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Perspective Of This Issue

This publication devotes itself primarily to ethics and economics; not to theology.

In the February through May 1955 issues, in our first year of publication, special attention was given to the Biblical *definition* of brotherly or neighborly love. The purpose was to refine out of the term the sanctimony which has infiltrated it.

In recent decades the cult of brotherly love, under the term *agape*, has reached a zenith of absurdity and hypocrisy. The more

sanctimonious the Christian religion becomes the more it will fall into disrepute and neglect. In Biblical times sanctimoniousness was as frequently under fire as any human infirmity. Whenever hypocrisy has flourished the church has been in a decline.

Now, three years later we have returned to the subject of brotherly love but whereas we previously made a scriptural approach we are now making a rational one. We are showing that the same hard common-sense characteristics of the Hebrew-Christian religion in regard to the relations of men to men are also sound economics.

There is a provocative proposition which is our starting point in this second analysis of brotherly love. That provocative proposition is one which underlies socialism (which is the most sanctimonious pseudo-religion yet fabricated by the human mind). Moses and Marx, both Jews, have with the genius of their race, formulated the basic ethical issue more uncompromisingly and clearly than other thinkers. Marx was for sanctimony, in the form of altruism. Moses was against such sanctimony, and legislated in favor of individualism (self-love and liberty). For Moses self-love was the ultimate standard of ethics; Moses wrote: Thou shalt love thy neighbor *as thyself*, a statement which sets up self-love as the *highest* standard for ethical conduct. Marx condemned the self-love set up as a standard in the ethics of Moses; he considered Moses's laws to be wicked and cruel. Marx demanded altruism, summarized in his famous slogan, From each according to his ability to each according to his need. There is no self-love in that, only pure altruism.

Marx's demand for altruism, in all the actions of men, had in it a basic presupposition, namely, that freedom in its very nature is an evil thing. Freedom, he admitted, was advantageous to the strong. But in proportion as it was advantageous for the strong, it was disadvantageous, he declared, for the weak.

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The existence of freedom obviously permits the exercise of self-love. In fact, that is the prime reason for favoring freedom, for which many men have sacrificed their lives. Who would care for freedom if he could not therewith accomplish *his own* wishes and satisfy *his own* choices, according to *his own* values, and in *his own* way.

Marx declared that under freedom the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer. Expressed in terms of power, the proposition is: the strong grow stronger and the weak grow weaker.

We have already partially presented our case against Marx's proposition. The first point that we set out to make was that men are obliged, by their *intellectual limitations* to be *self-regarding*. We *cannot* be wisely altruistic, because we do not know and *cannot know* the needs of others as we know our own. We are finite mortals, and therefore we *must* limit ourselves to being selfish; only God who is infinite in knowledge *can* play the altruistic role; however, He obviously has not undertaken that.

Next, we showed that men must be "selfish" — that is, must conserve resources useful to satisfy human needs. All men are afflicted with a *universal welfare shortage*. Therefore, men are subjected to a *coercion from circumstances*. This coercion from circumstances is to be distinguished sharply from coercion by men. The latter is contrary to the law of God, and it is equally contrary to sound economics. But in a finite world occupied by human beings who are insatiable in their needs, there is always a *welfare shortage*, which can best be countered only by self-decision and the pursuit by each man of his self-regarding interests (always, of course, within the bounds of the Law of God). Men conserve much more conscientiously what is their own than what belongs to others.

Next, we showed (in the July issue) that *unalloyed selfishness* induces men to *cooperate* together. This is an astonishing proposition. One might expect just the contrary, viz., that selfishness would induce men to separate from each other; in Marxian language, the strong would go their way and leave the weak to their fate.

In the July issue we put the case against selfishness as strongly as possible — one man excelled above the other in everything, but in *unequal degree*, as is always the case. We showed mathemat-

ically that selfishness indubitably contributes to human *cooperation* and spectacularly to human welfare. We contrasted that fact with a confused medievalistic type of thinking in regard to what holds society together. *The main influence holding society together is selfishness operating in a framework involving division of labor.*

But the question still remains. Grant (as must be granted) that selfishness is creative of far better results than most people realize, how about the *division of the spoils*? Grant that production is greatly increased by rational, individual selfishness resulting in human cooperation — do the strong only get the benefit, or do the weak also share in the results? The principle purpose of this issue is to answer that question.

In the July issue we considered two men, Strongman and Feebler, who both wished to build a house, requiring the sawing of 2,000 logs and the pounding of 9,000 nails for each house. Strongman, according to our assumption, made so that our case would be at a maximum disadvantage, was more capable *in everything* than Feebler. Strongman could saw 100 logs or pound 300 nails an hour. That means that he would have to spend only 20 hours sawing and 30 hours pounding nails in building his house, a total of 50 hours of work. Feebler, in contrast, could saw only 25 logs an hour, or could pound only 200 nails an hour. To build his house, he would have to spend 80 hours sawing and 45 hours pounding nails, a total of 125 hours. But — and this is the astonishing thing — if Strongman and Feebler *cooperated* — if they divided the work by Strongman doing all the sawing and Feebler pounding all the nails, then the total work would be 40 hours for Strongman and 90 hours for Feebler, or a gain for Strongman of 10 hours and for Feebler of 35 hours. This marvelous improvement is the result of an act of creation by God, namely, Strongman and Feebler were created *unequally unequal*.

It should be noted that that gain which we demonstrated in the July issue does not entail any harder work nor any increased skills on the part of either man. The difference in result from isolated labor versus cooperation rests solely in the native endowments of the two men, an act of creation.

This issue must be read in conjunction with the July issue. There are a number of Tables in these two issues. That is because it is necessary to consider a variety of cases. Analyses of this type

are not hard to understand. Readers should not hesitate to read these articles because they *appear* difficult. An ordinary sixth grader who learns mathematics better than by mere memory will have no difficulty with this material. However, it must be read *in sequence*, in order to be understood.

The Engine And The Brakes (Society Like An Automobile)

An automobile without an engine and without brakes will not operate.

Society needs something positive, as an engine, in order to have something which holds it together. That "engine" is self-love, or self-interest, or self-preservation, or selfishness — or whatever you wish to call it.

But society is no more safe without brakes than is an automobile. Something negative is also needed. The "brakes" that keep the self-interest, which creates society, within bounds and which make society safe is not the state nor magistrates of the state. The real brakes are principles rather than men with power; those principles are the Law of God.

The Law of God gives liberty to the pursuit of self-interest, but it forbids doing what injures the neighbor. The ethical content of the Law of God can be paraphrased from what Sallust, the Roman historian, said on another subject on another occasion, "*it [the Law of God] takes nothing away from men except the liberty to do wrong.*"

Self-love plus the Law of God — those two factors — are the factors that hold society together. And the two function together as an engine and brakes in an automobile.

Any other idealistic explanation of what holds society together is a form of medievalism.

Of course, in the abstruse sense that God is creator and sustainer of all things, God holds society together. But to be realistic it is necessary to be more specific on *how* it is done. That *how* is self-love plus the Law of God.

The More Probable Case

In the July issue we considered a rather improbable case, namely, that Strongman excels over Feebler in *every* activity. The more probable case is that Strongman exceeds Feebler in some

activities and that Feebler exceeds Strongman in other activities. This superiority of one man in one thing and of another man in another thing may be a native endowment or it may be an acquired superiority.

Concentration on one activity promotes great increases in skill and speed. Few scientists could build a house as well as a contractor, but vice versa, the contractor may not be skilled as a scientist. A doctor may be a wonderful surgeon, but a very poor farmer; and vice versa for the farmer. Almost certainly, therefore, some men excel in one activity and other men in another activity. The ability to excel is usually an *acquired* ability.

Let us assume, then, that Strongman excels in sawing only and that Feebler excels in nailing; then (let us say) Strongman can saw 100 logs an hour and pound 200 nails an hour. Feebler, however, can saw 25 logs an hour but he can pound 300 nails an hour. Now Strongman excels in one activity and Feebler in another. What is the result?

First, let us assume that they work separately:

Table 9

Two Unequally Unequal Men Working Separately

Strongman	Feebler
2,000 logs at 100 an hour = 20 hrs.	2,000 logs at 25 an hour = 80 hrs.
9,000 nails at 200 an hour = 45 hrs.	9,000 nails at 300 an hour = 30 hrs.
Total <u>65 hrs.</u>	Total <u>110 hrs.</u>

The two together (65 + 110) = 175 hours

But now consider what happens when they "associate," or cooperate, or exercise the Biblical law of brotherly love:

Table 10

Two Unequally Unequal Men Working Together

Strongman	Feebler
4,000 logs at 100 an hour = 40 hrs.	18,000 nails at 300 an hour = 60 hrs.
(2,000 for each house)	(9,000 for each house)
The two together = 100 hours, or a 43% saving from Table 9	

Table 11

Savings From Ricardo's Law Of Association Or
Savings From Scriptural Law Of Brotherly Love

	In Hours			In %
	Building Alone	Cooperating With The Other	Saving	
Strongman	65	40	25	38%
Feebler	110	60	50	45%
Total	175	100	75	43%

According to the assumption in the July issue, the result of cooperation, shown in Table 3 on page 211, was a saving of 25%. Here the saving is 43%. The *more varied* the inequality among men, the *greater the saving from associating together*, that is, from cooperation.

We have presented this case to show that under genuinely probable circumstances the gains are spectacular. The larger the gains, the more obvious they are; the more obvious they are, the more men wish to cooperate in society. It is the observable benefits from cooperation which induce men to seek cooperation with other men and so establish a society. There is nothing mysterious, theological or uniquely altruistic about it.

Much of the morality taught in Christian churches consists in the idea that there is only one way to show brotherly love — by altruism (that is, by charity). Such a doctrine ignores the most important way of showing brotherly love — by self-love in a division of labor framework, uncontaminated by violence, theft, fraud, covetousness.

As often taught, Christian ethics is dangerously obscurantist and erroneous. The trouble is that ecclesiastics have not informed themselves of the mathematics underlying the Ricardian Law of Association.

A Reader's Reaction To The Strongman-Feebler Case

One reader of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM was unimpressed by the savings from cooperation between Strongman and Feebler as explained in the July issue. Those savings or reduction in hours of labor were from 50 to 40 hours for Strongman, or 10 hours; and from 125 to 90 hours for Feebler, or 35 hours; a total saving of 45 hours. Building their houses without cooperation the two men would have had to work 175 hours; together, only 130 hours.

Our reader commented: "Why not let Strongman build both houses alone? Then the total labor would amount to only 100 hours. *That* would be a real saving." Our reader went on to say that for the original 175 hours required of both Strongman and Feebler, Strongman working alone could build $3\frac{1}{2}$ houses (175 hours divided by 50 = $3\frac{1}{2}$) compared with only 2 houses by the cooperation of two men.

The mathematics of our reader are undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, this *efficiency* will have to be forgone. The reason is simple; Strongman will not work hard while Feebler does nothing. Human nature will rebel.

Society, it should be clearly seen, is not held together by *efficiency*; something more than crass efficiency is necessary.

There is also a serious oversight in our reader's reaction. It assumed all the work was to be done by the able man, and no work by the less able man. Two men *could* work, but only one *would* work under this plan. Under this plan society would lose the whole of the services of Feebler.

Assume that Strongman and Feebler cooperate in building two houses as we outlined in the July issue, then what? First, Strongman will be a *willing* worker for 40 hours and Feebler for 90 hours. Strongman will have more spare time; namely 10 hours. Likewise, Feebler will have 35 hours more of spare time. It is not probable that either Strongman or Feebler will idle away all of their time saved. They will both have cooperated, which is gain number one; they will both probably also work part or all of the saved time which is a further "saving" (or more accurately, it is an increased production).

The moment that society adopts the policy of the efficient *only* doing the work, there will be much wasted labor time. The suggestion of our reader must therefore be wholly rejected; he had his attention fixated too much on the efficiency of Strongman only.

Strongman and Feebler both suffer from the world's universal *welfareshortage*. If they do not have a keen sense of a welfare-shortage, their wives will have, and the men will be persuaded to work at something besides building a house. It is patently a mistake, therefore, to look at the building of two houses as the only consideration.

We leave it to the common sense of our readers that society is better off with both the Strongmans and the Feeblers working, rather than the Strongmans only.

Readers may be unhappy about Feebler's inefficiency. Their dissatisfaction, if it *could be justified*, should be vented against God. God made Feebler as he is.

Advantages To The Weak And To The Strong From Cooperation Under Various Circumstances

In this article we wish to establish the following:

I That if two men are equally equal in native endowments and remain equal, then there are no advantages whatever from cooperation between them. See "Sterility From Cooperation Among Men Who Were Created Wholly Equal" on page 234.

II That if they are equally unequal, then there are no advantages to them from working together unless they disobey the Law of God. See "Equally Unequal Men Cannot Cooperate To Advantage Except By Violating The Law Of God" on page 235.

III That it would be practically impossible for an equality based upon creation to be continued in this world as it is presently constituted. Even if God had made us all equally equal or equally unequal, which He most certainly has not done, every effort by men of purposeful action (praxeological action) would be directed toward developing an inequality which did not exist in their original native endowments. There are two ways in which men wisely work with the intent of establishing inequality, to wit:

(a) Special skills (inequalities) are developed among men by one man specializing in one thing and another man in another thing; and

(b) The utilization of more capital to enhance productivity in one activity than in another.

Inequality among men, whether the origin is with God or with man, is for all practical purposes inescapable. It is in the nature of things. See "Neither God Nor Man Wishes Men To Be Equally Equal Or Even Equally Unequal. The Goal Is Complete Unequal Inequality" on page 237.

IV That genuine freedom, in the form of competition, should control the "distribution" of the benefits from cooperation without coercion of the weak or of the strong; furthermore, that it is impossible in a free society for the strong to appropriate *for themselves only* the benefits of cooperation. We shall consider this matter under four headings:

(a) The distribution of the benefits of cooperation under "isolated exchange"—that is, between only

two men, Strongman and Feebler. We shall make two separate assumptions under this head.

(b) One-sided exchange with only one weak man, that is, exchange between three Strongmen and one Feebler.

(c) One-sided exchange with only one Strongman and three Feeblers; and finally,

(d) Genuine two-sided exchange or competition, that is, between a variety of men, ranging from Strongman at one extreme to Feebler at the other extreme.

See "Who Gets The Spoils From Cooperation" on page 242.

I. Sterility From Cooperation Among Men Who Were Created Wholly Equal

Suppose we have two Strongmen, both of whom can saw logs at the rate of 100 an hour and pound nails at the rate of 300 an hour. They are equally equal. Will there be any advantages from cooperation in that case?

Let us assume that the two Strongmen decide that Strongman A does all the sawing and Strongman B does all the nailing. What will the savings be? It should be kept in mind that each of them working alone can build his house with 50 hours of labor, or 100 hours for the two. The calculation for the proposed division of labor is shown in Table 12.

Table 12

Two Equally Equal Men Working Together

Strongman A	4,000 logs at 100 an hour	= 40 hours
Strongman B	18,000 nails at 300 an hour	= 60 hours
	Total	100 hours

In total therefore, there is not one hour of saving by Strongman A and Strongman B cooperating. There is no saving and there cannot be any saving because they are equally equal.

In our illustration in Table 12, it is true that the division of labor is not equal between them, but that would be adjusted between the two of them by Strongman A doing some of the nailing, so that the division of labor hours between them would be 50 hours each. But the important thing to note is this; *there is no saving possible from cooperation between equally equal men. Cooperation under perfect equality is completely sterile. The total number of hours is never reduced.*

II. Equally Unequal Men Cannot Cooperate To Advantage Except By Violating The Law Of God

Neither is there a saving possible from the cooperation of *equally* unequal men, except by violating the law of God.

To illustrate this let us assume that Strongman can saw 100 logs an hour and pound 300 nails an hour; secondly, that Feebler is $\frac{1}{4}$ as good as Strongman at both sawing logs and pounding nails, that is, that Feebler can saw 25 logs an hour and pound 75 nails an hour. The men in this case are certainly unequal because Strongman is four times as good as Feebler at both sawing and nailing. But they are not *unequally* unequal.

What happens in this case if the two men endeavor to cooperate? To answer this question it is necessary first to compute how long it will take each of them working separately to build their house and how long it will take them if they cooperate together and divide the labor.

Table 13

Computation Of The Time Required For Two Equally Unequal Men To Build Two Houses Without Cooperation

Strongman		Feebler	
2,000 logs at 100 an hour	= 20 hrs.	2,000 logs at 25 an hour	= 80 hrs.
9,000 nails at 300 an hour	= 30 hrs.	9,000 nails at 75 an hour	= 120 hrs.
Total	50 hrs.	Total	200 hrs.
The two together (50 + 200) = 250 hours			

The table shows the obvious, namely, that it takes Feebler four times as long to build his house as it does Strongman.

Let us now assume that Strongman saws all the logs and pounds 3,000 of the nails, leaving 15,000 nails to be pounded by Feebler. Will there in this case be any saving *in the total* hours required to build the two houses?

Table 14

Time Required For Two Equally Unequal Men To Build Themselves Houses By Cooperation But Without Coercion

Strongman		Feebler	
4,000 logs at 100 an hour	= 40 hrs.		
3,000 nails at 300 an hour	= 10 hrs.	15,000 nails at 75 an hour	= 200 hrs.
Total	50 hrs.		
The two together (50 + 200) = 250 hours			

The table shows that there is *in total* no saving whatever under the division which has been made in Table 14.

Of course, Strongman is more efficient than Feebler and it is possible to reduce the total number of hours involved (namely 250 hours) by increasing the number of hours which the efficient man, Strongman, works. This is shown in Table 15 where it is assumed that Strongman will work 20 hours at nailing. Then there will be 12,000 nails to be pounded by Feebler requiring 160 hours by Feebler.

This combination gives a total of 220 hours as shown in Table 15, which *is* a saving, *but it cannot be accomplished without coercing Strongman by making him work more than 50 hours.* Such coercion would be contrary to the Law of God.

Table 15

Time Required For Two Equally Unequal Men To Build Themselves Houses By Cooperation But At The Cost Of Coercion

Strongman	Feebler
4,000 logs at 100 an hour = 40 hrs.	
6,000 nails at 300 an hour = 20 hrs.	12,000 nails at 75 an hour = 160 hrs.
Total	
60 hrs.	
total (60 + 160) = 220 hours	

There is a saving *but Strongman has been coerced to work an extra ten hours to a total of 60 hours.*

To establish the principle involved let us consider another case. Any endeavor to reduce Strongman's time by as much as one hour, namely, from 50 hours to 49 hours will increase the total amount of time required to build the two houses.

Table 16

Time Required For Two Equally Unequal Men To Build Themselves Houses By Cooperation Without Any Coercion Of The Abler Man

Strongman	Feebler
4,000 logs at 100 an hour = 40 hrs.	
2,700 nails at 300 an hour = 9 hrs.	15,300 nails at 75 an hour = 204 hrs.
Total	
49 hrs.	
Total (49 + 204) = 253 hours	

Working alone they could build houses in 250 hours. Now the hours have increased.

The following conclusions can be reached about the effects of cooperation among equally unequal men: It is possible to make a gain from cooperation only if one man is coerced:

- (a) a gain does occur if the abler man is *coerced* to work longer than before;
- (b) if he works exactly as long as before there is no gain whatever in total; the result is unchanged;
- (c) if the less able man is coerced to work longer than before, then there is an actual loss from cooperation. *Equally unequal men, therefore, can gain from cooperation only at the cost of coercion, a positive violation of the Sixth Commandment.*

We can summarize the situation up to this point as follows:

1. Unequally unequal men can gain by association or cooperation *without coercion*. See the July issue.
2. Equally equal men can never gain by any cooperation.
3. Equally unequal men can never gain by cooperation except at the cost of coercing the abler of the two men.

A *voluntary* society, in which men *willingly* cooperate, must therefore be a society made up of men who are *unequally unequal*.

It is not the "general operations of [the Holy] Spirit" of God which holds society together and makes it possible, but voluntary and beneficent self-interest which is profitable when and only when men are unequally unequal.

III. Neither God Nor Man Wishes Men To Be Equally Equal Or Even Equally Unequal. The Goal Is Complete Unequal Inequality

For all practical purposes the broad and categorical statement can be made that neither God nor man will tolerate anything except unequal inequality.

This may disappoint the socialists and communists, the social gossellers and the members of the *agape* (altruism) cult, but their disappointment will not alter the fact. They are sentimentalists. They lack realism. They are somnambulists. They suffer from delusions.

In regard to what God has done in *how* he has made various human beings — indeed *how* he has made everything — the record is so clear that (misquoting Shakespeare, as is usually done) "he who runs may read."* The natural sciences tell us that there are

*Shakespeare quoted Habakkuk correctly. See Habakkuk 2:2.

no two absolutely identical things in the world. Everything has individuality. God created an infinite *variety* in everything. One man may be a fine musician but stupid at mathematics. Another man may be a fine mathematician but be stupid in music. Children of the same parents are astonishingly different. Not even so-called "identical twins" are really identical; they have distinguishable differences.

There is the famous misstatement in physics that "nature abhors a vacuum," but although it is not strictly true it does express a workable idea. In a parallel way it can be said (respectfully) that God (apparently) abhors uniformity and created universal unequal inequality. In this case, there is no misstatement involved at all; the statement is wholly true on the basis of universal observation.

But assume, just for the argument, what in fact is not true, that God had made two persons absolutely equal. Would those two individuals endeavor to remain equal? No. Although sentimentalists think that they should endeavor to remain equal, they will in fact exert themselves to become unequal. They will do this in two ways: (1) they will engage in division of labor and (2) they will apply capital to various operations in variable degrees. These two programs result in inequality, not equality.

Inequality Resulting From Division Of Labor

Assume two men equally equal for all practical purposes. What will they discover, and after the discovery what will they do? The first man will discover that by specializing on one activity he can increase skill and speed enormously. The second man will discover the same for some other operation. And so the first concentrates on one activity and the other concentrates on another. The *total* production is now greatly increased.

Adam Smith wrote about the benefits of the division of labor with classic simplicity and force. We quote as follows from his *Wealth of Nations*, Book I (Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks of the People), Chapter 1 "Of the Division of Labour":

The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and

judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch. Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts, than in those of a more trifling nature, the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another

straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are similar to what they are in this very trifling one; though, in many of them, the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour.

Inequality Resulting From Application Of Capital

The second man-made factor promoting unequal inequality results from the utilization of capital.

The effect of applying *capital* to labor efforts is well-known — the increases in production resulting therefrom are enormous.

An ox is *capital*. A man puts an ox to work. Solomon says: "Where no oxen are, the crib is clean; *but much increase is by the strength of the ox.*" In modern language, capital contributes to "much increase."

The amount of capital behind every workman in the United States is steadily going up. *That*, and not the harder labor of men, is what is making the standard of living go up in the USA.

After World War II a friend who had been president of a diesel engine company decided that a great future lay in investing capital in various foreign countries. One of his favorites was India. His idea was that if more diesel engines (power equipment, capital) would be made available to each Indian, that then the standard of living in India would go up; the *hard* work would then be done by a modern ox — a diesel engine — and then the "increase would be much" in the productivity of India.

This, by the way, was an idea contrary to Mahatma Gandhi's. He wanted a simple society. He sought no *power* from capital for India! No "strength of the ox" to raise Indian productivity! But every man, as Gandhi, would have his own little corral, his own little rice patch, weave his own loin cloth, thatch his own roof, and squat beside his own fire of twigs! What atavism! Any man with mental ideals of that kind is morally unfit — because of economic ignorance — to have a position of social and political responsibility.

My friend, though, who wished to make large investments in India and apply capital (that is, diesel engines or other equipment) in order to increase Indian production, suffered a disappointment. Nehru, ex-communist and presently a socialist and a would-be expropriator or confiscator, made capital investments unsafe in India for my friend. He abandoned the idea of developing India — at his own loss.

Consider primitive man — let us say, Adam, who (Scripture clearly indicates) was not even a stone-age man. How long would it take him to chop down a tree or saw a log? A year maybe for

one tree and one board. With what would he do the work? His bare hands? But put a modern axe of tempered steel in his hand or a power chain saw — and he could have brought down a big tree in half an hour.

The net effect of capital accumulation is to increase unequal inequality. It makes inequality of production more unequal than before the capital was available. Thank God, if you will, for the capital; or the human saver and the creator of capital; but at least be thankful.

Capital is not essentially divisive in society. Sin, not capital itself, makes capital divisive. We refer to the sin of covetousness. Capital to the contrary is a cohesive factor in society, because it promotes production, reduces production costs, makes individual production efforts more unequally unequal, and *consequently more profitable, thereby promoting cooperation.*

In short, God and man cooperate (purely rationally) in promoting unequal inequality among men.

IV. Who Gets The Spoils From Cooperation

When Andrew Jackson became the second Democrat president of the United States he ousted the old office holders in Washington and put in his own partisans. This was done under the slogan, To the victor belongs the spoils. A careful reader of the July issue and of what precedes herein may say to himself, "The case for freedom is not proved. The examples show that both participants in a cooperative effort gain, and the gains have been fairly equally divided in the *specific illustrations selected.* But actually, practically all of the gains may go to one party. Because Strongman is generally the "stronger" and "wiser" man, he may be expected to get most of the benefits. He will out-trade Feebler. Not improbably Strongman may be almost the sole beneficiary of the cooperative effort. He may go off with the lion's share of the gains. It is (so it may be argued) still possible that Marx was right when he said that the strong grow stronger and the weak grow weaker.

The skepticism expressed is at this point well taken. The case has not yet been established that both the strong and the weak (especially the weak) gain by division of labor and cooperation

according to Ricardo's Law of Association. All that the law substantiates is that there is a gain from cooperation, but nothing has yet been shown regarding "who gets what" of the benefit — the one in the better bargaining position, or the one in the poorer bargaining position. What happens?

In what follows that question will be answered under four different sets of circumstances: (1) isolated exchange of services (that is, between only two men); (2) several strong and one weak man, or onesided competition between the strong; (3) one strong man and several weak men, or onesided competition between the weak; and finally (4) full competition between several strong men and several weak men.

Four examples will be worked out under the probable circumstances in each case. From those as examples, readers can work out the result under any combination of circumstances they wish to assume.

1. Division Of Benefits Under Isolated Exchange Of Services

The range of possible appropriation of the benefits of cooperation is a wide one in this case.

In this analysis we shall use our original figures, which we are repeating from the July issue.

Table 17 (same as Table 1 in the July issue)

STRONGMAN		FEEBLER	
2,000 logs at 100 an hour =	20 hours	2,000 logs at 25 an hour =	80 hours
9,000 nails at 300 an hour =	30 hours	9,000 nails at 200 an hour =	45 hours
Total	50 hours	Total	125 hours
The two together (50 + 125) = 175 hours			

Table 18 (same as Table 2 in July issue)

Two Unequally Unequal Men Working Together	
4,000 logs at 100 logs an hour =	40 hours labor for Strongman
18,000 nails at 200 nails an hour =	90 hours labor for Feebler
The Two together = 130 hours	

Table 19 (same as Table 3 in July issue)
 Savings From Ricardo's Law Of Association Or
 Savings From Scriptural Law Of Brotherly Love

	In Hours			In %
	Building Alone	Cooperating With The Other	Saving	Saving
Strongman	50	40	10	20%
Feebler	125	90	35	28%
Total	175	130	45	25%

The total savings are 45 hours, according to column 3 in Table 19.

For simplicity sake we shall assume that the most extreme distribution of the saving will be that all of the saving goes to Strongman except only one hour to Feebler; or vice versa, all the saving to Feebler except one hour to Strongman.

Who gets what within these ranges is a matter of bargaining skill and stubbornness. We assume each man will voluntarily cooperate if he saves at least one hour. Nevertheless the savings will be disproportionate if one man gets all the saving except one hour.

Let us assume first that Strongman is the tougher bargainer, and then later that Feebler is.

1. Strongman, if he is out to get practically all of the benefits from cooperation, will plan as follows:

(a) Feebler, building his own house alone, has to work 125 hours.

(b) I wish to let him have a one-hour saving down to 124 hours, that is, I propose to tempt him to cooperate by showing him how to save *one* hour. Pounding 18,000 nails will take him, at the rate of 200 an hour, 90 hours. That leaves 34 hours yet for him to work (124 hours total less 90 at nailing = 34 for sawing). He must saw 34 hours. At 25 logs an hour, he must saw 850 logs.

This is the proposition which Strongman as a hard trader will submit to Feebler.

**Feebler's Assignment So That He Saves
 Only One Hour, From 125 to 124 Hours**

18,000 nails at 200 an hour = 90 hours

850 logs at 25 an hour = 34 hours

124 hours

Working alone, 125 hours. Saving to Feebler, one hour.

This will leave for Strongman the following task:

4,000 logs less 850 logs = 3,150 logs he must saw

3,150 logs at 100 an hour = $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours

The savings will then be as follows:

Strongman: 50 hours alone, less $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours by cooperation =
18 $\frac{1}{2}$ hour saving

Feebler: 125 hours alone, less 124 hours by cooperation =
one hour saving

Percentage wise, the result of cooperation (association) on this basis is a saving for Feebler of less than 1% in his labor time, and a saving for Strongman of 37%. The "spoils" have been very unevenly divided, but in "isolated" exchange this *can* happen. Nor has Strongman violated the law of God. He has not *coerced* Feebler. He has left to Feebler the choice of 125 hours or 124 hours. He has offered Feebler a genuine saving; not much, but still a saving.

It would have been different if he had demanded Feebler's cooperation and made him work 126 hours. Then the law of God would definitely have been violated.

2. But now let us assume that Feebler is the more calculating and tough bargainer. Feebler says to himself: "it costs Strongman 50 hours to do it alone. I will offer him a one hour saving in his time. At 49 hours he will cooperate with me. What shall I suggest to him?"

Feebler says to himself that first Strongman must do all the sawing. That is: 4,000 logs at 100 logs an hour = 40 hours work. Then he must work 9 hours more, or a total of 49 hours, leaving him one hour saved. In that 9 hours he can pound 9 times 300 nails an hour, or 2,700 nails. There are 18,000 nails to be pounded, and so that will leave Feebler 18,000 less 2,700 nails, or 15,300 nails to pound. At 200 nails an hour Feebler will have to work: 15,300 nails at 200 an hour = $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Feebler's total time working alone was 125 hours; now it will be only $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours, or a $48\frac{1}{2}$ hour saving. That contrasts to Strongman's paltry one hour.

In percentages, with Feebler the stronger bargainer under "isolated" exchange, Strongman will have a 2% saving in his time, from 50 hours to 49 hours; but Feebler will have an almost 39% saving from 125 to $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. This time too the "spoils" have

been unequally divided. Nevertheless, Feebler has not violated the law of God. He has not coerced Strongman. He has left Strongman the choice of 50 hours or 49 hours. Feebler has offered Strongman a genuine saving; not much, but still a saving.

It would be different if he had demanded Strongman's cooperation and made him work 51 hours. Then the law of God would definitely have been violated.

Summarizing what each man gets between the ranges shown will depend on his bargaining skill. The ranges, in summary are:

If Strongman is a perfect (severe) bargainer, the saving in hours worked will be:

Strongman	18½ hours
Feebler	1 hour

But if the roles are reversed and Feebler is a perfect (severe) bargainer, then the saving in hours worked will be:

Strongman	1 hour
Feebler	48½ hours

No one can predict what will actually happen. It depends on the men. In *isolated* exchange between two men the "range" of the bargaining can be very wide. The following table gives a summary:

Table 20

Summary Of Ranges Of Benefits From
Cooperation Under Isolated Exchange

	<u>Each Man Working Alone</u>	<i>Working Together</i>	
		<u>When Strongman Is A Perfect Bargainer</u>	<u>When Feebler Is A Perfect Bargainer</u>
Strongman	50 hours	31½ hours	49 hours
Feebler	125 hours	124 hours	76½ hours
	<hr/> 175 hours	<hr/> 155½ hours	<hr/> 125½ hours

Depending on bargaining skill, the maximum range of hours for Strongman is from 31½ hours to 49 hours; for Feebler from 124 to 76½ hours.

There is nothing gained by denying what the figures show, namely, in isolated exchange the "spoils" from cooperation can be very unevenly divided, but without violating the law of God.

2. One-Sided Competition; Four Strong Men And One Weak Man

Under this circumstance we wish to make two subassumptions, namely, first that the four strong men are equally equal, and second that they are unequally unequal but that all are still relatively strong over against Feebler.

1. *Four Equally Equal Strong Men and one Feebler:*

This assumption we have previously explained is sure to be contrary to fact, but it will be instructive to see what would happen under that circumstance. (God, we indicated, does not make anything equally equal to something else, and men operate in a manner systematically to establish a salutary unequal inequality.)

We shall assume three additional strong men. In addition to our original Strongman we have three others, Strongman-A, Strongman-B, and Strongman-C. Each can saw 100 logs an hour and pound 300 nails an hour; they are equally equal. Over against these four equally equal strong men there is our one unequal weak man, Feebler. How will the poor fellow be able to trade over against the four strong men? What will the terms be?

The astonishing thing will be that Feebler will be able to "write his own ticket." Instead of having to put in 125 hours of hard labor building his own house in isolation he can now make a deal with either Strongman, Strongman-A, Strongman-B, or Strongman-C to get his (Feebler's) house built for only 76½ hours of labor! Why?

The four strong men will be utterly unable to gain from "associating with" or cooperating with the other three in building their houses. No gain to any one of them is possible. Cooperation among perfect equals is inescapably sterile; it is just as inescapably a prerequisite for gains to occur in economics only on the basis of differences between the participants, as it is necessary for men and women to be different in order to beget babies. The only man of the whole five with whom the four can make a "deal" is Feebler.

The four strong men will court Feebler as if he were the belle of the town.

Strongman will probably begin with an unattractive bid to Feebler. He will say to Feebler: "It takes you 125 hours to build a house working alone. Work with me and I will cut that down to 124 hours for you."

Strongman-A will immediately intervene. It is to his advantage to offer Feebler a deal requiring only 123 hours. He outbids Strongman accordingly.

But Strongman-B does not wish to lose the great potential gain for himself from cooperating with Feebler, and he bids to Feebler a house for only 122 hours work.

Strongman-C betters it by bidding 121 hours of work.

Feebler sits back and listens. He begins to realize that the four strong men will not stop outbidding each other until there is no advantage any more in it for any of them. That point is reached after one of them bids to Feebler a house for only 76½ hours work by Feebler. That will leave the best strong man's bid still good for himself, because it reduces his own work time from 50 hours to 49 hours. But here the bidding stops. There is nothing more in it for any of the strong men to court Feebler's cooperation. A still lower bid will do only one thing — make it unprofitable for themselves. The bidding ends. Feebler accepts the best voluntary bid available to him — 76½ hours.

We can come then to the astonishing conclusion that the more strong men there are relative to our weak man, the better the deal that the weak man can make. If there is only one of them against two or more strong men, then the weak man can trade to get *practically* all of the benefits from cooperation. The situation for Feebler is that shown in the last column in Table 20.

2. *Four Unequally Unequal Strong Men And One Feebler*: This is the more probable case. We have four men, and they are all strong but not quite equally strong. Their "strengths" are assumed to be as follows:

	P e r H o u r	
	<u>Sawing</u>	<u>Nailing</u>
Strongman	100	300
Strongman-A	85	270
Strongman-B	70	260
Strongman-C	60	250

Feebler, we assume, remains on his original basis—he can saw 25 logs an hour and nail 200 nails.

Readers will immediately realize that the four strong men are no longer in an equal competitive position and that the strongest, our original Strongman himself, can outbid the rest. But our strong men will continue to bid one against the other, until each reaches his limit.

The first to drop out of the bidding will be Strongman-C. By our usual calculations it can be computed that he will stop out-bidding the others when he has offered to cooperate with only 88 hours of work for Feebler (instead of Feebler's own solo cost of 125 hours). Strongman-C can do no better.*

But the other three strongmen continue to outbid each other. Again by our usual calculation Strongman-B drops out after he has made Feebler a bid of only 84 hours.

Strongman-A is still in the bidding. He and Strongman raise each other's bid until Strongman-A has reached his limit, namely, 78 hours. Then he too stops.

Feebler has been calmly waiting for the strong men to eliminate each other by their bidding. Where does he now find himself?

Strongman himself will better the bid of Strongman-A by say one-half hour. He offers Feebler cooperation at 78 hours minus one-half hour or $77\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

Now at last the bargaining begins between Strongman and Feebler themselves. The best that Feebler can get will be $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Strongman has already offered the $77\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

The price will settle at or somewhere between $77\frac{1}{2}$ hours and $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Whether it is $77\frac{1}{2}$ hours or $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours or in-between will depend on the bargaining skill of Strongman and

*In abbreviated form the computation for Strongman-C is as follows:

- | | |
|-----|--|
| (a) | 2,000 logs at 60 logs an hour = 33.3 hours |
| | 9,000 nails at 250 nails an hour = 36.0 hours |
| | Total time working alone = <u>69.3</u> hours |
| | |
| (b) | Strongman-C's best offer will be 69.3 minus 1 hour = 68.3 hours that he himself will work. |
| (c) | 4,000 logs for two houses at 60 logs an hour = 66.7 hours at sawing only. |
| | 68.3 hours less 66.7 hours = 1.6 hours available for nailing |
| | 1.6 hours x 250 nails an hour = 400 nails |
| (d) | 18,000 nails for two houses less 400 nails = 17,600 nails for Feebler to drive in |
| | 17,600 nails at 200 an hour = 88 hours, the best offer Strongman-C can make to Feebler |

Feebler. If Feebler has more stamina than Strongman, then the hours Feebler must work may go down to $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. But if Strongman has the greater stamina, then Feebler may settle for as much as $77\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

We can now state the interesting conclusion that competition among our so-called strong men has helped Feebler, the weak man. Competition helps him who is the loneliest, who has the fewer competitors. Feebler, because he had no competitors could just sit back and shake his head to all bidders until the original Strongman had eliminated all competitive bidders. Only then did Feebler need to begin to bargain. Up to that time the other strong men were doing his bargaining for him.

Note this: competition in this situation has greatly narrowed the range in which the price might settle. In isolated exchange it was a range for Feebler from 124 to $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Now the range is down to $77\frac{1}{2}$ to $76\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Competition has "disciplined" the possible price within a much smaller fence.

So much for one-sided competition* among our strong men. Let us reverse the situation and consider one-sided competition among our weak men.

3. One-Sided Competition; Four Weak Men And One Strong Man

In this situation we have our original Strongman but four Feeblers. In addition to the original Feebler we have Feebler-A, Feebler-B and Feebler-C. Let us again consider the two kinds of cases: (1) where the four Feeblers are equally equal and (2) where the four Feeblers, although unequally unequal, are nevertheless all "weak" men.

1. *Four equally equal Feeblers and one Strongman:* Again this is an improbable (in fact impossible) assumption, but we shall make it again in order to clarify the principle.

It may be thought that the four Feeblers will be a good match for the lone Strongman and that they will be able to drive a better bargain than if the ratio of men were different; but that is not the

*Acute readers will realize that there will be some "trading" and "cooperation" between the unequally unequal three, Strongman-A, Strongman-B, and Strongman-C. This will in fact, affect the whole computation but for simplicity sake that is here being ignored.

case. Strongman will find himself in a most excellent trading position, and, as in the case of Feebler before him, will take full advantage of it.

The four Feeblers can do *nothing* for each other. They are equally equal. They cannot profitably "associate together." Cooperation *between them* is perfectly sterile.

The only cooperation possible of any one of the Feeblers is with Strongman. There is considerable at stake for each of these Feeblers. Whichever one is fortunate enough to make a deal with Strongman can really do himself some good. The minimum benefit to a Feebler is 124 hours (a one hour saving) and the maximum benefit is 76½ hours (47½ hour saving). None of the Feeblers will be reconciled not to make the most saving that he can.

One of the Feeblers will begin the bidding by offering Strongman a saving of one hour from his solo time of 50 hours to 49 hours. Suppose Feebler-C starts off that way. Then Feebler-B betters the offer to Strongman to 48 hours. Of course, all the Feeblers will outbid each other as long as there is a potential advantage to them. Finally, one of them bids Strongman that he needs to work only 31½ hours. That will leave 124 hours to the Feebler making that bid; see Table 20.

But here the bidding ends. The other Feeblers pick up their saws, hammer and nails and leave in order to build their own houses alone. It will cost each of them 125 hours, which may be compared with 124 hours for the successful bidder cooperating with Strongman.

Again, it is obvious that *being different* rather than being identical is a very profitable thing for any man in society. And, as has been shown earlier, it is also a very profitable thing for society. The preoccupation of uplifters, of do-gooders, of theorists, of *agape* cult members, of politicians and of demagogues about equalizing men, i.e., about egalitarianism, is a preposterous miscalculation. It is not equality that society needs for its existence, but inequality.

2. *Four Unequally Unequal Weak Men and one Strongman*: We come to the probable case, namely, four Feeblers, all weak, but of different degrees of weakness. Their "weaknesses" are assumed to be as follows:

	<i>Per Hour</i>	
	<u>Sawing</u>	<u>Nailing</u>
Feebler	25	200
Feebler-A	30	210
Feebler-B	35	220
Feebler-C	40	230

Strongman, we assume, remains on his original basis — he can saw 100 logs an hour and pound 300 nails.

These four men, under our new assumptions, will compete to cooperate with Strongman. By computations identical with those earlier, the result of competitive bidding is as follows:

(a) Feebler-C has reached his limit when he has offered to Strongman only 36 hours work. Feebler-C can go no further because he has sacrificed all his savings from cooperation and must work 124 hours himself under this offer, only one hour less than doing it entirely alone.

(b) Feebler-B, similarly, drops out of the bidding at 34.7 hours for Strongman.

(c) Feebler-A has reached his limit at 33.1 hours for Strongman, and

(d) Finally, Feebler, our original, will better the Feebler-A bid, say, by being prepared to go to 33 hours.

That 33 hours is the best deal Feebler can make for himself; the other Feeblers have frustrated him from making a better deal than that. The worst to which he will go will be $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours (see Table 20).

At what number of hours between 33 and $31\frac{1}{2}$ Feebler and Strongman will reach an agreement depends on their bargaining skill.

Again, the *different* man has been the one who could make a good deal; in this case it was Strongman.* In the previous section it was Feebler.

Note that the range of the possible deal has again been narrowed by competition. Now it is between 33 and $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours for Strongman. Previously, under *isolated* exchange (Table 20) it was

*See previous footnote on page 250.

49 to 31½. The competition of the Feeblers has helped Strongman, not hurt him. Paradoxically, *competition always helps the other man. That is the brotherly love so few people realize that exists in fact in competition.*

Finally, we come to the kind of situation that genuinely is in accord with real life, namely, the determination of the basis of the exchange in real life under full two-sided competition — many differing Strongmen and many differing Feeblers.

(To be continued)

What Is Brotherly Love? Charity Only!

Apparent Ignorance Of Ricardo's Law Of Association

During a life now well past its zenith we have never heard a Calvinist scholar (whether sociologist, political scientist, theologian, economist or historian) mention Ricardo's Law of Association as an explanation of what "holds society together." We consider it strange that what does more than anything else to explain the cohesiveness of society has not been mentioned in any Christian literature that has come to our attention.

What explanation is to be given for that? Is the silence about Ricardo's law a *tacit* denial that it helps hold society together? We doubt it.

Our explanation is that there is practically universal ignorance about this significant, determinative law. Although there may be instances where that law is known to be applicable to international trade (the field for which Ricardo especially worked out his law), it apparently has not been understood as a universal principle controlling *all* human association.

This law which bears Ricardo's name is obviously in harmony with ancient Hebrew-Christian thinking. It is not contrary to nor neutral to Hebrew-Christian ethics; it is a perfect, *rational* formulation of what was delivered as long ago as the time of Moses (1400 B.C.).

Assumptions Underlying Ricardo's Law

Ricardo's law is based on two principles of Hebrew-Christian ethics, to wit, (1) *self-love* and (2) *liberty of the neighbor*.

Altruism—the love of others—is irrelevant to Ricardo's law. The opposite of altruism is self-love—action based on what is good for the self. This harmonizes with what is involved in the well-known rule, Thou shalt love . . . *thyself*—which is an elliptical form of the expression, Thou shalt love thy neighbor *as thyself*. If you do not love yourself, your ethics are not Biblical.

To those who recoil from that plain teaching, we address a question: Why? Do you recoil because you do not believe it is moral to love yourself, or *are you injecting a foreign idea into the situation*; are you *assuming* that to love yourself means that you will injure your neighbor, by violence, theft, fraud?

If that is the case, then the answer is easy: Ricardo's law assumes each party to an "association" is *free* to participate or to refuse. What does that mean? Clearly, it means that there can be no coercion of the neighbor (nor theft nor fraud for that matter) because that is what freedom of the neighbor is—to be noncoerced. When Scripture says, Thou shalt not kill, that means Thou shalt not coerce; and that can be put in positive form, as distinguished from negative, by saying, *Thou shalt leave other people free to follow their own self-interests*. This is the Sixth Commandment in positive rather than in negative formulation.

Attention should be directed to an important error which results from ignorance of Ricardo's Law of Association—namely, that brotherly love is, consequently, defined as being limited to mere *charity*. When that happens—when brotherly love is identified with charity *only*—then the *whole* view of interpersonal relations is slanted, dangerous and un-Biblical.

(1) If self-love is valid, which it is; (2) if self-love is properly a standard for conduct toward the neighbor, which it is, (as indicated by, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as [thou lovest] thyself; (3) if self-love can be manifested in no other way than by each person following his own choices, which Moses's law prescribes; (4) if, consequently, we cannot show love to our neighbor unless we grant him equal liberty to follow his choices, as we should; (5) if, therefore, their freedom is an essential ingredient in our loving our neighbors, which it should be; and (6) if it can be shown mathematically that when men divide

tasks, one specializing on one task and another on another task, that *then* there are great benefits in productivity and welfare, which definitely is the situation, then (7) *why should we not honestly admit that self-love and genuine liberty do more to hold society together than do altruism or the strong arm of the state?*

To dispute that is to dispute the obvious.

Thomas a Kempis's Pessimism On Real Progress

One of the famous medieval ecclesiastics, Thomas a Kempis (1380-1471), lived in a monastery at Mount St. Agnes near Zwolle, The Netherlands.

Recently when examining family graves on the old monastery grounds at Mount St. Agnes I was reminded of a Meditation, about periodic resolutions, by Thomas a Kempis in his famous book, *The Imitation of Christ*. Kempis wrote that (1) if on every resolution we made, (2) if we really lived up to that resolution and if really *completely and permanently* rid ourselves of that sin, then (3) we would be making some real progress. How right he was about the gains that would accrue from thoroughly liquidating a sin rather than never perfectly getting rid of it!

Similarly, we think how wonderful it would be if people would *completely and permanently* get rid of the idea that intrinsically self-love and all gratification of self-love is sin. They may in more lucid moments realize that self-love is not sin, and that it is in fact a great virtue, but they "fall from grace" in regard to this insight. A day or two later they talk sanctimoniously again as if self-love were sin! They have made no more progress than the man making New Year resolutions (about whom Thomas a Kempis wrote) who never really *liquidated* his inclination to even one specific sin.

It is not self-love that is sin, nor the gratification of a need, but improper methods of gratifying a need—the methods of coercion, adultery, theft, fraud and covetousness.

On Many Friends, a la Schopenhauer

"Nothing betrays less knowledge of humanity than to suppose that, if a man has a great many friends, it is a proof of merit and intrinsic value: as though men gave their friendship

according to value and merit! as though they were not, rather, just like dogs, which love the person that pats them and gives them bits of meat, and never trouble themselves about anything else! The man who understands how to pat his fellows best, though they be the nastiest brutes,—that's the man who has many friends.

"It is the converse that is true. Men of great intellectual worth, or, still more, men of genius, can have only very few friends; for their clear eye soon discovers all defects, and their sense of rectitude is always being outraged afresh by the extent and the horror of them. It is only extreme necessity that can compel such men not to betray their feelings, or even to stroke the defects as if they were beautiful additions. Personal love (for we are not speaking of the reverence which is gained by authority) cannot be won by a man of genius, unless the gods have endowed him with an indestructible cheerfulness of temper, a glance that makes the world look beautiful, or unless he has succeeded by degrees in taking men exactly as they are; that is to say, in making a fool of the fools, as is right and proper. On the heights we must expect to be solitary." [Arthur Schopenhauer, *The Art of Controversy*, pp. 72, 73 (Book IV in *Complete Essays of Schopenhauer*, T. Bailey Saunders translation, Willey Book Company, New York, 1942.)]

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