAL	_____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____

STATE _____

ZIP _____

Mail to:
Antithesis
4521 Campus Dr. #435
Irvine, CA 92715

OR PHONE IN YOUR ORDER TO
1-800-788-0038

OUT OF PRINT

OUT OF PRINT

ANTITHESIS

"Antithesis shows the dimensions of a new Christian social movement."
Religion Watch

"One of the more exciting projects in quite some time."
Journey Magazine

"Antithesis...is something many of us have been desiring for a long time."
Rev. Steve Wilkins

"'Christianity come into its own' finally has a voice in my generation."
Rev. John Owen Butler

"Conservatives of all stripes will find *Antithesis* an interesting journal applying Biblical theology in non-utopian social practice"
New American Magazine

"I know of no periodical superior to it....[It is] fresh, up-to-date, and intellectually vigorous."
Joe Morecraft
The Counsel of Chalcedon

"[*Antithesis* is] an excellent, new publication."
Jacob Hornberger
The Future of Freedom Foundation Report

"*Antithesis* promises to become one of the main vehicles for an intelligent explication of the Reformed tradition."
Karl Keating, *Catholic Answers*

In Previous Issues:

"What Samuel Adams, had he written about himself, probably would have stressed, was his orthodox Christian belief in the God of the Bible. The Great Awakening had made a permanent theological impression on him. That impression is evident in Adams' writing and action, in his prayers each morning, and in his family Bible reading each evening."

**"Samuel Adams:
Re-Evaluating a Journalistic
Calvinist"**
Marvin Olasky

"There is no rational basis for believing that population will ever outgrow its ability to provide for itself using the resources it develops.... Contrary to what seems common sense, we get more land, food, and other resources, and less pollution per person, as the world's population grows."

**"Population Growth as
Blessing or Blight?"**
E. Calvin Belsner

"A moral problem – the refusal to glorify God – is the cause of an intellectual problem. It is not the other way around.... The reason unbelievers do not believe has nothing to do with a lack of arguments."

"Apologetics and the Heart"
Douglas Wilson

"Whatever choice the state makes will only establish one person's set of ultimate concerns at the expense of others. An education that pretends to be religiously neutral is a fraud."

"The Three Kinds of Illiteracy"
Ronald Nash

"One day the skipper of a ship tried to get John Knox to kiss a statue of the Virgin Mary. Knox replied, 'trouble me not, such an idol is accursed; therefore I will not touch it.' The skipper, determined to overcome Knox, thrust the statue in his face and said, 'Thou shalt handle it.' At this, Knox took the idol and cast it into the water and said, 'Let our lady now save herself. She is light enough; let her swim.' Thereafter, the Catholics appeared to leave the Scots alone."

**"John Knox: The Years of
Preparation"**
L. Anthony Curto

"If you kill babies for a living, you have to deal with it some way – by laughing, joking, turning the radio up so loud in the operating room that no one can hear or think about what's going on. The nurses dance, the doctor's joke – 'Here's looking at you!' – when an eye goes through the tube."

**"Behind the Scenes of an
Abortion Clinic:
An Ex-Director Speaks"**
Carol Everett

An Emerging Voice for Classical Protestantism

An antithesis is a juxtaposition of sharply contrasting ideas, and Biblical faith stands in this relationship to non-Christian philosophies.

Antithesis aims to emphasize the uniqueness and superiority of Christ in order to strengthen Christ's church and demonstrate the futility of non-Christian thought.

"Anti-Christian literature can be very edifying. When all is said and done, the arguments contained in some of the better texts are really quite silly and dogmatic.... Atheism claims to provide a basis for knowledge, but in fact it destroys the very foundations of rationality, logic, science, and ethics."

"Is Christianity Unintelligible?"
Douglas Jones

"Neocatholics claim that 'there is no fully Christian church but the one that was there from the beginning....' The Protestant Reformation was really 'nothing more than a kind of teen-age rebellion.' Ironically, the Catholic view of history is the truncated view since it mistakenly assumes that the church sprang up in the first century A.D."

**"Evaluating Why Protestants
Convert to Catholicism"**
David Hagopian

"Encouraged by the President's dedication to the status quo, NATO enthusiasts, instead of celebrating the elimination of the military threat that warranted the creation of the alliance, are now concocting new duties for America's troops in Europe."

**"NATO's Disappearing
Mission"**
Doug Bandow

"The Puritans pleaded with worshippers to appreciate the momentous character of sermons and listen with awe, attention, and expectancy to the preached Word. We complain today that ministers do not know how to preach; but is it not equally true that our congregations do not know how to hear?"

**"The Puritan Approach to
Worship"**
J.I. Packer

Please enter my subscription to *Antithesis* for
☐ 2 Full Years (12 Issues): \$34.00 (students \$25.00)
☐ 1 Full Year (6 Issues): \$18.50 (students \$13.00)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Send Check or Money Order to:
Antithesis, 4521 Campus Dr. #435, Irvine, CA 92715

NOW, ORDER TOLL-FREE 1-800-788-0038

**MONEY BACK
GUARANTEE!**

If you are not satisfied with *Antithesis*, you may, at any time, cancel your subscription and receive a pro-rated refund for any unmailed issues.