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Orientation

This issue is the second of a series on the relation of *government and politics* to Biblical principles of morality.

We are using as a starting point the ideas of John C. Calhoun, in his lifetime Senator, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Vice-President of the United States. We consider him to be one of the great American thinkers on questions of government and politics, and a man whose ideas were essentially "Calvinistic." (Personally, Calhoun was not an orthodox Calvinist.)

The United States today, as the world's most powerful nation, has begun to "export" a foreign policy presumably based on "American" political ideas. But the ideas we are exporting are not in general Calhoun's political ideas, but those which he opposed.

Unless there is a rediscovery of Calhoun's ideas, there is no good future for any minority group in the United States or elsewhere. If there is no reversal in popular and judicial thinking, the *minorities here and all over the world are destined* for liquidation.

No writer, to our knowledge, sounds so convincing and so ear-piercing a note of warning as Calhoun on the danger of tyranny by "democracy." Calhoun's ideas are of more significance today than at any time since he wrote them.

Calhoun's fundamental and systematic thoughts on government are presented in a book (or booklet) of some 80 pages, entitled *A Disquisition on Government*. We quoted in the November issue from that treatise. We are offering to readers who subscribe now for 1959 a FREE paperbound copy of *A Disquisition on Government*. Because we shall be making extensive references to Calhoun's treatise, readers should have a copy available.

Problems of government are exceptionally controversial. Some of Calhoun's ideas — not all of them — are in the area where it appears impossible for finite minds to state a principle which undoubtedly is universally applicable. Although profound admirers of Calhoun, we shall not ignore these difficulties; rather, we shall emphasize them. If and when we have a different answer, that does not detract from our very great indebtedness for essential aid from the rugged ideas of Calhoun himself. Calhoun was a fertilizing thinker. We are permanently his debtor. We are "working over" the ideas of the great South Carolinian so that readers can do their own thinking on fundamental questions of government.

Calhoun As A Statesman

It is a hallmark of a statesman to *lead* public opinion. It is a hallmark of a politician to *follow* or to *manipulate* public opinion. Calhoun wrote:

I never know what South Carolina thinks of a measure. I never consult her. I act to the best of my conscience. If she approves, well and good. If she does not, or wishes someone else to take my place, I am ready to vacate.

Calhoun's idea was that it is a mistake to cater to the people. He said:

Democracy, as I understand it and accept it, requires me to sacrifice myself *for* the masses, not *to* them. Who

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knows not that if you would save the people, you must often oppose them?

Calhoun obviously was no demagogue; he was not the type which would have been interested in "opinion polls"; clearly he intended to do what was right, as he saw it. He was a born leader of opinion; not a follower. He boldly declared that he was doing his own thinking.

"Not Fit To Associate With Gentlemen"

William A. Seward was one of the founders of the Republican Party. He was the leading contender for the nomination for the presidency against Lincoln in 1860. Lincoln appointed Seward to be his Secretary of State.

Earlier (in 1850) Seward and Calhoun were fellow Senators. Seward declared in a speech that there was a "higher power" than the Constitution, which should decide the slavery question. Calhoun's bitter comment on that was, "With his ideas, he is not fit to associate with gentlemen."

Calhoun was wrong about that. It may be granted that the Constitution and not any other document was and is the basic law of the United States, and that *legally* there was and is no appeal beyond the Constitution. To do something not authorized by the Constitution requires that the Constitution be amended *first*. That is the right procedure.

But the Constitution is not the *ultimate* moral standard or "highest power."

We believe with Seward that there is a "higher [moral] power" than the Constitution. The higher moral authority which we acknowledge is the Decalogue of Moses, which in previous issues we have described as "the constitution of constitutions." Calhoun, we believe, with singular clearness recognized that ultimate moral standard (for *public* as well as *private* affairs) better than any other political writer, except that he had a blind spot on the slavery question. This latter is the oil stain on his great name.

It will be shown later that Calhoun relied, for the defense of freedom, on a compact or agreement formalized (in a constitution), which was founded on legitimate, defensive self-interest. More is required than that, namely, the *general* acknowledgment that the famous laws of Moses are *universally* binding, under all circumstances, in all ages, in all locations.

Calhoun's Awareness Where "Sin" Begins

Where does "sin" begin? Is it "sin" to be as we are created? Does sin originate in the needs of life, or does it begin later during the process of fulfilling the needs of life? Are the "natural" motivations of life sinful, or are only the improper means to satisfy those motivations sinful? These are obviously important questions of moral theory and moral philosophy.

One of the merits of Calhoun as a political and moral thinker is that he does not call "sin" what is not sin, but that he nevertheless clearly shows how sin becomes so general. There is, in this respect, a singular balance in Calhoun's thinking.

To show this we shall repeat extracts from Calhoun's *A Disquisition on Government* already quoted in last month's issue. Calhoun's basic propositions about the nature of man are:

1. Men are essentially selfish (but Calhoun avoids the word *selfish*, as conveying a potentially-misunderstood meaning); his view is that men were *created* to have more interest in themselves than in others; they did not *fall* into that state, but were *created* that way, and are still that way;

2. Men's interests inevitably clash; Calhoun realizes that men are disposed to sacrifice purposes of others rather than their own purposes; and

3. Society is much better off with interests clashing because of selfishness, than it would be if interests clashed because of altruism, because clash there will be as a result of human judgment varying and men being free to act on their judgment. Calhoun accepts the necessity of this choice, and specifically chooses for the individual, because otherwise there would be "boundless . . . disorder" with everybody meddling with the affairs of others.

Here are extracts of quotations:

(1) . . . while man is created for the social state and is accordingly so formed as to feel what affects others as well as what affects himself, *he is*, at the same time, *so constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him directly than what affects him indirectly through others*, or, to express it differently, he is so constituted that *his direct*

or *individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings* (our italics).

(2) But that constitution of our nature which makes us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through others necessarily leads to conflict between individuals. Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others, and, where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own. And hence the tendency to a universal state of conflict between individual and individual, accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger, and revenge — followed by insolence, fraud, and cruelty — and, if not prevented by some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion destructive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained. This controlling power, wherever vested or by whomsoever exercised, is *Government*.

(3) . . . the stronger feeling or affection of individuals for themselves, combined with a feebler and subordinate feeling or affection for others, is [it should not be doubted] in beings of limited reason and faculties a constitution necessary to their preservation and existence . . . if their feelings and affections were stronger for others than for themselves or even as strong, the necessary result would seem to be that all individuality would be lost and boundless and remediless disorder and confusion would ensue. For each, at the same moment intensely participating in all the conflicting emotions of those around him, would, of course, forget himself and all that concerned him immediately, in his officious intermeddling with the affairs of all others, which, from his limited reason and faculties, he could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state of things would, as far as we can see, lead to endless disorder and confusion not less destructive to our race than a state of anarchy. It would, besides, be remediless — for government would be impossible or, if it could by possibility exist, its object would be reversed.

Selfishness would have to be encouraged, and benevolence discouraged. Individuals would have to be encouraged by rewards to become more selfish, and deterred by punishments from being too benevolent; and this, too, by a government administered by those who, on the supposition, would have the greatest aversion for selfishness and the highest admiration for benevolence.

These quotations, from early pages of Calhoun's *A Disquisition on Government*, were originally quoted in full in the November issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM, on pages 336, 338 and 340, which see.

In other language, these three propositions become simply: (1) self-interest and freedom to pursue the objects of self-interest are not in themselves wrong nor does it manifest depravity; (2) men are *by their very liberty* brought face to face with the problem of harmonizing their own interests and the interests of their neighbors; and (3) it is great good fortune that men who know so little and are certainly not omniscient are *by creation* minded to look out for themselves rather than to mess into the affairs of everybody else.

What might the contrary doctrines be? These: (1) that man was created to look out for his neighbor and not himself, but that he fell from altruism to individualism and that that was sin! (2) that there originally was no "conflict" possible between men; yes, they may have been created free, but the original creation was so wonderful that freedom nevertheless never permitted any conflict! and (3) that men (or at least some men, great moralists, or those who have seized, or those who were elected to, public office) being themselves unselfish, can direct how others are to sacrifice themselves for their neighbors; or the proposition might be, that everybody else knows so much better than an individual does himself, that they will all be managing everybody's affairs except their own, and that we ourselves shall be managing everybody else's affairs; in other words, two billion people will be regulating our lives, and we shall in turn, in company with 1,999,999,999 others, be determining the lives of everybody else!

Principles are always general. They do not permit exception. Moral principles have the same characteristic. Therefore, men must choose between:

Calhoun's Ideas	vs.	Opposing Ideas
1. self-interest		1. altruism
2. liberty		2. duty
3. collision of interests		3. passive obedience to others
4. a rule for resolving the collision of interests		4. chaos or tyranny

Calhoun chose the principles in the left-hand column. He unqualifiedly rejected *altruism*, which is what most people mean when they use the term, neighborly or brotherly love.

If *altruism* is the initial principle of human society, then liberty is replaced by duty. Liberty is literally obliterated by any acceptance of altruism as the basic principle of society.

If altruism and duty are the basic principles, then we have no option left beyond that, except to submit passively to other people "serving" us in all matters pertaining to ourselves. Actually they will not be serving us, but regulating us. But 1,999,999,999 people doing that will create chaos in our lives. Or, in any event, if order is to be re-established, it will be outside of our action; we shall be subject to what is really the tyranny of others. If altruism is the basic *diffused* principle, then the consequence is chaos; if altruism is the basic *centralized* principle, then the consequence is tyranny.

On the basis of Calhoun's analysis, altruism (what most people call brotherly love) is a great evil. Strangely, leading men in the Christian churches teach altruism as the essence of Christian ethics. They teach that a man is his "brother's keeper." The bond of society is charity, not cooperation! There is a world of difference between the principles of *charity* and of *cooperation*.

Calhoun's system — which is also the Biblical system — must have a corrective in it. He admits that liberty inescapably entails collisions of interest. That is merely a common observation; everybody knows it. It is here that morality and ethics, and right and wrong, begin. What has preceded pertains to the character of creation; what is done to "harmonize" conflicting interests constitutes questions of morality.

The great principle which Calhoun came to in answering the basic question was *noncoercion*. You might not, in Calhoun's system of thought, coerce your neighbor. Everything in his thought, and in the "organization" he wanted for society, was designed to

reduce the coercive factor. When *A*'s interests conflicted with *B*'s interests, the solution, according to this approach, required that neither *A* nor *B* coerced the other, but that they came to the "best" solution possible, namely, the one which involved the smallest concession *A* would make to bring *B* into cooperation with him (*A*), and the smallest concession *B* would make to bring *A* into cooperation with him (*B*). *A*, under this scheme, preferred to concede what he did concede, rather than to forego cooperating with *B*; *B*, in turn, preferred to concede what he did concede, rather than to forego cooperating with *A*. Calhoun wrote: "Our government is founded on freedom and hates coercion."

Calhoun was against coercion by kings, aristocrats, and also by men generally in a democracy. Coercion by a people's government was as obnoxious to him as coercion by a king or an aristocratic clique. The main burden of his thinking about how to organize a government was in regard to preventing a government from being coercive. An important phase of this part of Calhoun's thinking pertained to what he called "the concurrent majority." Those words designated a system designed to prevent men from injuring each other by coercion. We shall describe the idea of a "concurrent majority" later.

Calhoun's system is obviously Biblical. The Christian religion, historically, has taught (1) individualism, (2) liberty, (3) collision of interest, (4) and has pointed to the way to resolve that collision, namely, by five very simple rules: thou shalt not coerce (the Sixth Commandment); thou shalt not commit adultery, that is, rob the neighbor of his mate (the Seventh Commandment); thou shalt not steal (the Eighth Commandment); thou shalt not lie, that is, deceive the neighbor (Ninth Commandment); and thou shalt not covet, that is, poison your own soul, even though you do not act on the covetous thought (Tenth Commandment).

Where does Total Depravity (to use a Calvinist term) enter the picture? At the early point of self-interest? No. At the point of liberty? No. At the point of collision of interests? No. At the point of resolving the collision of interests? Yes. There is where total depravity in ethics occurs unless there is observance of the rules for resolving the collision of interests, according to the ageless precepts of Moses which have just been mentioned.

What Started Calhoun On His Basic Idea?

Opportunities for great deeds and heroic action are never distant. They are before us daily in the insignificant affairs of ordinary living. See the issues clearly at that humble point, and fight for them—and then what? You will find yourself in a great fight for great principles. Standing your ground on *one* issue, no matter how small, if it is a question of right and wrong, will result in more and more evil lining up against you, so that, unless you are courageous and wise, you may succumb. But in any event you will be in a great fight.

What was the question, or issue, or dispute which “sparked” Calhoun’s thinking on basic organization principles for society? A tariff question. That tariff question showed to Calhoun how it was possible to engage in an evil, or in our language to sin against the Tenth Commandment (Thou shalt not covet), and nevertheless *appear not to sin*. Calhoun saw through such skullduggery, and fought it as a moral and political evil.

The Tenth Commandment is considered by some to be a mere repetition of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Commandments, and really no more. One way to look at the commandment against coveting is that it forbids caressing evil in your mind but *without taking action*. This is itself a Gargantuan sin. It is valid to legislate *morally* against such a psychology.

But in a sense, the Tenth Commandment covers another colossal field. The Sixth through Ninth Commandments can be considered as restraining *individual* action. The Tenth can be looked upon as restraining *group* action. If you coerce your neighbor by individual violence, the “law” should and usually will punish you. But suppose as a voter you pass a law which permits you, together with others, to compel the neighbor to give you something which it would be wrong for you to coerce from him by personal violence. What was the situation? You *coveted*. You did not act yourself *individually*. You did not then, at least so it seems, violate the Sixth Commandment. You may think that you are not guilty at all. But you have simply used *legality* as a cover for your evil. You had two courses open to accomplish your evil: (1) direct action which would have put you in violation of the Sixth Commandment; or (2) no apparent action on your part, except you voted for a law, or you voted for a representative who

you expected would vote for a law, which took from *A*, *by law*, what you wanted but did not dare to take by individual violence. It only *seems* that you took no *action*. You may consider yourself free from violation of the Sixth Commandment, but Moses has nevertheless caught you in his dragnet, the Tenth Commandment. Although you did not act, or did not act directly, you are a gross sinner.

Calhoun's campaign against evil was in an important way a campaign against violations of the Tenth Commandment, that is, evils committed by *A* against *B* under forms of legality, but as if no wrong was being done. The sin in question was one that directly touched Calhoun, namely, robbed him. The thief was the North (the northern states of the United States). The method was the tariff against English manufactured products. Calhoun clearly saw through the disguise. He attacked it. The real situation can be easily described, to wit:

1. The South produced a surplus of raw cotton.
2. The raw cotton could be shipped to cotton mills either in New England in northeastern United States or across the Atlantic to old England.
3. Then to pay for the raw cotton, our New Englanders could ship the South various manufactured items, or the English in Europe could ship similar manufactured items.
4. For a given amount of raw cotton the British overseas were willing to ship back *more* manufactured merchandise, than New England could afford to ship back or was willing to ship back.
5. Therefore, the South wished to sell raw cotton to England and to buy English wares. The people in the northeastern part of the United States *coveted* the business. New England could have employed direct violence to compel the South to sell its raw cotton to the North (that is, New England). The "law" of course would not authorize that. In fact, there was a *better method* to accomplish the *same result*, namely, to rob the South under the form of legality.
6. That method consisted in "passing a law" which would put a "tariff" on British goods coming into the United States. That tariff would be a toll. If cotton was 10c a pound,

and if Northern yard goods made of cotton sold for 50c a yard, but British yard goods for 40c, then the way to stop the British goods from coming in would be to put a tariff of 15c a pound on British yard goods (or other wares). Then the price of British yard goods sold in the South would have to be 55c a yard, or 5c higher than Northern yard goods. And so the North would get the business. Here was no violence. Here was no sin! Everything was legal!

7. Who was hurt by this "legal" action? The South which paid 10c more for yard goods than was necessary. Who else? The Britishers who lost the business; (they would have to find something else to do, but it would be less lucrative than what they lost). And who would gain? The North, which was able to get business at 50c a yard, under the protection of a tariff of 15c a yard.

8. Who passed the law establishing the tariff? The *majority*, of course. Who was the majority? The North. Who were the minority? The South. What was the South entitled to do, in this situation? Nothing? Nullify? Rebel? Secede?

With this simple, graphic case before him, and as one of the victims because he was a cotton planter, Calhoun asked the *general* question: How *organize* in order to protect a minority, any minority, against coercion as has just been outlined? To that, his answer was, the "concurrent majority." The "concurrent majority" was a term Calhoun coined to contrast it with the "numerical majority." Obviously, the North had a numerical majority, and further, it was abusing the opportunity of power residing in the numerical majority. The idea of the "concurrent majority" consisted in the right of minorities to declare null and void laws made by the majority which had the effect of robbing or injuring the minority. The right of the "concurrent" majority was the right of a veto power, or as it became known, the right of nullification. Nullification is the right to resist legalized evil by declaring null and void what is a moral wrong by a majority against a minority. Consider the Amish case which was described in the November issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM.

Tariffs have only one *appearance* — to help somebody; in this case, the North. Tariffs have only one *reality* — to hurt somebody (under the *guise* of helping somebody); in this case, the South.

Calhoun was a powerful, metaphysical thinker but the origin of his ideas was the simple, practical matter just outlined. He protested against an injustice, as all good men should do.

For after all, theft is theft, whether it has been *legalized* or not.

* * *

"Free trade, Calhoun concluded, had its foundation in truth itself. Not only did it increase American prosperity. It held the nations together in concord. Severe penalties would follow a departure 'from its laws.'" [Margaret Coit, *John Calhoun, An American Portrait*, p. 348.]

* * *

"The protective tariff is a tax that interferes with production and trade. It aims to handicap foreign producers and favor certain domestic producers to the detriment of all domestic consumers. If the rates are high enough, competition from foreign made articles may be wholly denied, giving domestic producers a monopoly." [Hans Sennholz, *The Freeman*, Nov. 1958, p. 4.]

Should There Be A Right Of Self-Determination?

John W. Burgess in 1923, when Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Constitutional Law at Columbia University, published a book entitled *Recent Changes in American Constitutional Theory*, (Columbia University Press, New York). In this book (p. 2) he defines political science as follows:

. . . political science is a body of principles derived from the genius and historical development of the people subject to the given political system, and is presumed to be, and ought to be, the foundation of its constitutional law, through which it is expressed in the form of authoritative commands and prohibitions.

In the framework of the foregoing, (1) specific laws will depend on (2) constitutional law, and constitutional law, in turn, on (3) principles of political science. (One might go back further than Burgess does and make political science dependent, in its turn, on (4) principles of morality, and principles of morality on (5) the Law of God; and, in order to tie that in with "reason," finally to add that the Law of God is in harmony with (6) the phenomena known as Cause and Effect.)

Burgess then goes on to state six basic "axioms and customs in our political system which were most generally accepted as constituting the substance of our political science as understood at the close of the last century." These six axioms were:

(1) ". . . the principle of the widest possible scope for free action on the part of the individual and of strict limitation . . . upon the powers of government."

(2) ". . . sovereignty could not be an attribute of government in American political science, but of an organization of the state nearer to the people than government. This doctrine has been expressed under the formula that government in the United States of America 'is a government of laws not of men.'"

(3) The doctrine of local self-government, by which is meant "that doctrine of sovereign power . . . which . . . distributes the powers of government in detail between general and local government; and [does] so, secondly, on the basis of two most important considerations, the one being the requirement that local government shall have the maximum of powers which it is capable of exercising, and the other that it shall be the recipient of the residuary powers, . . ."

(4) ". . . all governmental mandate and office are a public trust, to be exercised in strictest independence of all personal interests, prejudices or passions, for the maintenance of individual liberty, the preservation of the public order and the promotion of the general welfare." This differs from Europe which permits a "personal property . . . in governmental office or mandate."

(5) ". . . the proper boundaries of a sovereign state are those prescribed by physical geography, economic unity and ethnical solidarity, and, in case these elements do not fully coincide, the emphasis is to be placed in the order in which I have recited them." (We shall return to this item.)

(6) ". . . the sixth fundamental doctrine of the political science of the United States . . . [consists in avoiding] the entanglements of European politics . . . and . . . resistance to the interference of Europe or Asia in the politics of the American continents."

Such were the six policies which Burgess declared constituted the basic political science of the United States in the year 1900. His book develops the idea that those basic policies were breached

shortly thereafter, initially by the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. (That, however, was relatively insignificant compared with what has happened under the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thereafter, and what is still continuing.)

It is the fifth principle listed by Burgess to which we wish to give special attention. That fifth principle denies what is known today as the right of *the self-determination of people*. Practically every American theoretically subscribes today to the right of any people to "self-determine" to what government they will belong. This slogan "the right of self-determination" obtained extensive currency in the United States during and after World War I, when Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States. The international "settlements" after World War I were based on that principle. Especially, the people in the nations which had just been defeated in World War I were to decide on their respective governments by *plebiscites*. If they wanted to stay with another group they could so vote; if not, they could vote to be a separate group and a separate nation. By appeal to this principle, namely, the right to self-determination, the Austro-Hungarian empire was fragmented into Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

By affirming that this principle is sound and is a proper ground for appropriate action, the United States in recent years has been systematically weakening or helping destroy the ties that have bound the various European countries to their so-called colonies.

Because the United States today accepts the principle of "the right of self-determination" it is generally promoting the undermining of established political order. It has, for example, undermined the position of The Netherlands in Indonesia; of England in India and Egypt; of France in the Far East and the Near East, and is continuing to do it in North Africa; etc., etc.

But, curiously, in 1923 Burgess was writing that in 1900 the policy of the United States was the exact opposite, viz., the United States (so he wrote) did not believe then in "the right of self-determination" but instead that boundaries between government should be based on military, business and/or race-language considerations; his exact terms are "physical geography, economic unity and ethnical solidarity."

Do we, as a people in the United States, today really believe in the doctrine of "the self-determination of people" or in the

contrary doctrine outlined by Burgess, namely, that people belong together or should be under separate governments depending on whether there are no mountains, rivers or oceans dividing them; or because they do business together; or because they are of the same race and have the same language? Burgess says that it is not the inclinations of the people, but physical realities which should determine boundaries between nations and governments.

Americans may be disposed to differ with Burgess on this question. They will say that it is not the policy of the United States, or should not be its policy, to determine borders between nations on the objective bases of geography, economics and race, with (as Burgess says) weight given to each factor in the order mentioned. But is Burgess, who was a prominent figure in political science and jurisprudence in his day, to be declared, blandly, to have been mistaken? And where may Burgess have got his apparently "un-American" idea?

Burgess felt obliged to declare this principle because we had denied the right of self-determination to the South, and because in 1860-64 we had fought a bloody civil war to force the South to remain in the federal union. If the right of self-determination of people is a right which we are genuinely and honestly willing to accept, then the North was not justified in compelling the South to remain in the union.

Actually, in the United States, the history of thought on the right of self-determination has not been consistent. In the Revolutionary War we declared that *we* had the right of self-determination, namely, the right to separate from England. In the Civil War we declared exactly the opposite; although the United States was limited to being a federal union of *sovereign* states, we declared that no state or states might secede. Then, beginning with World War I, we reasserted the principle of the right of self-determination *for other people*; and since World War II we have been *undermining* the existing political structure of the world by insisting on its universal application. We would be consistent today only if we declared that we are now prepared to tolerate the secession, based on the right of self-determination, of any state of the United States by a simple plebiscite indicating that it wishes to secede.

There appears to be some hypocrisy and sanctimony involved in the contradiction between our own internal conduct and in our foreign policy. It is certain that if a section of our own nation today demanded the right of self-determination we would refuse it to them. But for the rest of the world we appear to be agitating to promote splintering the various communities into as many fragments as dissentient groups wish.

There is reason to believe that the northern states were indeed *exploiting* the southern states, in the first half of the nineteenth century, by the tariff policy which the North was able to vote into existence by reason of it having a *numerical* majority in congress. The evidence is, in fact, conclusive that the North was "robbing" the South, by the tariff the North put into operation. Probably, the South was exploited more by the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 than any colony today is being exploited by its mother country (excepting Russian exploitation). (The Brookings Institution in the 1940's published a book showing that the evidence was not available that Japan had exploited Korea, but that it had probably put more wealth into Korea than she (Japan) had taken out of Korea!)

Calhoun himself was no rash secessionist. He loved the federal union. But he was profoundly disturbed by the exploitation of the South by the North by means of the tariff. Rather than secession Calhoun favored nullification. South Carolina, in fact, passed an act nullifying the application of the Tariff of 1832 within the boundaries of the state of South Carolina. President Jackson in 1833 had the wisdom to recommend a reduction of the unfair and burdensome tariffs, and a reduction was made; then the Nullification Act was repealed by South Carolina.

But which side was right *in principle* — on one side (1) the thirteen original states in the Revolutionary War; (2) the Southern states in the tariff controversy; (3) John Calhoun; and (4) the people of the United States *today*, all of whom accepted (or still accept) the right of self-determination? or on the other side, was the North right in principle in the Civil War, and Lincoln, and Professor John W. Burgess, all of whom denied the right of self-determination?

Burgess quotes Lincoln in support of his Fifth principle. Burgess wrote (p. 7): "Lincoln, when the slave-holders claimed under the now so-called principle of 'the self-determination of

people' that they had the right to secede from the United States . . . said, 'Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them.'" (See Lincoln's *First Inaugural Address, Lincoln's Speeches*, selected and edited by G. Mercer Adam, A. L. Burt Company, New York.) Here is a plain statement that *physical geography* determines which people belong together; that at any rate is Burgess's interpretation. In his *second annual message to Congress* Lincoln reiterated his view: "A Nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people and its laws. The territory is the only part which is of a certain durability. It is of the first importance to duly consider and estimate this ever-enduring part;" this is also quoted from evidence submitted by Burgess.

The evidence is substantial that, confronted with a specific case, Lincoln repudiated the principle of "the right of self-determination." He declared in his First Inaugural Address: "Plainly, the central idea of *secession is the essence of anarchy.*" Burgess concludes: "In Lincoln's political philosophy, thus, the self-determination of peoples unsupported by the conditions of natural physical boundary is secession pure and simple, no matter with what rhetoric it may be presented, and our Civil War cast this doctrine out of our political science completely and forever."

Although Burgess makes that broad declaration, it is apparently an erroneous statement. It should read that the right of self-determination is forever (?) rejected for the United States *internally*, but is in contrast fully to be applied by us in our foreign policy wherever we can successfully intermeddle in the affairs of other people.

Obviously, the moral position of the United States on this question of the self-determination of people is seriously compromised. Our position has an element of falseness in it; of hypocrisy; of sanctimoniousness. We have one rule *internally*, and a contrary rule *externally*.

Summarizing, in order to designate one and the same idea two terms are being used, namely, the term "the right of self-determination" and "secession." The first term sounds noble and fine; the second sounds dangerous and dubious. There is a very small difference between the two, to wit, the first term, "the right of self-

determination" is broader than "secession"; *secession* is merely one privilege under the "right of self-determination." A people, for example, might decide not to secede. They would also be exercising the right of self-determination when they made that decision.

Should we not challenge the foreign policy of the United States when it stands for the "right of self-determination," a right which Lincoln called the "essence of anarchy"?

Two of the greatest men whom the United States has produced are Calhoun and Lincoln. Both were rigorous and sagacious reasoners. On the question of "the right of self-determination" (or in a specific case, of secession) they disagreed or seemed to disagree. In later issues we shall endeavor to analyze the merits of their relative positions. Let every man make his own choice; but whatever choice it is, it will be momentous for the remainder of his political science.

Lamponing Calvinism — Holmes' "The Deacon's Masterpiece"

This article and the two which follow are related. They constitute a closing attempt to give a perspective on the novel doctrine of Common Grace.

Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-1894), well known American writer of prose and poetry, was born and lived in New England, the old territory of the Puritan Calvinists.

Holmes wrote a poem entitled, "The Deacon's Masterpiece" or "The Wonderful 'One-Hoss Shay.'" It has a subtitle "A Logical Story." "Hoss" is obviously a Yankeeism for horse; and "shay" is also a lamponing kind of word, as it is a corruption of *chaise*. A *chaise* is a two-wheeled, one-horse vehicle for two persons.

The butt of Holmes' humor in this case is Calvinism. His poem follows:

The Deacon's Masterpiece, or The Wonderful "One-Hoss Shay," A Logical Story

Have you heard of the wonderful one-hoss shay,
That was built in such a logical way
It ran a hundred years to a day,
And then, of a sudden, it — ah, but stay,
I'll tell you what happened without delay,
Scaring the parson into fits,

Frightening people out of their wits, —
Have you ever heard of that, I say?

Seventeen hundred and fifty-five.

Georgius Secundus was then alive, —
Snuffy old drone from the German hive.

That was the year when Lisbon-town
Saw the earth open and gulp her down,
And Braddock's army was done so brown,
Left without a scalp to its crown.

It was on the terrible Earthquake-day
That the Deacon finished the one-hoss shay.

Now in the building of chaises, I tell you what,
There is always *somewhere* a weakest spot, —
In hub, tire, felloe, in spring or thill,
In panel, or crossbar, or floor, or sill,
In screw, bolt, thoroughbrace, — lurking still,
Find it somewhere you must and will, —
Above or below, or within or without, —
And that's the reason, beyond a doubt,
That the chaise *breaks down*, but doesn't *wear out*.

But the Deacon swore, (as Deacons do,
With an "I dew vum," or an "I tell *yeou*")
He would build one shay to beat the taown
'N' the keounty 'n' all the kentry braoun';
It should be so built that it *couldn'* break daown:
— "Fur," said the Deacon, "'t's mighty plain
That the weakest' place mus' stan' the strain;
'N' the way t' fix it, uz I maintain,
Is only jest
T' make that place uz strong as the rest."

So the Deacon inquired of the village folk
Where he could find the strongest oak,
That couldn't be split nor bent nor broke, —
That was for spokes and floor and sills;
He sent for lancewood to make the thills;
The crossbars were ash, from the straightest trees,
The panels of whitewood, that cuts like cheese,
But lasts like iron for things like these;
The hubs of logs from the "Settler's ellum," —
Last of its timber, — they couldn't sell 'em,
Never an axe had seen their chips,
And the wedges flew from between their lips,
Their blunt ends fizzled like celery-tips;
Step and prop-iron, bolt and screw,
Spring, tire, axle, and linchpin too,
Steel of the finest, bright and blue;
Thoroughbrace bison-skin, thick and wide;
Boot, top, dasher, from tough old hide
Found in the pit when the tanner died.
That was the way he "put her through." —
"There!" said the Deacon, "naow she'll dew!"

Do! I tell you, I rather guess
 She was a wonder, and nothing less!
 Colts grew horses, beards turned gray,
 Deacon and deaconess dropped away,
 Children and grandchildren — where were they?
 But there stood the stout old one-hoss shay
 As fresh as on Lisbon-earthquake-day!

EIGHTEEN HUNDRED; — it came and found
 The Deacon's masterpiece strong and sound.
 Eighteen hundred increased by ten; —
 "Hahnsum kerridge" they called it then.
 Eighteen hundred and twenty came; —
 Running as usual; much the same.
 Thirty and forty at last arrive,
 And then come fifty, and FIFTY-FIVE.

Little of all we value here
 Wakes on the morn of its hundredth year
 Without both feeling and looking queer.
 In fact, there's nothing that keeps its youth,
 So far as I know, but a tree and truth.
 (This is a moral that runs at large;
 Take it. — You're welcome. — No extra charge.)

FIRST OF NOVEMBER, — the Earthquake day —
 There are traces of age in the one-hoss shay,
 A general flavor of mild decay,
 But nothing local, as one may say,
 There couldn't be, — for the Deacon's art
 Had made it so like in every part
 That there wasn't a chance for one to start.
 For the wheels were just as strong as the thills,
 And the floor was just as strong as the sills,
 And the panels just as strong as the floor,
 And the whipple-tree neither less nor more,
 And the back-crossbar as strong as the fore,
 And spring and axle and hub *encore*.
 And yet, *as a whole*, it is past a doubt
 In another hour it will be *worn out!*

First of November, 'Fifty-five!
 This morning the parson takes a drive.
 Now, small boys, get out of the way!
 Here comes the wonderful one-hoss shay,
 Drawn by a rat-tailed, ewe-necked bay.
 "Huddup!" said the parson. — Off went they.
 The parson was working his Sunday's text, —
 Had got to *fifthly*, and stopped perplexed
 At what the — Moses — was coming next.
 All at once the horse stood still,
 Close by the meet'n'-house on the hill.
 — First a shiver, and then a thrill,
 Then something decidedly like a spill, —
 And the parson was sitting upon a rock,

At half-past nine by the meet'n'-house clock, —
 Just the hour of the Earthquake shock!
 — What do you think the parson found,
 When he got up and stared around?
 The poor old chaise in a heap or mound,
 As if it had been to the mill and ground!
 You see, of course, if you're not a dunce,
 How it went to pieces all at once, —
 All at once, and nothing first, —
 Just as bubbles do when they burst.

End of the wonderful one-hoss shay.
 Logic is logic. That's all I say.

Note the references to the deacon, the parson, the meeting-house (church) on the hill. These direct attention to the idea that the poem refers to religion.

Note also the last line, "logic is logic," referring apparently to something in religion which is, or which is alleged by religion to be, logic.

Note further the alleged *quality* of the material which went into the chaise. Note that it held together marvelously for exactly one hundred years. Note its peculiar end — it suddenly and completely collapsed into a heap of dust; everything failed *at the same second*. Here apparently there must be a reference to a logic that is all right in perpetuity (apparently designated by the one hundred years), but there is something that can do something to the "logic" and then the whole system collapses. There is nothing left.

The *shay* is (we are told) Calvinism. The perfectly adjusted parts are:

1. The sovereignty of God, and
2. The responsibility of man.

These two ideas constitute the foundation stones of Calvinism. But those two ideas are logically contradictory, that is, they are antinomies; if God is sovereign, that is, if He regulates everything, then men cannot logically be held responsible. But if men are responsible, are "free agents," can do what they please and can control their destiny, then God is no longer sovereign, because men are independent. And so, the acceptance of those two contradictions — these antinomies — involves a major logical problem.

Traditional Calvinism has boldly accepted the contradictions. It freely admits it cannot reconcile them. It can have no God

worth mentioning if He is not sovereign. It can have no men who are moral beings if they are not responsible.

Accept the antinomy and proceed from there. Then what do you get? A beautiful system — a perfect chaise, a carriage that will run forever. Everything can be "rational." Grant the first basic "inconsistency," and for the rest you can have a reasonable and sensible system. Men and generations go, but Calvinism, the system of thought based on the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man, will survive.

Now refuse to accept the contradiction. Refuse to grant the *simultaneous* existence of the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man, and then what? Holmes' answer is that the whole system of Calvinism collapses suddenly and completely in a heap of dust, "As if it had been to the mill and ground."

There are various kinds of Calvinists. (1) A few stress strongly the sovereignty of God, but are not happy with the idea of the responsibility of man. (2) Many stress strongly the responsibility of man, but they are not happy about predestination and reprobation (two cardinal doctrines based on the sovereignty of God). (3) Some keep fast hold of both doctrines; they are happy to accept the antinomy, the contradiction; they are genuinely happy about *both* the sovereignty of God *and* the responsibility of man. It is the ideas of this third class, which are like the deacon's shay; they last forever (for the 100 years designating perpetuity).

PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM belongs to the third group.

However, having accepted these two propositions, constituting an inescapable antinomy, we are not prepared to accept every additional antinomy with which modern Calvinism may have burdened itself — for example, (1) the social gospel doctrine of *agape* (unmotivated love) and the antinomy between that idea and the idea of man's individual moral responsibility; or (2) the antinomy between obeying those in authority versus obeying the Law of God; or (3) the antinomy that God loves and hates the reprobate simultaneously.

Supplement

The following is taken from the "Critical Comments" on page 669 of Percy H. Boynton's *American Poetry*, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1918). This explanation differs somewhat from the preceding explanations.

The best and most famous example of all the satires is "The Deacon's Masterpiece or, The Wonderful 'One-Hoss Shay,' a Logical Story." Holmes had been brought up under the austerities of Calvinistic theology. It was a creed derived not from the consciousness of God as he was daily revealed in nature and mankind, but from the interpretations put upon the Scriptures by a grim sect of theologians. They assumed that through the sin of Adam—one recalls no mention of Eve—all mankind had incurred the eternal wrath of God; that the intervention of the Mediator had earned for certain of the Elect an immunity from future punishment; but that these happy few had been elected, not on account of any desert of their own, for they deserved nothing, but by the arbitrary exercise of God's will. Starting from these assumptions, the Calvinistic preachers of New England composed sermons in such a logical way that there was no escape from their awful conclusions. So it happened that with the revolt of the 19th century the creed broke down, though it couldn't wear out. This gives the whole point to the emphasis upon logic, the truth, the parson, the sermon, and the collapse in front of the "meet'n'-house."

Calvinist Predestination And Mohammedan Fatalism

Predestination is the distinctive doctrine of that branch of the Christian religion known as Calvinism. Predestination has two phases, one luminous as the sun and the other black as the night. The first is the doctrine of election to salvation; the second is the doctrine of reprobation to perdition.

Those who are hostile to any doctrine of predestination, or who are at least unwilling to emphasize the doctrine of predestination, sometimes declare that John Calvin was a product of that contributory stream of medieval thought which sprang from two Moorish philosophers who were Mohammedan fatalists, Avicenna (980-1037) and Averroes (1126-1199). We are not qualified historians of the thought of the scholastic era, and have no opinion on the truth or untruth of the allegation that any acceptance of predestination in Roman Catholic thought, and its strong emphasis in Calvinist thought, is simply an off-shoot of Mohammedan fatalism (of which possible origin those who profess belief in predestination may not be aware).

Rafael Sabatini, the historical novelist, wrote a novel of adventure, entitled *The Sea Hawk*, the story of an English gentleman kidnapped from his Cornish home, shipwrecked, made galley-slave, but who escaped and eventually temporarily became an Algerian

pirate *and a Mohammedan*. He acquired the Algerian name, equivalent to our *Sea Hawk*.

This renegade Christian, admonished about his proposal for further desperate action which might damn his character and soul still more, seeking to justify his proposed conduct by an appeal to predestination or to Mohammedan fatalism, whatever you may wish to call it, gave this answer:

I have but fulfilled the destiny which in His Omniscience Allah [God] has marked out for me. . . . My life has been as He designed it, since naught may exist or happen save by His Will. Shall I then fear damnation for having been as God fashioned me? [Rafael Sabatini, *The Sea-Hawk*, p. 333, Grossett and Dunlap, New York.]

Distinctions regarding the differences between Mohammedan fatalism and Calvinist predestination are outside the scope of this publication, but the fallacy in this statement will be apparent to any good Calvinist.

It is easy, by being careless in regard to problems which arise because of belief in predestination, to fall into logical difficulties of a serious or even ludicrous kind.

A Self-Imposed Logical Difficulty, A Cul de Sac

If something illogical (but maybe unnecessarily so) is accepted by intelligent people there must be an explanation, difficult as it may be to find it.

The denomination to which the writer belongs accepts a doctrine of so-called "common grace" which teaches what appears to be an absurdity, namely, that God *simultaneously* loves and hates the reprobate. (A reprobate in Calvinist theological terms is some one not selected by God for salvation but destined for damnation.) How could sensible people have been induced to accept such a doctrine? Suppose a man vigorously told his wife *simultaneously*: "I love-hate you, or I hate-love you" and that the wife had reason to fear that, despite the contradictory statement, her husband had a general plan which involved her eventual destruction. Would she believe the whole statement, or only the part, "I hate you"?

That is the problem in the dogma of predestination, which is

the cardinal tenet of Calvinism. Predestination, according to Calvinist dogma, has two phases: (1) the election of the saved; and (2) the reprobation of the lost. The election of the saved does not cause too great logical difficulties; it can, in a sense, be defended with some success. But the reprobation of the lost can put Calvinist doctrine in a very difficult position. Here for example is a man who has been predestined to be lost — to be reprobated; according to human logic God cannot love him, because of the end destined for him. But then the question arises, how can that be reconciled with God's love, and his alleged *general* offer of salvation in the preaching of the gospel? Either that general offer does not exist and God only hates the reprobate; or else God loves and hates simultaneously. And so some Calvinists have come to the doctrine of common grace, that is, God loves and hates the reprobate *simultaneously*. Who, intentionally or unintentionally, ran them into that apparently nonsensible trap, or *cul de sac*?

In the early 1920's a brilliant young preacher in the denomination unflinchingly taught that God loves the elect *and hates the reprobate*. This is indeed taught in the *Canons of Dort*, one of the "standards" of the denomination. It should be noted, however, that although the Canons teach that, they also warn against the *fixation* of attention on the doctrine of predestination, because of the confusion and disquiet which that may cause. The candid preaching of this young preacher about reprobation brought about (1) the formulation of the amazing doctrine of God's simultaneous love and hate, and (2) his excommunication and that of his associates. He lost; the denomination won!

But such a victory is a Pyrrhic victory. A few more like that, and the denomination will be saddled with logical antinomies which will make it a subject of amusement.

In contrast, what *logical* position might the denomination have taken? (Grant that a firm grip on the grim Calvinist doctrine of predestination had already been lost, what might have been salvaged without being nonsensical?) Was it inescapably *necessary* (in order to "protect" the reputation of God) to say that although He hated He also loved, and thereby to be committed to the proposition that He loved and hated one and the same person *simultaneously*?

It is one thing to accept the Calvinist antinomy (an unfath-

omable inconsistency) of the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man, which cannot be reconciled,* but shall we proceed from antinomies to irrationalities and declare that *God is inconsistent with himself*—loving and hating *simultaneously*? This is driving Calvinism into a logical *cul-de-sac* with a vengeance.

Behind that answer there lies unfortunately a primitive cosmology or conception of the way that the world is organized. That primitiveness has sucked the denomination into a logical sack. The denomination appears to have accepted the premise that the world is organized on two contrary principles—good and evil, like the old Zoroastrian principle. The evil is sin, and the good is grace. There is nothing that equates between them. There is an endless battle between sin and grace. Those are the *only* two realities. When you look through the lens on the left eye, you see *sin*; when you look through the lens on the right eye, you see *grace*. You never see with either lens an *ordered* society; you never see legitimate self-preservation or profitable division of activity;** those two things were apparently never realized to be able to hold society together. Instead of an act of creation being adequate to hold society together, it was assumed that only grace can restrain and inhibit the effects of sin; nothing, it was assumed, in the structure itself could frustrate sin; there was no automatic corrective built into the system. In short, the unstated cosmological assumption consisted in the idea that creation was not an un-wreckable job; it would not hold together, unless God works—by grace—continuously and hard at salvaging it, as a shipwrecked sailor bailing water out of his lifeboat.

If the denomination had understood *how* the world had been created (or organized) namely, that a law governing human relationships (which carries the name of Ricardo's Law of Association) showed clearly that continuous grace, as the opposite of continuous sin, was not necessary in order to sustain society, but that two ingredients which God put into creation (self-preservation and unequal inequality) would make society hold together without *continuous* grace, then the acts of predestination and creation could play out their courses in time without it being necessary for God to love the reprobate continuously, just because, if He did not, the world would otherwise fall apart.

*But has a certain "high rationality."

**See July 1958 issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM, pp. 207ff.

In short, a defective doctrine of creation (of cosmology) has induced a denomination to teach a doctrine that might be described as being hideously illogical. Solutions of this kind bring religion into disrepute. What is needed is a sound cosmology and a supra-lapsarian view of predestination. Then religion and science are reconcilable.

Society is "held together" by the unchangeable characteristics implanted in it *by creation*. Any explanation that society is "held together" by Providence is ambiguous and really meaningless unless Providence is explicitly defined; but, of all possible explanations of what holds society together, the most superficial is common grace, the doctrine that God loves-hates the reprobate *simultaneously*.

The antinomy of the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man is an asset to Calvinism. But it can never be an asset to Calvinism to teach that God is inconsistent with Himself — loving and hating the reprobate *simultaneously*.

Final Summary Of Major Propositions Presented In Progressive Calvinism

Four years ago we chose the name, PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM.

In regard to the term, *Calvinism*: As a way of life, in the field of ethics, Calvinism flourished from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries in England, Scotland, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States. These are the centuries that cover what is known as the *industrial revolution*. Calvinists were in the forefront of that phenomena. Max Weber, the well-known sociologist, went so far as to ascribe the rise of the industrial revolution to the spirit of Calvinism. We have shown that what Weber quotes from sixteenth-century Calvinists as expressions of their basic life view *are identical with the views that have been outlined in PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM*. If the Calvinist leaders in the heyday of Calvinism were properly called Calvinists, then the ideas which we have presented — which are in perfect harmony — are also properly to be considered truly Calvinistic.

In four years no one has questioned our Calvinism. However, we have been dubbed, by some, as *reactionary* Calvinists. We are called reactionary by those who say that they themselves are Calvinists, but who repudiate and ridicule the basic ethical principles of the early Calvinists. These modern so-called "Calvinists" are

not entitled to the name of Calvinists, if the rule should be that the meaning of terms should not be reversed. It is they who, in the field of ethical ideas, are not *historical Calvinists*.

In regard to the term, *Progressive*: Many ideas accepted by present-day Calvinists have been challenged in PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM. The grounds for that are that the ideas were (1) exaggerated Biblical interpretation, or (2) unnecessarily inconsistent, and (3) that the advances in knowledge in the so-called social sciences, especially in the science of economics, threw new light on Biblical principles so that they have become more valuable for modern living.

(1) As an example of *exaggerated* Biblical interpretation, the modern doctrine of brotherly or neighborly love may be cited. This doctrine has been exaggerated in modern thinking to mean that we are our brother's keeper, that the basic motivation of men should be altruism, that *charity* is the great bond of society (not *cooperation*). These exaggerations, which are viewed as absurd by people who are realists, have been designated by the use of one of the Greek words for love, namely, *agape*. Most modern Protestantism holds more or less to an *agape* religion.

Declaring that the *agape* doctrines are absurd and sanctimonious, neighborly love has been defined in PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM as liberty allowed to every neighbor and to self, except for the limited restriction of not harming the neighbor; to that was added the requirement of Biblical charity; and further the two New Testament emphases were included (a) of genuine forbearance and forgiveness, and (b) the declaration of the gospel. This is simply the historical doctrine of *controlled individualism* versus *boundless altruism*.

(2) As an example of attention which has been given to doctrines which were *unnecessarily inconsistent* the prevailing doctrine concerning original man may be cited. Adam is ordinarily considered to have been living in perfectly ideal circumstances in the Garden of Eden. That is an obvious romantization of the actual Biblical record. Scripture makes inescapably clear that Adam from the beginning was poor, lived under adverse circumstances, and was not even a stone age man. This is not a new doctrine but as old as the Pentateuch. By unequivocally accepting that fact, a different cosmology regarding the character of creation has been outlined. This has stayed within the bounds set by the

fully tolerated supralapsarian view of creation and is in accordance with the nature of things. That permits the common sense doctrine that the Fall of Adam did not, for example, change the laws of gravity or the weather. The result is a cosmology comfortably related to common sense and modern science.

As another critical example of inconsistency or vacillation, we have given major attention to doctrines about the state (government). There is a lamentable inconsistency among Christians about whom to obey: God or men. There is an influential school which declares that we must obey the government as the representative of God; this is in fact the dominant school. We hold the contrary view, namely, that the revealed will of God must be obeyed, individual men, groups of men (unions), and government to the contrary notwithstanding. This is admitted to be a revolutionary (although ancient) principle. We have disputed that there is any pipe line of power from God to any man. We have denied that those in authority have any *charisma* direct from God. No government is legitimate which assumes more authority than an individual has or has had. Governments get a transferred authority; not a new authority. All legitimate governments derive their legitimacy from the Law of God and have no legitimacy when they violate the law of God. No government has legitimacy which does not tolerate opposition. Toleration of opposition is proof that there can be no *charisma* direct from God to governments.

(3) In PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM we have espoused capitalism, or more exactly *laissez-faire* capitalism. It is the *only* system that is consistent with Biblical ethics. We have not declared that no sins have been committed under *laissez-faire* capitalism; that would be absurd. We have asserted that the *principles* of *laissez-faire* capitalism, namely, (a) *liberty*, (b) but *no liberty to do wrong*; (c) plus *cooperation* are the basic principles for organizing society; those positive principles need to be supplemented by some charity which must be voluntary; and also, finally men have one unlimited obligation to each other (the only unlimited one) to "get each other's thinking straight on everything" by the "gospel" in the broadest sense, but especially in regard to a man's relation to his Creator. The foregoing ideas (except the gospel part) are known as *Individualism*.

The contrary ideas can be of one kind only, and have only one

correct designation, *Collectivism*. Collectivism is the principle underlying interventionism, socialism and communism. It is a hallucination to think that there is an intermediate system (interventionism or *dirigisme*) which has the merits of individualism and collectivism and none of the demerits of either.

The *principles* underlying society are not charity nor sentimental love, but *unequal inequality* (determined by creation) and the resulting benefits which are derived from *cooperation*, according to Ricardo's Law of Association. Inequality and cooperation constitute the major factors in brotherly love; charity is a supplement, albeit important.

In the field of economics we have shown that the *accumulation of capital per capita* is the *only basis* for a rising standard of living. The unions, for example, have contributed *nothing* to human prosperity because they have not contributed to the accumulation of capital; they have only influenced the direction in which the benefits from increasing capital are to be channelled — more leisure versus more income. Unions are the greatest iniquity in

(Continued on page 384)

The Last Issue Of Progressive Calvinism

This issue completes four years of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM. A total of 1,520 pages of material, on rather varied subjects, have been presented — especially in the fields of ethics and economics, with excursions into politics, theology, epistemology, psychology, cosmology.

Beginning January, 1959, the name of the publication will be changed to:

FIRST PRINCIPLES IN MORALITY AND ECONOMICS

*on which depend personal well-being, and
the general health and harmony of society.*

© Libertarian Press, 1959

The character of the publication will be changed so that it is properly addressed to the *general public* and not restricted to Protestants of Calvinist persuasion. There will be no change in ideas, except that sectarian doctrines will get less attention. However, the general method of presentation and the general emphasis

will be different, namely, the new publication will be more in the practical field of everyday living. The questions discussed will pertain to: what is right and what is wrong? What will promote genuine and abiding happiness? What will stimulate genuine cooperation and helpfulness among men? How love your neighbor *as yourself*—but no more (because to “love” him more than self is destructive of society)? How do what is called morality and what is called economics coincide, and why? What will promote the general health of society and improve individual well-being?

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(Continued from page 382)

America, being based essentially on violence or the threat of violence, a direct violation of the Sixth Commandment.

Further, we have shown that present-day capitalism harbors within itself a systematic iniquity, namely, a voluntary variation in the quantity of money. We have shown how that evil developed "naturally," causing the business cycle. We have declared that God is not mocked, and that His law against theft cannot be flouted (even when in a subtle form) without penalty. We have declared that modern capitalism's "sin will find it out."

In the field of epistemology we have followed the critical method of William of Occam (or Ockham), the famous medieval scholasticist, who ushered in the modern age. He reacted against words — words, *words*, WORDS — one piled on another. We react similarly to piling words on words without meaning or with obscure meaning; for example: *providence* piled on top of natural law and theistic government, and then *common grace* on top of providence. We have cited many other examples, and have challenged the whole mentality.

Such ideas and many others have been investigated. As business people outside the (in some respects) make-believe world of religion, we have observed that men will give lip service to irrational, unBiblical and unsound ideas, but fundamentally they reject matters on which religion is obviously wrong. Unless there is "rebirth" — a rediscovery of FIRST PRINCIPLES — Calvinism will not survive as a vital force in society.

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